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Abstract 
In this book, I defend the present-centered approach in historiography of science (i.e. 
study of the history of science), build an account for causal explanations in 
historiography of science, and show the fruitfulness of the approach and account in 
when we attempt to understand science. 
 
The present-centered approach defines historiography of science as a field that studies 
the developments that led to the present science. I argue that the choice of the targets 
of studies in historiography of science should be directly connected to our values and 
preferences in an intersubjective process. The main advantage of this approach is that 
it gives a clear motivation for historiography of science and avoids or solves stubborn 
conceptual and practical problems within the field.  
 
The account of causal explanations is built on the notions of counterfactual scenarios 
and contrastive question-answer pairs. I argue that if and only if we track down 
patterns of counterfactual dependencies, can we understand history. Moreover, I 
define the notions of historical explanation, explanatory competition, explanatory depth, and 
explanatory resources.  
 
Finally, I analyze the existing historiography of science with the framework built in 
the previous chapter, and I show that this framework clarifies many first-order (i.e. 
concerning the history of science) and meta-level issues (i.e. concerning the nature of 
science in general) that historians and philosophers tackle.  As an illustration of the 
philosophical power of the framework, I explicate the notion of local explanation and 
analyze the question of whether the developments of science were necessary or 
contingent. 
 
 
  
  
Tiivistelmä 
Tässä työssä puolustan nykyhetkikeskeistä (presentismi) tieteenhistoriografiaa, 
muotoilen tieteenhistoriografiaan soveltuvan mallin kausaalisesta selittämisestä ja 
osoitan sekä presentismin että selittämisen mallin hedelmällisyyden yrityksissä 
ymmärtää tiedettä. 
 
Nykyhetkikeskeinen lähestymistapa määrittelee tieteenhistoriografian alana, joka 
tutkii nykyiseen tieteeseen johtaneita kehityskulkuja. Argumentoin, että 
tieteenhistoriografian tutkimuskohteiden valinnan tulisi yhdistyä arvoihimme ja 
preferensseihimme intersubjektiivisen arviointiprosessin kautta. Tämän 
lähestymistavan suurin etu on siinä, että se tarjoaa tieteenhistorialle selvän 
motivaation ja välttää tai ratkoo vaikeita käsitteellisiä ja käytännöllisiä ongelmia, jotka 
ovat vaivanneet tieteenhistoriografiaa. 
 
Kausaalisen selittämisen malli, jonka esitän, perustuu kontrafaktuaalisille 
skenaarioille ja kontrastiivisille kysymys-vastaus-pareille. Argumentoin, että jos ja 
vain jos jäljitämme kontrafaktuaalisia riippuvuussuhteita erilaisten tekijöiden välillä, 
voimme ymmärtää historiaa. Lisäksi määrittelen sellaiset käsitteet kuin historiallinen 
selitys, kilpailevat selitykset, selityksen syvyys ja selittämisen resurssit. 
 
Lopuksi analysoin olemassa olevaa tieteenhistoriografiaa aiemmin muotoillun 
viitekehyksen läpi ja osoitan, että kyseinen viitekehys selventää monia ensimmäisen 
kertaluvun (ts. tieteenhistoriaa koskevia) ja meta-tason (ts. tieteen luonnetta yleisesti 
koskevia) ongelmia, joiden parissa historioitsijat ja filosofit työskentelevät. 
Osoittaakseni muotoillun viitekehyksen filosofisen potentiaalin analysoin käsitettä 
lokaali selitys ja kysymystä siitä, onko tieteen kehitys ollut välttämätöntä vai 
kontingenttia. 
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1 PREFACE 
This is a book on the philosophy of historiography of science. The production of this 
book depended on two conditions.  
First was my interest in the philosophy of science. The idea that the philosophy 
of science, as well as other disciplines studying science, must take into account the 
history of science is widely recognized these days. It follows that we need to under-
stand the history of science in order to develop a philosophy of science.1 But how do 
we gain such understanding? The trivial answer is that historiography of science2 (more 
or less professional) provides that understanding. This trivial answer deceives us: his-
toriography of science is no longer a transparent intellectual enterprise than science itself. 
As much as we need a philosophy of science in order to understand science, we need a 
philosophy of historiography of science in order to understand historiography of science. 
Once we recognize the intimate relationship between historiography of science and 
philosophy of science, we are also able to recognize the intimate relationship between 
philosophy of science and philosophy of historiography of science: if historiography 
of science stands on shaky grounds, then our philosophical views on science stand on 
similarly shaky grounds. 
The second condition was that, while discussing on a regular basis with people 
who practice historiography of science and knowledge (to use actors’ categories) for a 
few years, I came to realize the above-mentioned issue, that there are many philosoph-
ical concerns related to historiography of science. That this insight came not from the 
philosophy of science but from historiography of science convinced me that there is a 
                                                 
1 Increasingly, many philosophers have questioned this link (see the following chapters). However, 
even such skepticism toward the link between history of science and philosophy of science must 
be based on a detailed philosophical analysis of historiography of science. The irrelevance, as well 
as relevance, of the history of science to the philosophy of science cannot be decided a priori. 
2 By ”historiography” I refer to the study of the history, and by “history of science” I refer to the 
developments (events, processes) of science in the past. 
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need for philosophical framework where some of the philosophical issues in histori-
ography of science can be solved (or at least avoided) and that a such framework is 
needed even when it has no direct relevance for philosophy of science. Historiography 
of science deserves its own philosophical attention. 
In this book, I scrutinize philosophical grounds of historiography of science and 
suggest a conceptually clarified framework where those grounds can be examined. 
However, not every philosophical question concerning the nature of historiography 
of science can be studied in one book. Therefore, I will discuss two of the most central 
issues: the nature and the role of explanations in historiography of science. 
The title of this book is inspired by John Mackie’s book The Cement of The Universe 
(1974). Mackie’s book is about causation. He writes: 
The causation that I want to know more about is a very general feature or cluster of features 
of the way the world works: it is not merely, as Hume says, to us, but also in fact, the cement 
of the universe (Ibid., 2). 
My aim in this book is not to find out what causation is but how to use causal 
thinking in a particular field, historiography of science. I want to show how this ce-
ment can be used to build insights into the developments of science. I add the cement 
to the historiographical thinking. Cementing also means establishing something firmly or 
permanently. The final chapter of this book discusses the issue of inevitability and con-
tingency in the development of science. The question is, in a sense, how permanently 
science is established and how firm were the processes that shaped science. The title 
Cementing Science captures these important aspects of this book.  
Even though I discuss historiography of science, my hope is that the general 
framework formulated in this book is also applicable to other fields of historiography. 
 
The Structure of the Book: 
In Chapter 2, I discuss recent views on the nature of historiography of science. 
This chapter shows that historiography of science is a field loaded with idiosyncratic 
philosophical issues. Due to these issues, there is a genuine worry that writing sound 
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historiography of science is an impossible task, philosophically speaking. At the end 
of the chapter, I outline my own position in relation to these issues. 
In Chapter 3, I formulate a present-centered (or presentist) approach to the history 
of science and I solve a set of philosophical problems of historiography of science with 
this framework. In the presentist historiography, an event or a process is a part of the 
history of science if and only if it has a causal connection to the present science. I show 
that the presentist approach enables to see why historiography of science matters and 
how the causal definition of the history of science avoids many conceptual and meth-
odological problems.3 
In Chapter 4, I argue that it is possible to rationally evaluate what is significant 
about science. I show that if the subjects of study of historiography of science are cho-
sen by using the method of reflective equilibrium, historiography of science can remain a 
highly motivated intellectual field. The method also helps historiography of science 
to avoid morally or politically biased studies due to its intersubjective essence. 
In Chapter 5, I discuss previous views on the nature of explanation in historiog-
raphy of science. I point out four possible perspectives on the history of science in 
Kuhn’s Structures and argue that these perspectives open four important families of 
issues that need to be considered when we, in the following chapters, build an account 
for explanation in historiography of science. I discuss different perspectives on the 
scale and nature of explananda, the role of reasons and rationality, and - most importantly 
– the role and nature of causal explanations in historiography of science. I show that there 
is an urgent need for a unifying account for explanations in the field. 
                                                 
3 Some ideas in Chapters 2 and 3 are published, in a rather rudimentary and probably unrecog-
nizable form, in my paper “Miten tieteenhistorian pitäisi valita tutkimuskohteensa?” [“How 
Should the Historiography of Science Choose its Targets of Study?”] Ajatus 72 (2015). Due to the 
serious reformulation of the ideas (and due to the language of the paper) I do not cite that paper. 
However, I would like to thank the editors of Ajatus 72 and the anonymous reviewers for their 
comments on the paper. 
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In Chapter 6, I formulate an account of causal explanation in historiography of 
science. This account is based on contrastive explanations and patterns of counterfac-
tual dependencies. I define such concepts of historiography of science as historical ex-
planation, scenarios and situations in the causal thinking, competing explanations, explana-
tory goal, explanatory depth, and explanatory resources. These are all useful tools in histo-
riographical thinking, as is shown by analyzing existing historiographical claims and 
studies in later parts of the book. An important meta-level result of the chapter is that 
we should not be scared of causal notions in historiography once these are defined in 
a suitable way.  
Here we should note a terminological distinction. When I discuss the ideas in 
this book, by “framework” I refer to the presentist approach with all of its components 
(formulated in chapters 3, 4 and 6) and by “account” I refer to the account developed 
in Chapter 6. The account of explanation is a part of the more general framework. 
(Notice that not every use of “framework” and “account” refer to the positions in this 
book. For example, I might write about “explanatory framework of science”. I trust 
that it is obvious enough how to decide what is meant in these cases.) 
In Chapter 7, I illustrate the philosophical framework of the previous chapters 
by explicating the notion of local explanation. I point out the need for such explication 
and show how ideas from Chapter 6 can be used in the explication. Within the chapter, 
I discuss two existing historiographical studies to illustrate the issue. 
In Chapter 8, I show how questions of contingency of science can be answered 
within the framework developed in earlier chapters. I show how we can evaluate the 
contingency of some feature of science once we (i) have understood why that feature 
is significant, (ii) have found causal explanation of that feature, and (iii) use, when 
possible, existing historiographical studies. Within the chapter, I discuss one existing 
study from historiography of science to illustrate the issue. 
In Chapter 9, I conclude by arguing that the historical understanding that histo-
riography of science provides is not a sui generis. In other words, historical explana-
tions do not differ from explanations in other fields and in everyday life. They share 
the same structure, tracking down patterns of counterfactual dependences, and the 
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same explanatory resources, i.e. knowledge that is used when explanations are built. 
Moreover, I sketch how the framework in this book can be used to build tools to esti-
mate the future of science. 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
2 HOW  TO  UNDERSTAND  SCIENCE  HISTORICALLY? 
Science, as a human practice, needs to be understood. Human practices are al-
ways difficult to understand in depth. In the case of science, the number of relevant 
elements that play a role in the practice makes this task even more difficult. There are 
cognitive agents and social structures; there are theories, models, concepts, instru-
ments, and methods that are produced and used by these agents and structures; there 
is the universe that these products seek to capture. Moreover, the feedback-loops be-
tween these sets of elements and the ways in which these elements are connected with 
other aspects of human life militate against building any neat picture of how science 
works. However, it is precisely this complexity that makes science so important a prac-
tice to be understood, as the complexity reflects how deeply our present world and 
science are intertwined. 
One way to tackle the complexity of the scientific practices is to approach them 
historically. If we focus only on the present, we are lost in the labyrinth of the com-
plexities of science. However, if we extend our horizon, the present state of affairs 
might begin to look understandable. As we examine the developments of science 
through history, we are able to put our present situation into a wider perspective. 
Moreover, historiography of science provides a unique perspective: it is the perspec-
tive of the actual world. If we want to understand science as a part of the actual world, 
there is no other perspective except the historical one. Historiography of science, re-
vealing the history of science in our actual world, provides a key to understand the 
complex workings of science. 
But what, exactly, is historiography of science about? What can it achieve? Dif-
ferent considerations pull us in different directions. On the one hand, modern science 
is a relatively new invention. The cluster of events traditionally known as ‘the scien-
tific revolution’ happened somewhere between 1500 and 1800. Only since that revo-
lution, whatever its exact characteristics were, have there been epistemological prac-
tices that share recognizable similarities with our science, a point made by Richard S. 
Westfall: 
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[The] question [about the scientific revolution] is whether the enterprise of science as it was 
carried out after 1687 was radically different from that before 1543. Clearly, I think that it 
was and that the transformation was a once and for all event that has never been reversed. 
Scientists of today can read and recognize works done after 1687. It takes a historian to com-
prehend those written before 1543. (2000, 44). 
However, even that period was mainly a revolution in physics. In chemistry, a 
revolution began in the late 18th century and is often credited to Lavoisier. Other fields, 
such as biology and psychology, began to take their somewhat mature forms only 
much later. For example, Darwin published his The Origin of Species in 1859 and Wundt 
his Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie [Principles of Physiological Psychology] in 
1874. Moreover, even in physics many fundamental developments, such as the formu-
lations of quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, have occurred in the 20th 
century. In general, the science in the early 21st century looks very different from what 
there was at the beginning of the 20th century. How can the history of something so 
recently developed be written?  
The fact that many features of our sciences have developed so recently is not 
even the main problem. Historians of science warn us about the dangers of consider-
ing, say Newton, as a scientist in our sense. The world has changed since the days of 
Newton, and we should not impose our own ideas of science on Newton’s work and 
practices. The past should not be seen from the viewpoint of the present. Among other 
unfortunate things, a presentist approach is said to lead to the projection of present 
categories on the history of science and thus to the distorted use of the sources. It al-
lows us to see only what is absent in the past and prevents us from finding anything 
concrete from the past. (Ashplant & Wilson 1988.)  Moreover, Cunningham argues 
that it can be hardly appropriate that the historians in the present set the criteria for 
what counted as science in the past (1988, 367). 
On the other hand, knowledge of the history of science seems necessary in order 
to understand science. As our science has developed only recently, the historians must 
remind us that things have not always been the way they are now. In general, the 
historians of science can show the contingency of our science. This point is nicely put 
by Rée: 
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The contemplation of historicity – of the sheer singularity of places and times, situations and 
conjunctures, including all those you habitually take for granted – will help you see that 
there are different ways of looking at the world, and that what is obvious in one perspective 
may be ridiculous in another. (1991, 961.) 
Moreover, historians must remind us that the ancestors of our present science 
were not the only candidates to pass on their thoughts and practices to the following 
generations. Complex social and epistemological structures, in a continuous flux 
themselves, need to be revealed in order to understand the developments of science. 
This is one of the messages that Schaffer and Shapin wanted to convey in Leviathan 
and the Air-Pump: 
Yet we want to show that there was nothing self-evident or inevitable about the series of 
historical judgments in that context which yielded a natural philosophical consensus in fa-
vour of the experimental programme. Given other circumstances bearing upon that philo-
sophical community, Hobbes's views might well have found a different reception. (1985, 13).  
However, the focus on the detailed analysis of our ancestors should not blur the 
fact that these people were not intentionally developing science for the future gener-
ations, a point made, again, by Cunningham (1988). These people should be studied 
in their own right and on their own terms. We should also avoid big pictures that 
imply that the history of science was a coherent and progressive set of developments. 
(Shapin 2005, 242).  
If there is one lesson above all the others, it is that we should not celebrate those 
people who turned out to be winners or who thought in the same way as we do. This 
lesson was given by Butterfield in The Whig Interpretation of History (1931). A related 
demand is that we should not use our present scientific knowledge to explain the past 
since this knowledge is a historical product. Schaffer and Shapin write: 
‘Truth,’ ‘adequacy,’ and ‘objectivity’ will be dealt with as accomplishments, as historical 
products, as actors’ judgements and categories. They will be topics for our inquiry, not re-
sources unreflectively to be used in that inquiry. (1985, 14) 
So the puzzle is this: If there has not been science, as we conceive it, in the past, 
and if we cannot find a coherent set of developments, what are all the articles and 
books in the historiography of science about? What do they achieve as historical works 
9 
 
 
 
about science? The following topics4, just to pick some examples (many more are eas-
ily found5), have been discussed in the journals for the history of science: 
“Early Modern Iberian Science, from the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Cen-
turies”. Early Science and Medicine Vol. 21. 
“Trading Zones in Early Modern Europe”. Isis Vol. 106 (4). 
“Restoration commerce and the instruments of trust: Robert Boyle and the 
science of money”. History of Human Sciences Vol. 29 (1). 
“A Patient with Word Blindness in the Seventeenth Century”. Journal of the 
History of Neurosciences Vol 24 (4). 
“Reputation in a box. Objects, communication and trust in late 18th-century 
botanical networks”. History of Science Vol. 53 (2). 
Perhaps the historians study the practices that were sciences in the past? Sciences 
were different in the past, and each of the papers above, for example, discusses a sci-
ence in a particular era. Whether a practice was a science depends on the historical 
context of that practice. This has been suggested: “[--] historians of science are as likely, 
perhaps even more likely, to consider their work part of a conversation about a par-
ticular time and place, science in the nineteenth century rather than the nineteenth 
century’s contribution to the history of science” (Findlen 2005, 235). This view can be 
described as the science-in-the-past view.  
The science-in-the-past view has been built in the reflexes of the historians at 
least since Kuhn published his Structures. Kuhn’s whole project, with the notion of a 
paradigm shift, is understandable only with the assumption that there have been dif-
ferent sciences in the past. Kuhn also explicitly writes: 
                                                 
4 The high quality of the work mentioned here is not in doubt.  
5 "Current Bibliography of the History of Science and Its Cultural Influences, 2016" Isis 107, no. S1. 
i-240. 
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The more carefully they study, say, Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry, or caloric 
thermodynamics, the more certain they feel that those once current views of nature were, as 
a whole, neither less scientific nor more the product of human idiosyncrasy than those cur-
rent today.6  
Gradually, and often without entirely realizing they are doing so, historians of science have 
begun to ask new sorts of questions and to trace different, and often less than cumulative, 
developmental lines for the sciences. Rather than seeking the permanent contributions of an 
older science to our present vantage, they attempt to display the historical integrity of that 
science in its own time. (1970, 2-3 [emphasis added]) 
However, there are serious dangers in the science-in-the-past view which sug-
gests abandoning it. First, the view is problematic if we want to understand the past 
in its own terms. As Cunningham writes:  
But did these people in the past perhaps also describe this self-same activity of theirs as 
‘science’? The answer must be that until at least 1750, and possibly until as late as 1800, no-
one at all described their activity like this. [--] 
Thus we customarily take people who, by their own accounts, were engaged in intentional 
activities other than science, and treat them as having been engaged in science. We mistake 
one activity for another. As a consequence we also give the wrong identity to what these 
people said and did. For us to ascribe the activity ‘science’ to people who were not only not 
engaged in science but who were actively engaged in another activity altogether, is for us to 
hijack their actions and statements into our context, a modern-day context, and give them a 
post factum identity. (1988, 380). 
It is questionable whether the intentions of the people in the past should be de-
cisive in defining what they were doing.7 However, most of the scientific fields, theo-
ries, methods (especially statistical), and the institutional structures of science have 
developed only recently. Once we connect this observation with the right sensitivity 
to the intentions of past people, Cunningham’s demand, that we should not think that 
there where sciences (in any historically reflective sense) before the 19th century, seems 
                                                 
6 It must be noted that in the rest of the paragraph Kuhn writes that past practices were more 
science than myths. Of course, if we need to choose which one of these descriptions is more ade-
quate, the description as “science” is more adequate. This, however, does not change the picture 
that the Structures conveys as a whole. 
7 Surely the intentions do not define science in our time. Astrologists are not doing science no 
matter what their intentions are. Moreover, the practices of CERN are scientific even if it is difficult 
to tell whose intentions would be relevant when judging that. 
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justified. This means that we should avoid describing the past epistemological prac-
tices as sciences if we want to describe past in its own terms. 
Moreover, the problem with the claim that science has taken different forms in 
different eras is that this claim presupposes that there is a universal category of science 
that can be used to describe practices of different eras. But if one takes seriously the 
idea that different eras should be understood in their own terms, it does not make 
sense to presuppose such universal categories. We should accept that because differ-
ent eras were different they require different categories and concepts to describe them. 
Only in this way can we understand the past in its own terms.  
Of course, there can be endless debates about whether some past practices were 
similar to the present sciences with respect to some criteria of science. However, this is 
not the point behind the science-in-the-past view. Rather, the lesson is that science has 
taken (sometimes radically) different forms in the past, and we should appreciate this 
fact in our thinking about science. We should learn from the difference, not from the 
similarity. The changing nature of science is what interests us historically. It is difficult 
to deny this intuition: historiography of science would be a rather odd practice if its 
purpose was to produce checklists that tell what practices in the past were science 
according to some present-day criteria. 
Secondly, the problem does not go away by stating that the concept of science 
has itself developed through history. When we speak about science, we use our own 
concept of science. If we say that something was science in the past, we use our own 
concept to deliver the message no matter how much we specify the claim. We could 
perhaps use concepts such as “science” (=df our concept of science) and “sciencepast” 
(=df concept of science of some past era), but this would only add unnecessary opacity 
to our language and give the mistaken impression that the historical actors used sim-
ilar conceptual resources as we do.8 If we wish to avoid the obsession of seeing past 
                                                 
8 Of course, this does not mean that our concept of science has not developed historically. That 
there were no human beings 65 million years ago does not mean that human beings have not 
developed from the species that lived back then. 
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actors as similar to us, the introduction of concepts such as “sciencepast” is the last 
thing to do. We should not make the past look a cartoonish place9 where everything 
is exactly as it is in our world but built from different materials. It is simply wrong-
headed to take a category we happen to use and expect that the studies of a historical 
period or society then fill that category with the contents of that time or society.  
In the third place, the science-in-the-past view magnifies one fundamental prob-
lem, the disunity of science. The problem is that if there is no unity in the practices 
that historiography of science studies, what makes historiography of science a coher-
ent field? Dear aptly writes: 
[History of science] may comprise any sort of knowledge or human activity to do with the 
world that we regard as serious, formally organized, and respectable. It could range from 
gnomons to genomics; from satellites to stalactites; from ancient Kenyan iron-ore smelting 
to Polynesian navigation. Very little would be off-limits, and a broad vision to encompass it 
would have little real coherence. (2012, 37.) 
This a pressing problem for the science-in-the-past view. The assumption that 
the sciences of different eras were different from one another implies that there is no 
unity in the practices that are studied in historiography of science. Therefore, the sci-
ence-in-the-past view builds in historiography of science the unattainability of a co-
herent picture. The science-in-the-past view, then, not only leaves the problem of dis-
unity unsolved but makes it unsolvable. It is difficult to find any reason not to aban-
don a field that cannot in principle produce any coherent pictures from its separate 
results. The science-in-the-past view cannot save historiography of science.  
In the fourth place, describing something as a science in the past obscures our view 
and can lead to a construction of misleading images of science. For example, it is not 
acceptable to argue that religion and science cannot be distinguished one from the 
other (or that religion can even improve scientific thinking) since in Newton's thinking 
                                                 
9 Think of The Flintstones. 
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science and religion were in close contact. 10 We can find this kind of argumentation, 
for example, in Brooke (2014, 24) and in Dembski & Ruse (2006). Dembski and Ruse 
write: 
If Boyle, Kepler, and Newton did superb science while believing that the success of the sci-
entific enterprise depended on God’s Providence, it does not seem absurd to suggest that 
science again might flourish in a non-naturalistic framework. (2006, 44). 
It should be obvious that, as the past was very different from the present, argu-
ments such as these are simply irrelevant. However, the discussions about “the past 
sciences” and “the sciences in the past” fuels the industry of arguments like the one 
above.  
In general, we should not evaluate the value of science with reference to the epis-
temological practices of the past. Neither negative nor positive assessments of science 
should be made on the basis of what happened in the past. We should not say that 
since the alchemists had illusionary goals, we should be skeptical toward chemistry 
today. Neither should we say that because the scientific revolution was a highly pro-
gressive era in knowledge, we can trust that the present sciences can solve the major 
challenges of our time such as climate change. In the similar manner, we should not 
project the positive or the negative aspects of the present science on the past. The gap 
between the past and the present is too wide in order for there to be straightforward 
inferential or evaluative links between the two.11 The science-in-the-past view blurs 
this fact. 
In sum, there are several problems in science-in-the-past view: (i) it leads to a 
conceptually crippled historiography by projecting our categories and concepts onto 
                                                 
10 My claim is not that there is no connection between the present science and religion. I leave the 
issue open. I claim only that facts about Newton's practices are not relevant for establishing this 
connection. 
11 See e.g. Pitt (2001), Schickore (2011), Kinzel (2015B) and Journal of the Philosophy of History 12 (2) 
(2018) discussing a related issue, that of relationship between the history of science and the phi-
losophy of science.  
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the past; (ii) it does not answer the problem of the disunity of science; and (iii) it easily 
leads to a confusion about our present situation and our prospects by building unwar-
ranted analogies between the past and the present. 
The problems of the science-in-the-past view have not gone unnoticed. Perhaps 
the idea of historiography of science is a relic from an age when the past was not un-
derstood correctly and when science was thought to be a universally applicable cate-
gory. Perhaps the term “science” in journals and books lives only due to the institu-
tional inertia. Daston writes: 
Historians of premodern science grew increasingly skittish about calling what they studied 
science at all, and the word scientist when applied to Archimedes or Galileo set their teeth 
on edge. (2009, 806). 
Perhaps science is just one way of knowing the world, and historiography of 
science is a study of the ways in which the world was known in the past. Renn writes: 
For many historians of science, science no longer seems distinguishable from other forms of 
cultural practices. It has ceased to be a paradigm of universal rationality and presents itself 
as just one more object of study for cultural history or social anthropology. Even the most 
fundamental aspects of the classical image of science -- proof, experimentation, data, objec-
tivity or rationality -- have turned out to be deeply historical in nature. This insight has 
opened up many new perspectives on the study of the history of science, which is turning 
more and more into a history of knowledge. It thus includes not only academic practices, 
but also the production and reproduction of knowledge far removed from traditional aca-
demic settings, for instance, in artisanal and artistic practices, or even in family and house-
hold practices. (2015, 37–38.) 
It is becoming more and more acknowledged that the historiography of science 
is not literally about science but about ways of knowing the world, i.e. epistemological 
practices in general. Moreover, historians have argued that science does not even de-
serve a distinct treatment. People have always had knowledge of the world and tools 
to gain and to use such knowledge. There is nothing special about science, and thus 
there cannot be a distinct field of historiography of science. It can also be pointed out 
that how science became conceptualized is itself a historical and thus contingent fact. 
In fact, Dear is desperate enough to suggest that historiography of science should fo-
cus mainly on the history of how the current conception (or “ideology”, as Dear puts 
it) of science developed. (2012, 38).  
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I agree that historiography of science must avoid the many pitfalls suggested 
above. I have already argued that it is futile to study the sciences in the past as this 
would lead to all sorts of problems. “Science” is our category, and science is a practice 
that exists in our present world as it is conceptualized by us. 12 At least, this is the only 
claim that can be made on firm historical and philosophical grounds and I will argue 
that there is no need to go beyond it.  In this book, I show that there is no need to take the 
conceptual risks that are involved in the science-in-the-past view.13 However, I disagree 
with the idea that there cannot be historiography of science. I think that the history of 
science deserves serious reflection and that the history of epistemological practices in 
general does not satisfy our need to understand science historically. We know more 
than ever that this knowledge is organized and available in an unprecedented manner, 
and the practical implications of this knowledge penetrate every aspect of our lives. 
However, this does not imply an uncritical stand towards science. On the contrary, 
only by accepting the special nature of science can we understand the dangers that 
have been created together with the scientific achievements. To put it bluntly: Aristo-
tle or Paracelsus could not have caused a nuclear apocalypse, our science can. Moreo-
                                                 
12 Some might have the reflexes to say that, in the present day, different societies have different 
conceptions of science. If this is true, then everything said in this book about historiography of 
science can be applied to the practices that are scientific under some conception of science. “Our” 
does not then refer to the author’s society but to the reader’s. However, the truth and even mean-
ingfulness of the claim raises serious philosophical problems. Here lies a similar trap as in the 
science-in-the-past view. Why should we (or any society, for that matter) think that other societies 
share the same conceptual framework with us (involving the concept of science) and, at the same 
time, in a paradoxical manner, think that those concepts differ from our concepts? Again, this is 
only unnecessary conceptual maneuvering. The reason cannot be ethical: in many sections of this 
book, I argue that the label “science” does not automatically make a practice good or preferable. 
13 I am not in principle against a new concept of science (based on family-resemblance, for example) 
that would unify historiography of science. However, the surest way to prevent conceptual prob-
lems is to build a historiography of science that is not built around any concept of science. 
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ver, science is the most important epistemological practice for us. It would be a histo-
riographical inconsistency to suggest that while we need to understand epistemolog-
ical practices of the past as different from our practices, we need to understand our 
own practices as not-so-unique. The asymmetry exists in both ways. 
I also disagree with the idea that our present scientific knowledge cannot be used 
in historiography of science. This point is connected to the previous one: Science is a 
special epistemic practice and it is our epistemological practice. We cannot expect that 
the historians go beyond our own system of knowledge. Moreover, science describes 
the universe and, as the past is a part of that same universe, science also describes the 
past. That the earth rotates around the sun; that electrons are constituents of the uni-
verse; and that evolution has shaped the life on earth are facts about the world as it is 
and as it has been for a long time. These facts are parts of our knowledge and estab-
lishing credible alternatives to them would be an enormous achievement that would 
change our worldview dramatically. However, as there are no credible alternatives, 
historiography cannot be practiced as if there were.14  
                                                 
14 We need to be careful here. Perhaps we could have a different science, as discussed in Chapter 
8 (or a plurality of sciences, see Chang [2012]). However, we do not actually have a different sci-
ence and the historiography of science cannot transcend the actual conditions, at least not based 
on the mere possibility of a different science. Moreover, the possibility of a different science implies 
that we could perhaps have an alternative explanatory framework. It does not imply that we could 
write a historiography of science without any such framework. As I argue in this book, the histo-
riography of science cannot take an agnostic position based on the possibility of a different science. 
Therefore, the historiography of science either (i) uses the current scientific knowledge and, in the 
case of emergence of a different science, collapses with the current science (if the emergence im-
plies the untenability of the current science), or (ii) is unable to do explanatory work. It must also 
be noted that the question of philosophical interpretation of our knowledge is irrelevant for the 
historiography of science (see Section 6.7). This means that even if the possibility of a different 
science (or any other consideration) makes us cautious in our ontological commitments (see Stan-
ford 2006), this has no implication on the acceptability of our historiographical explanations that 
cite the results of science. 
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Of course, many people have argued that science does not achieve genuine 
knowledge about the universe. We have also seen that some people think that science 
is not that special. The task of this book is not to argue against the arguments of such 
people.15 I set aside skepticism toward science.16 In this book, I make the following 
claims:  
1. The present-centered historiography of science is a viable option that 
serves scholarly work and wider science-related social interests. 
 
2. There is something special and significant in our present science.  
 
3. Explanations exhibit patterns of counterfactual dependencies. 
 
4. Historiography of science can use all knowledge available, involving sci-
entific knowledge.  
 
5. All knowledge is always fallible and subject to a philosophical problem-
atizing. We should not let these facts bother us too much. 
I suggest that these claims enable us to build philosophically sound historiog-
raphy of science and avoid paralyzing effects of skepticism and open-endedness. If 
someone is inclined to accept skepticism towards science, there is not much I can do. 
                                                 
15 If the reader wants to read such arguments against arguments, I can recommend Nick Tosh’s 
papers ([2006] and [2007]). 
16 I do not claim that skepticism towards science is impossible to establish. Rather, I do not see 
skepticism as a sound methodological assumption. In fact, Chapter 6 indicates how skepticism 
towards science can be established if skepticism is the correct attitude. However, establishing 
skepticism would require a long series of reflectively sound studies that provide results that sup-
port skepticism. The general lesson is that there does not exist shortcuts to meta-views on science. 
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I cannot defend science in this book. What I can do is to show that it is possible, con-
trary to the reflexes of many historians, to write present-centered historiography of 
science that uses the explanatory resources of sciences. Moreover, I show that this ap-
proach is the solution, not the ground (as is usually thought), for many problems that 
the historians of science face. The theory is a tool for historiographical thinking about science.  
Daston once wrote: 
As of yet, a new vision of what science is and how it works has yet to be synthesized from 
the rich but scattered and fragmented materials gathered by some twenty years of histori-
cized history of science. The very practices that made that history possible militate against 
such a synthesis coming from the history of science itself. Science studies seems a still less 
likely candidate for the task. A new form of interdisciplinarity must be forged. Philosophy, 
anyone? (2009, 803). 
This book shows how this can be done.  
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3 PRESENT-CENTERED HISTORIOGRAPHY OF 
SCIENCE 
We saw in the previous chapter that the historiography of science has, perhaps 
ironically, led to a situation where the idea of studying the sciences in the past has be-
come ridden by historiographical and conceptual problems. There were epistemolog-
ical practices in the past but they were very different from the science as we now know 
it. If one is interested in understanding how nature, including human beings, was 
studied and understood in the past, one can study these epistemological practices. 
This is an extremely interesting field of historical studies in itself, and I see no reason 
to be skeptical toward such a project as long as the equivocation of science of our time 
and those past practices is avoided. However, I do not think that we need to abandon 
historiography of science. This means that we need to find an alternative to the sci-
ence-in-the-past view. In this chapter, I formulate such an alternative. As one might 
guess, such an alternative must turn upside-down many previous views on the nature 
of historiography of science. 
 Causal-Narrative Presentism 
The approach I offer is the present-centered (or simply presentist17) approach to the 
history of science. From the presentist point of view, historiography of science is the 
study of the past practices that have led to the present science.18 In other words, his-
toriography of science is the study of practices and episodes that were causally rele-
vant to the formation of what is now known as science. Nick Tosh (2003) is a notable 
defender of this approach. According to Tosh, historiography of science is a study of 
                                                 
17 This a specific form of presentism and there are others. To contrast this kind of approach with 
other forms of presentism, Laurent Loison (2016) uses the term “causal-narrative presentism”. 
18 Of course, there are many different sciences. However, using the term “present science” does 
not affect the argument here.  
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past activities ancestral to modern science: “Modern science  has  a  causal history, and 
[historiography of science] could reasonably be structured around a causal backbone 
of  past  activities  which  helped  to  bring  it  into  being.” (2003, 648.)  
It is helpful to use Lorraine Daston's words19 as a guideline to the presentist ap-
proach: “[the historians of science] must explain how [the distinctive] character [of 
science] crystallized out of practices, both intellectual and manual, designed for other 
purposes”. (Daston 2009, 807). The past practices that the historians of science study 
do not have to be scientific themselves, and we should not force them under the con-
cept of science. All that is required is that these practice are causally connected to the 
present science. With the presentist approach, we avoid the dangers of science-in-the-
past thinking. The question whether or not some past activity was scientific itself 
simply does not arise. 
However, avoiding the dangers of science-in-the-past thinking is not the only 
motivation behind the presentist approach. Arguably, one of the main goals of science 
studies is (or at least should be) to understand the present scientific practices.20 The 
reason for this is that we can affect the world around us only at the present moment. 
Scientific practices can be evaluated and changed only at the present. Our present sci-
ence is a broad collection of achievements that has been built through the history. To-
gether with these achievements, a remarkable range of ethical, political, theoretical, 
methodological, and conceptual problems have emerged in science and in our science-
                                                 
19 Of course, I do not want to suggest that Daston is a presentist. 
20 As the science-in-the-past view is not viable, as argued in the introduction, this claim might look 
trivial. However, it is possible to argue that once the conceptual landscape is clarified, what was 
named (naively, without conceptual reflection) “science studies” is really “epistemological practices 
studies”. From the name of a field we cannot draw conclusions about the real nature of the field.  
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related life.  We, in the present, live with the achievements and problems that the his-
tory of science has generated.21 These achievements and problems cannot be ignored 
as we are surrounded by them. Passages from Richard S. Westfall are worth quoting 
at length here: 
Recall the world about us. To me it appears that the existence of modern science is the pre-
condition for most of the central features of our society. I think of such things as means of 
communication, from the mass media that bring the world to our homes each morning to 
individual devices such as the telephone and e-mail, which together have so expanded our 
lives in comparison with those of the people I know from the seventeenth century. Ease of 
transportation enabled scholars from all over the country and beyond to gather in New Mex-
ico to hear Dobbs's lecture; we have incorporated the various dimensions of ready transpor-
tation into our lives to the extent that we have forgotten it was not always there. The level 
of material plenty has lifted the burden of poverty from the great majority. Modern medicine 
has more than doubled the average life span and driven pain and disease, once familiar 
members of every circle, to the margins of our existence. These features of our life are not 
evenly spread around the globe. In general, they prevail where modern science flourishes 
and are in shorter supply elsewhere. 
Most people think of these characteristics as benefits. Almost no one considers other features 
of our world that are also derivative from science as benefits, though they are no less central. 
Scientifically based technology has accelerated the consumption of nonrenewable resources 
until we stand already face to face with their exhaustion. It has produced products that na-
ture cannot degrade, so that we are well on the way to choking on our own refuse. It has 
conjured up weapons of mass destruction more hideous than earlier ages were able even to 
imagine. I do not think that I have compiled a partisan list. Every item on it appears incon-
trovertably true, and I am convinced that I could go on indefinitely listing similar ways in 
which science impinges, both positively and negatively, on our lives until I had more than 
satisfied everyone who finds my list wanting in some respect. (2000, 42–43). 
That we are so intertwined with science should direct our historical reflections. 
There is nothing wrong with this. This point about the relationship between the histo-
riography and the present state of the world is formulated eloquently by Naomi 
Oreskes in her paper “Why I Am a Presentist?” (2013). Oreskes calls herself a “moti-
vational presentist” and writes:  
What matters to us about the past has everything to do with who we are, where we live, and 
what we think is important – to us, here and now, in the present. Our motivations are ines-
capably presentist. Thus, to qualify the deliberately provocative title of this paper, I am a 
motivational presentist, and I believe all historians are. (2013, 603). 
                                                 
21 Of course, science alone is not responsible for the achievements or problems. However, those 
achievements or problems would not have been generated without practices that belong to the 
history of science. 
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However, we should not only look the past through our present interests. Un-
derstanding the past is necessary for us to understand the present. The importance of 
understanding the history of the present science has been noted by philosophers of 
science. For example, Schickore argues that  
[--] a history of the present should remain part and parcel of our present efforts to under-
stand the sciences. Fully to understand the concepts, practices, and methodological and epis-
temological goals and commitments of present science, we need to trace how they have come 
into being. (2011, 477.)  
Moreover, Psillos concludes that  
[--] what science tells us about the world, as well as the reasons to take what it tells us seri-
ously, are issues that are determined historically, by looking at the patterns of convergence 
in the scientific image of the world”. (2012, 101).  
In the presentist approach, the historiographical studies of science are seen as 
studies that provide understanding about our present situation. However, presentists 
do not build loose and questionable comparisons between the past and present. In-
stead, presentists show how the present situation depends on the past.  
To put some flesh on this idea, consider the study, ”Distrust and Discovery: The 
Case of the Heavy Bosons at CERN” by John Krige (2001). In this study, Krige de-
scribes “the microhistorical process whereby different groups of scientific actors [--] 
came to claim that a new fundamental particle (the W boson) had been discovered at 
CERN” (2001, 517). The study points out a complex set of factors that were relevant to 
the announcement of the discovery: the personal trust between the actors; the local 
technological environment; the methodological and theoretical complexity of the sci-
entific work at hand; the limited possibilities that expensive science leaves open to the 
scientists especially under political pressures, and so on. Krige’s study shows that 
there is no way we can understand the science around the W boson and the announce-
ment of the results without focusing on these factors. We need the historical perspec-
tive. Moreover, Krige’s study provides us with a very detailed understanding about 
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the development of a particular piece of science. While more general works22 about 
the experiments in the history of science deserve their place, studies that give detailed 
explanations of our present situation are crucial for our understanding of science. The 
presentist approach captures these insights.  
Krige’s study shows how one piece of our present worldview came to be estab-
lished. In this sense, it is about an epistemological aspect of the present science. We 
saw above that Schickore and Psillos give a good list about epistemological aspects of 
science that are worth historical inquiry. However, the presentist approach is not lim-
ited to the historical study of these epistemological aspects. Science has other signifi-
cant features as well. In addition to the epistemological aspects, historiography of sci-
ence can fruitfully deal (at least) with the following aspects of science (and their inter-
connections): 
Social: How is science organized? What kind of social roles are there in the 
sciences and how do these roles guide the practices? What and whose val-
ues are built in the science? 
 
Science and society: What is the relationship between science and politics, 
science and the economy, science and different social groups? How 
global/local is science? How accessible is science for different groups? How 
are the results of science communicated to and understood by society in 
general? What and whose values are built into the science? 
 
Science and culture: What is the relationship between science and other as-
pects of culture (religion, for example)? What and whose values are built 
into the science? 
 
                                                 
22 Such as the Leviathan and the Air-Pump by Simon and Schaffer (1985). 
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Science and technology: What is the role of science in the making of new tech-
nologies? How does technology shape scientific practices? 
 
Psychological: How do individual scientists understand themselves? What 
kind of thoughts and emotions do scientists have during their work and 
about their work?23 
This list is far from exhaustive but it gives an idea of what can be studied in 
historiography of science according to the presentist approach.  Present science is an 
enormous global practice that has these multiple dimensions in it. Thus, the multitude 
of the aspects of science that a historian of science can focus on follows naturally from 
the presentist framework. However, I do not want to give the impression that the epis-
temological aspects of science stand on the same line with other aspects with respect 
to their importance. On the contrary, I take it that these other aspects of science are 
worth studying as a part of the history of science due to the connections they have with 
the epistemological aspects.24 Science is a human practice, but it is a human practice 
that is devoted to knowing and understanding the world. We already saw, in Chapter 
2, that even when the ability of the category of science to capture the practices of the 
past was questioned, the essential connection between historiography of science and 
history of knowledge and knowing was not doubted.25 I see no reason to abandon the 
tradition on this issue: historiography of epistemological practices is an important 
field and its importance is directly related to the central role that knowledge plays in 
human lives. Epistemological practices therefore deserve a distinct historiographical 
field that studies them. Science is our epistemological practice and it is also a very 
                                                 
23 The historiographical illustrations that I use in this book provide examples of these aspects. We 
see that the existing historiography of science discusses and combines aspects in a fruitful and 
indispensable manner.  
24 I discuss this further in Section 4.5. 
25 E.g. Renn (2015) and Dear (2012) cited in Chapter 2. 
26 
 
 
 
successful epistemological practice.26 Therefore, the history of science deserves a dis-
tinct historiographical field that studies it. In this way, historiography of science de-
rives its justification as a field of inquiry from the central role that knowledge plays in 
human life. It is therefore difficult to see the raison d’être for a historiography of science 
that marginalizes the epistemological aspects of science and I do not discuss that pos-
sibility. However, understanding epistemological practices in isolation from other as-
pects of science is not possible and the impact of the epistemic aspects of science on 
our lives is mediated through a network that involves social institutions, technology, 
cultural representations, etc. Thus, even as we recognize the importance of epistemo-
logical aspects of science, the historiography of the other aspects of science is neces-
sary in order to understand how science works and how it penetrates our lives. 
However, we should note that even if someone does not view the present science 
as epistemologically special (for whatever reason), that person would change from a 
(perhaps reasonable) skeptic to a complete nihilist if she did not acknowledge that the 
present science has a multitude of interesting connections to many aspects of our lives. 
Nothing in the presentist approach itself forbids us from asking, for example, “Why 
are scientific theories produced by power structures rather than by sound methods?” 
or “Why is the misconception about the epistemological soundness of science so wide-
spread?” In this way, the presentist approach is suitable for anyone who is not a nihil-
ist and acknowledges the significance of science. Presentism allows disagreements 
about the exact nature of science. In the next section, we begin to see how the presentist 
approach achieves such neutral ground for historiography of science.  
 Significant Features as a Starting Point 
Giving a definition of science is notoriously difficult as the age-old discussion on 
the problem of demarcation has proven (see Laudan [1983], and Boudry & Pigliucci 
                                                 
26 In the philosophy of science, the implications of this success are debated, but the success itself is 
beyond reasonable doubt (see discussions in Psillos 1999 & 2009). 
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[2013A]). Thus, it would be bold if a presentist historian of science began her study by 
giving a definition of science and then studied the causal histories of the practices that 
are scientific according to the definition. However, presentists have an escape route 
from this problem. One does not need to give necessary and sufficient conditions (or 
anything like that) for science in the presentist approach. We can simply take the prac-
tices of our society that have a scientific status and study the history of these practices: 
The theoretical, conceptual, ethical, social etc. aspects of science which are significant 
to us are problems of those practices. It would be nonsense to suggest that we should 
consider some other existing practices as really scientific.27 This would not solve our 
problems but change their name. In addition, if the historians of science were to chal-
lenge the conception of science of their own society, they would act against the prin-
ciple of “different eras and societies must be understood on their own terms” by mak-
ing their own society an exception. This certainly would be a paradoxical position. 
(See also Section 3.4 Contingency). Finally, as philosophers working on the demarca-
tion problem have noted, there exists widespread agreement about which practices 
count as science even if formulating the criteria to separate science from non-science 
is an extremely challenging task (e.g. Pigliucci & Boudry [2013B, 2]; Hansson [2013, 
61]). Thus, telling which practices count as science in our society is not too difficult a 
task. This ability to bypass the demarcation problem is a clear advantage of presentism. 
One thing must be underlined here. In the previous section and in the sections 
to come I often mention “a conception of science”. It should be now obvious that this 
                                                 
27 Of course we can ask whether science could be improved. This, however, does not affect which 
of our existing practices are the scientific ones. Moreover, we may even have wrong beliefs about 
the nature of scientific practices but this does not change the fact that these practices are the ones 
we want to understand in the science studies (and thus in the historiography of science). In fact, 
science studies would become a redundant field if we already knew the exact nature of those prac-
tices that we consider as science.  
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does not refer to any explicit conception that can be philosophically clarified. “A con-
ception of science” is interchangeable with “the set of activities considered as scien-
tific”. 
Of course, one could argue that there are some borderline practices between sci-
ence and non-science and thus the presentist approach is vague. We must remember, 
however, that there are also practices that are considered as clearly scientific. The bor-
derline cases can thus be compared with the clear cases in order to evaluate their sci-
entific status. Furthermore, whether the borderline practices are counted as science or 
not does not matter much. The history of science should not study the history of all the 
features of the present scientific practices but only the significant ones. Thus, the existence 
of borderline cases does not make the presentist approach vague. In the next chapter, 
I develop this idea of significant features in detail and I argue that the borderline cases 
are usually insignificant. For now, it is enough to note that not everything in science 
is equally significant to us. For example, the existence of nuclear physics is significant 
unlike the exact notations used in scientific texts. It is important to analyze in a sys-
tematic way what the significant features of our science are and what would count as 
an interesting alternative to such a feature. In the next chapter, I show how this can be 
done. The idea is that by collectively negotiating which features of the present science 
are significant and then studying the history of these features, the historians are able 
to make their studies more meaningful and understandable for other scholars and for 
the wider audiences outside the specialist circles. By focusing on the significant fea-
tures of science, the presentist approach can bring unity to the shattered field of the 
history of science that is sometimes confusing in its heterogeneity for the non-special-
ist consumers of the literature and even for the scholars in related fields.28 
In the presentist approach, historiography of science is defined as the study of 
the causal history of the significant features of those practices that are considered sci-
ences in our society. There is no need to understand (and thus no need to agree on) 
the exact nature of science, whatever that means, before we study its history. 
                                                 
28 Shapin (2005) and Oreskes (2013, 606) share this worry. 
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Finally, historiography of science can build causal chains. If we know that Z was 
the cause of a significant feature, we may then ask what the cause of Z was. This means 
that Z does not need to be a significant feature in itself in order to be explained in 
historiography of science. Its causal link to a significant feature is enough. In this way, 
an explanation can provide interesting research questions (see Section 6.6 for further 
discussion).  
 Causal Explanation in Historiography of Science 
Our next task is to sketch a conception of causation that can be used in the history 
of science. As I formulate this notion fully in Chapter 6, only the general lines are given 
here. 
I take it that the conception of causation as difference-making (see Beebee & al. 
[2017]; Menzies [2004]; Lewis [1986]) is well suited to historiography of science. As 
Ben-Menahem puts it, “Historical analysis seeks to separate the factors that made a 
difference from those that did not” (2016, 374).29 In the difference-making conception 
of causation, “cause is something that makes a difference to its effects” (2004, 139). 
This notion is best understood by using examples.30 
 
Example 1: That I hit the cue ball makes a difference to the movement of a 
red ball. Had I not hit the cue ball, the red ball would not have moved. 
                                                 
29 This is not a new insight. Max Weber wrote: “[The] attribution of effects to causes takes place 
through a process of thought which includes a series of abstractions. The first and decisive one 
occurs when we conceive of one or a few of the actual causal components as modified in a certain 
direction and then ask ourselves whether under the conditions which have been thus changed, the 
same effect or some other effect ‘would be expected.’” (1949, 171).  
30 The first examples are not from the historiography of science since the built-in ideas about the 
nature of that field might obscure the insight one should gain from the examples.  
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Thus, hitting the cue ball was a cause of the movement of the red ball. (See 
the next figure.) 
 
Example 2: That I smile when I hit the cue ball does not make a difference to 
a movement of a red ball. Had I not smiled, the red ball would have moved 
anyway. Smiling is not a cause of the movement. 
 
Example 3: That the cue ball hits the right side of the red ball makes a dif-
ference to the red going in the left pocket. Had the cue ball hit the left side 
of the red ball, the red ball would have gone in the right pocket. Thus, the 
hitting of the cue ball on the right side is a cause of the red ball going in the 
left pocket. (See the next figures). 
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Example 4: That I hit the cue ball does not make a difference to which (left 
or right) pocket the red ball goes. The cue ball must be hit in both cases.  
Now it is time to shift the focus lightly. The task of the historian of science is not 
to find the causes of present scientific practices but to provide causal explanations of 
these practices. The conception of causation as difference-making is closely related to 
the notion of contrastive explanations31. We noticed that the hitting rather than not hit-
ting the cue ball makes a difference to the movement of the red ball. It is the contrast 
between hitting and not hitting the cue ball that is explanatorily relevant.  
Moreover, hitting the cue ball (rather than not) made the red ball move rather 
than not move. Hitting the cue ball in contrast to not hitting made the red ball move 
in contrast to not moving. The contrast between hitting and not hitting explains the 
contrast between the red ball moving and the red ball not moving.  
                                                 
31 There has been a lot of discussion about contrastive explanations (see e.g. Hart and Honoré 1959; 
van Fraassen 1980; Garfinkel 1981 and Lipton 1990). Here, I follow Woodward's (2003) theory. See 
the beginning of Chapter 6 for the justification of the choice. It is important to notice that Wood-
ward’s theory differs from other theories of contrastive explanations and therefore the account of 
explanation in this book does not exhaust the possible ways in which contrastive analysis of his-
torical explanation can be formulated.  
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In the similar manner, the cue ball hitting the right side rather than the left side 
of the red made the red go to the left pocket rather than to the right pocket. The con-
trast between hitting the left side and hitting the right side explains the contrast be-
tween the red ball going to the left pocket and red ball going to the right pocket.  
However, smiling rather than not smiling does not make the red ball move rather 
than not move. The contrast between smiling and not smiling does not explain the 
contrast between the red ball moving and not moving.  
Moreover, hitting the cue ball rather than not does not make the red ball go to 
the left pocket rather than right pocket. The contrast between hitting and not hitting 
does not explain the contrast between the red going in the left pocket and the red 
going in the right pocket. 
By following this connection between difference-making and contrasts we can 
sketch the notion of contrastive explanation and their use in the history of science. The 
basic idea in contrastive explanations, put in somewhat simplified terms, is that when 
we are explaining X, we are not explaining X simpliciter. What needs to be explained 
is why X rather than Y took place. In the explanation, we must refer to a factor Z that 
led to X but not to Y, and we must also be able to tell which factors W would have led 
to Y, had W occurred. An explanation answers the question “Why X rather than Y?” 
by stating that “because Z rather than W”.32  
For example, someone might ask why the red ball went to the left pocket. If we 
answer that it is because I hit the cue ball, this answer might not be satisfactory. Sup-
pose that the questioner wanted to know why the red ball went to the left pocket ra-
ther than to the right one. The answer is that this happened because the cue ball hit 
the right side of the red ball rather than the left side. The explanation has the following 
structure: The question, why X (the red ball went to the left pocket) rather than Y (the 
red ball went to the right pocket), gets an answer from the statement that because Z 
                                                 
32 There must exist appropriate counterfactual dependencies between X, Y, Z and W. If contrary to 
facts Z did not take place but W did, then X would not take place but Y would. I discuss the rele-
vant counterfactuals in Chapter 6. 
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(the cue ball hit the right side of the red ball) rather than W (the cue ball hit the left 
side of the red ball).  
Two remarks are in order here. First, it must be noticed that the fact that I hit the 
cue ball does not explain why the red ball went to the left rather than right pocket 
since the cue ball must be hit in both cases. Secondly, the question “Why did the red 
ball go to the left pocket rather than the right?” is not answered in a satisfactory way 
if the answer is only “because the cue ball hit the right side of the red”. Genuine un-
derstanding is achieved only when one knows when the red ball would have gone to 
the right pocket. 
 
Let’s take an example from the history of science33: We ask  
Why did scientists come to believe that atoms34 exist?  
 
This question has (at least) two readings: 
(I) Why did scientists come to believe that atoms exist rather than have no 
beliefs at all? 
 
(II) Why did scientists come to believe that atoms exist rather than believe 
that atoms do not exist? 
The first question can be answered by citing all sorts of factors, such as nutrition 
and oxygen, that are necessary for there to be cognitive agents. Had there not been 
nutrition or oxygen, scientists would not have had any beliefs. However, there is 
something wrong with this question. Even though it is significant that scientists came 
                                                 
33 See e.g. Renn (2005) and Psillos (2011) discussing this topic. I have used the same example in 
Virmajoki (2015). [In Finnish.] 
34 In a somewhat modern sense. 
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to believe in atoms, the lack of beliefs altogether is not an interesting alternative to our 
present situation. There would not be an interesting alternative to science; there would 
be nothing cognitively interesting.35 
The second question is much more interesting. Here the contrast is between two 
beliefs with different contents. The factors that are necessary for cognitive agents to 
exist are irrelevant in the explanation since those factors need to be in place in order 
for there to be either of these two beliefs. Those factors do not tell us why one of the 
beliefs came to be hold rather than the other. Thus, the informative answer is: 
(1) Scientists believe in atoms rather than believe that atoms do not exist 
because Einstein formulated an explanation of the Brownian motion and Per-
rin confirmed this explanation with his experimental work. Had there not 
been such explanation or experimental work, scientists would not believe 
in atoms. 
This answer has the form of explanation that was introduced above. It shows 
how the belief in the existence of atoms depends on the work of Einstein and Perrin.36 
However, even if we agree on the above reading of the question and on the pro-
cess, involving Einstein and Perrin, that must be analyzed in order to answer the ques-
tion, we may still have disagreements about the explanatorily relevant aspects of that 
process.  
Consider the following explanation:  
(2) Scientists believe in atoms rather than believe that atoms do not exist 
because Einstein formulated an explanation of Brownian motion and Perrin 
confirmed this explanation with his experimental work. Had someone else 
                                                 
35 As indicated, this analysis is developed in chapter 4. See also Chapter 8. 
36 To be sure, the knowledge gained was transmitted to other scientists and to the future genera-
tions through communication and education. In other words, Einstein’s and Perrin’s works are not 
the only factors that led to the current beliefs but they are (among) the most important factors. 
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formulated the explanation or performed the experimental work, scientists 
would not believe in atoms. 
If the first explanation is found (with historiographical studies) to be more plau-
sible, then the epistemological factors are relevant in the history of science, at least in 
this case. If the second explanation is found to be more plausible, then the personal 
prestige and social status are relevant factors in the history of science, at least in this 
case. It is an empirical question to which one of the explanations is more plausible. 
Thus, the model of contrastive explanations allows different kinds of causes to be con-
sidered as relevant in the history of science and the model even provides tools for 
comparing explanations that are based on different assumptions about the main 
causes of certain events and processes. With the notion of contrastive explanation, 
there is no need to make assumptions about what kind of causes are always at work 
in history. There can be (and there always are, as far as I know) many different kinds 
of causes that must be cited in a good historiographical explanation. These topics are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
Moreover, it is important to note that the model of historical explanations 
sketched here differs substantially from the idea that detailed descriptions of historical 
developments are necessary for historical understanding. This idea is made famous 
by Butterfield who writes: 
It is only by undertaking an actual piece of research and looking at some point in history 
through the microscope that we can really visualize the complicated movements that lie 
behind any historical change (1931, Section 2).  
The historians of science have shown, correctly, how complicated and multidi-
mensional practice science is. However, adding more and more details to our accounts 
of the history of science does not help us to make sense about this complexity. Instead 
of a microscope, we need a welding mask. We need to blind ourselves to the details and 
focus on what is relevant, i.e. on significant features of science and on the factors that 
they causally depend on. The presentist approach with contrastive explanations pro-
vides the tools for achieving this. This topic is also discussed in Chapter 6. 
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The fact that details only matter when they make a difference to an outcome also 
means that narratives that describe a detailed chain of events between cause and effect 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for an explanation. They are not sufficient because 
a description of a chain of events does not tell how the outcome depended on the chain.  
They are not necessary since sometimes many causal chains lead to the same outcome, 
given that certain initial conditions hold (see Chapter 8). In these cases, detailed his-
tories do not add explanatory force. Of course, it is still possible that a detailed de-
scription of a series of events is often more explanatory than a less detailed one. How-
ever, this has nothing to do with the amount of details involved per se. The only thing 
that matters is whether those details are such that replacing them would have led to a 
different outcome. As Ereshefsky and Turner puts it, 
The more the narrative is filled in, that is, thickened, with information about intermediary 
events that bring about the outcome, the stronger the historical explanation. [--] The mere 
introduction of any factor does not make a historical narrative stronger. Only citing factors 
that are causally relevant to the outcome explained make a narrative stronger. (2019 [empha-
sis added]). 
This means that we need to understand what causal relevance is before we can 
assess whether a particular narrative is explanatory. At the heart of every kind of ex-
planation lies causal dependencies.37 
Finally, the model of explanation in historiography of science can be summa-
rized as follows: 
                                                 
37 Due to these reasons, I will not discuss narrative explanations as a distinct category in any part 
of this book. That would lead us astray from understanding what causal explanations in general 
are. However, in Chapter 6, I discuss what makes one explanation better or deeper than another 
in a given context. If the reader is interested in analyzing what makes one narrative better than 
another, the ideas in Chapter 6 can be applied in such analysis. 
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1. By rational discussion we isolate a significant feature (F) of the present 
science.38 
 
2. Next we isolate a feature F* such that: if the present science had the fea-
ture F* in contrast to the actual feature F, the present science would be in-
terestingly different from what it actually is.  
 
3. The task of the history of science is to provide explanations of the form: 
Had there been (in the past) an event W, in contrast to the actual event Z, 
the present science would have the feature F* in contrast to the feature F.  
In other words, historiography of science provides explanations for signif-
icant features of the present science. (Virmajoki 2015). 
As we have now explicated the presentist approach in historiography of science, 
we need answer a set of common objections to presentist thinking. 
 Presentism Is Not the Problem; It Is the Solution 
Next I discuss a set of problems associated with presentism. This discussion 
shows that the problems are not a serious threat to presentism. On the contrary, in 
many cases presentism turns out to be the most promising way to avoid problems that 
are recognized in the philosophy of historiography of science. The discussion shows 
that presentism, with its causal criterion for what counts as a history of science, is able 
                                                 
38 We do not need to require that every study in the historiography of science is directly related to 
the present situation. For example, a historian can study why it was the case that Z rather than W 
happened in the nineteenth century, as long as it is at least prima facie plausible that the difference 
between Z and W had an effect on the difference between X and Y, X being a feature of present 
science, and Y an interesting alternative to it. I will discuss this topic in the further chapters. 
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to clarify many historiographical issues. Moreover, I argue that the wider causal per-
spective is useful in historiography beyond demarcating what counts as the history of 
science. In the previous sections, I argued how presentism can be motivated with ref-
erence to the central place science has in our world. In this section, I argue that pre-
sentism is preferable for reasons internal to historiography. I show that if we look at 
particular historical events and processes as parts of a wider causal nexus, many prob-
lems in historiography, such as questions of contingency of science and what catego-
ries can be used to describe past practices, can be answered. The following discussion 
also further clarifies the presentist approach and points out important aspects of pre-
sentist commitments. 
 
Contingency: One could perhaps argue that if historiography of science is only a 
study of causal histories of the present science, the historiography of science loses its 
grip on explaining how things were different in the past and how they could be dif-
ferent in the present. It is one of the main tasks of historians – the objection continues 
– to show that the present state of things is only contingent and that the ways in which 
societies have organized their epistemological practices have varied greatly. Rée 
writes: 
The contemplation of historicity – of the sheer singularity of places and times, situations and 
conjunctures, including all those you habitually take for granted – will help you see that 
there are different ways of looking at the world, and that what is obvious in one perspective 
may be ridiculous in another. (1991, 991.) 
I agree that there is some force in this objection – understanding how the past 
has been different, and gives us tools to imagine how things could be at present. Yet 
this kind of imagination does not give us any idea of what should have happened in 
the past in order for things to be different at present. As we will see in Chapter 8, 
presentism with its contrastive explanations can answer this question. When one 
states that the present science has the feature F rather than F* because episode E rather 
than E* occurred in the past, one is automatically providing information about condi-
tions (E*) that would have led to a different science. Thus presentism with its contras-
tive explanation is a rather powerful tool to reveal the degree of contingency of our 
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own scientific practices. The presentist approach allows us to pinpoint which condi-
tions our present practices are based on. 
In connection with this objection, one could also argue that how science became 
conceptualized (i.e. what practice fell under the concept “science”)39 is itself historical 
and thus a contingent fact (e.g. Dear 2005; 2012). It could have been the case that we 
took as scientific different practices than we actually do. This observation is not a prob-
lem for presentism. Presentists can accept that the line between science and non-sci-
ence could have been drawn differently, but once the line has been drawn, historiog-
raphy of science studies the history of practices that are conceptualized as scientific as 
a result of this contingent process. We need to separate the history of scientific prac-
tices and the history of our conceptualization of science. Even if it is contingent which 
practices we conceptualize as scientific and which not, the only practices in which we 
are interested when we analyze and evaluate science are those that fall under our ac-
tual conception of science, a point already argued for in Sections 3.1–3.2.40  
An analogy: Our conceptualization of different species of animals has developed 
historically. However, the evolution of those species is a completely different matter. 
These things need to be studied separately– in fact, only because this is separation is 
possible, have we been able to revise our conceptions of species (taking into account 
their evolutionary histories). Now, without a doubt, the history of our conceptualiza-
tion of science is an interesting process that must be studied. However, this is a differ-
ent project from the study of the history of scientific practices. Moreover, we need to 
make a further distinction between conceptualization of science (i.e. which practices 
                                                 
39 See Section 3.2 in order to avoid confusion. 
40 Of course this could be sometimes a fruitful way to reflect on the practices we understand as 
science. We could ask, for example, what would follow if we took an Aristotelian conception of 
the study of nature and applied it to our categorization of different fields of sciences. The scenario 
could reveal some implicit assumption in our categorization and therefore it could be a tool to 
understand our own sciences.  
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fall under the concept of “science”, see Section 3.2) and our explicit beliefs (or “ideol-
ogy”, as Dear [2012, 38] puts it) about the nature of science, as there might be a mis-
match between our conception and the ideas we associate “science”. For example, one 
may think (after reading Popper) that science must be falsifiable and still think that 
science exists, even though nothing, strictly speaking, is falsifiable. Such a person 
would have a false belief concerning science. It would be an interesting project to 
study the history of beliefs associated with “science”. However, this is a project differ-
ent from the study of the history of how certain fields came to be considered as sci-
ences. To continue the analogy, we can have a false belief about a species of animals 
and still know which animals belong to a given species. I may have the false belief that 
a particular snake is poisonous and still classify it as an Emerald tree boa. Why I had 
the belief and why I included the individual into the species can require different ex-
planations. To assume that the history of explicit beliefs concerning science reveals 
why certain activities fall under the concept of science is clearly a mistake based on 
exaggeration of the power of abstract ideas to unambiguously impose order on the 
social world. Moreover, the distinction between the conception and explicit beliefs 
grounds the possibility of there being false beliefs concerning science. If our explicit 
beliefs determined what counts as science then those beliefs could not be wrong. This 
clearly is not the case. 
What is argued above also means that, even if the conception of science changes 
or is revised41 and if the historians of science begin to study the history of activities 
that fall under this new conception, this has no implications whatsoever to the ques-
tion of which activities are reasonable to study as a part of the history of science in our 
society. Of course, one could worry that if our conception of science changes, then dif-
ferent practices might count as part of the history of science according to presentism. 
This is true, but there is no mystery here. The past remains the same but different parts 
                                                 
41 And if we still want to maintain that the new conception is a conception of science, which is 
debatable. The aim of the argument here is to show what presentism implies if we allow that the 
conception of science may change. 
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of that past become explanatory due to the change in the explanandum. That different 
explananda require different explanations is nothing to be worried about.42 One could 
perhaps also worry that, according to presentism, what once counted as a key contri-
bution to the historiography of science might lose that status due to the reasons that 
are independent of the developments within the field. I do not see a mystery here. On 
the one hand, if the future science develops causally from the present one, then the 
history of the present science will also count as a history of the future science. The key 
contributions would retain their status in that scenario. On the other hand, if the future 
science develops independently of the present science, then the key contributions 
would lose their status. However, in a world that changes so drastically, there is noth-
ing peculiar in the fact that historiography also changes radically. Actually, it is diffi-
cult to see what would be a better reason to reconsider the relevance of some historical 
works than a dramatic change in world history. 
Finally, presentism admits that the way in which the boundaries of science are 
drawn can affect science. We can say, for example, that “had the people P not been 
excluded from what is seen as science, the discussions concerning theory T would 
have been different and so would the results”. However, here we are not explaining 
when we would have had a different conception of science but when we would have 
had an alternative to some feature of present science (e.g. different results). In the ex-
ample, a different conceptualization would have led to an alternative to the present 
science (the conceptualization is an explanans, not an explanandum) and the way in 
which science has been conceptualized belongs, therefore, to the same historical plane 
as the rest of the history of science: it is part of the causal history of present science. 
Moreover, the beliefs that some scientists have about science can be a significant fea-
ture of science and therefore require an explanation. Therefore, beliefs about science 
                                                 
42 Moreover, nothing forbids historians from studying other parts of the past than those which 
have led to present science. Of course, such a study would not be a historiography of science ac-
cording to presentism but my claim is not that only historiography of science is valuable. 
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can sometimes be an explanandum in historiography of science according to the pre-
sentist approach. However, in such cases the explanandum is derived from our interest 
in the history of present science, not from an interest in the history of beliefs concern-
ing science.  
 
A boring list of causes: Someone might worry that the presentist approach reduces 
historiography of science to the practice of listing the causally relevant factors in the 
development of the present science and thus the project of truly understanding the 
past is abandoned.  
The worry can be mitigated: First, nothing in the presentist approach forbids the 
study of the working environment of Einstein, for example, for its own sake. It does 
not matter that such study might not have a direct explanatory motivation. Actually, 
this kind of “basic research” in historiography of science is highly valuable. The better 
we know and understand the past, the easier it is to find answers to explanation-seek-
ing questions when asked. Secondly, it is not true that explanation-seeking questions 
can be answered easily, just by taking a quick look at the archives. Finding out relevant 
factors requires substantial study. What is more, to establish a causal connection be-
tween two factors in history requires argumentation that is based on detailed descrip-
tions of the past. The claim, for example, that scientists believe in atoms because Ein-
stein [rather than someone else] explained the Brownian motion, can be established 
only by detailed argumentation that confirms that Einstein held a unique and author-
itative position in the scientific community. It is clear that this kind of argumentation 
requires enormous amounts of historical knowledge and detailed descriptions.43  
                                                 
43 Take a passage from existing historiography to exemplify the issue presented here. Cohen writes: 
“Why the Golden Age came to an end when it did, roughly by the mid-2nd century BCE, is a 
question hard to answer with assurance in view of the scantiness and unreliability of the evidence. 
Still, two major causal factors that we shall meet in our later cases can confidently be ruled out for 
Greece. At the time, about halfway between Alexander and the armed establishment of Roman 
supremacy, no invasion or military conquest was so destructive as to disrupt the entire culture. 
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However, it must be noted that not every aspect of the working environment of 
Einstein, to continue the example, counts as a part of the history of science from the 
presentist point of view, even if studying them is necessary for historiography of sci-
ence. Only those parts of the environment that are causally relevant to the present 
state of science can be considered and presented as a part of the history of science.44 
The point can be put as follows: pinpointing causally relevant factors is the true task 
of the study of the historiography of the science, but these studies must also display 
more or less complicated argumentative structure and accurate description of the past 
to warrant the claims about causal dependencies.45 These topics, connected with the 
boring list accusation, are discussed in more detail in the chapters to come. 
 
The past in its own term: Presentism has a bad connotation for anyone who is com-
mitted to study the past on its own terms. The warnings from Ashplant and Wilson 
may enter someone's mind. Among other unfortunate things, the presentist approach 
leads to the projection of present categories on the history of science and thus to the 
distorted use of the sources. It also makes us see only what is absent in the past and 
prevents us from finding anything concrete from the past. (1988, 255–266.)  Also Cun-
ningham (1988) argues that we should not describe historical actors by using present 
concepts. In short, we should understand the past on its own terms and the presentist 
approach cannot do this as it looks at the past from our point of view.  
                                                 
And of sacrilege, in the sense of a widely shared perception of current nature-knowledge trespass-
ing religious boundaries, there was very little question. Nor was any further handling of the vari-
ous branches of mathematical science bound to be fruitless.” (2010, 29-30 [emphasis added].) 
44 If one is puzzled by this, consider: If a car gets into an accident, the causes of the accident can be 
established only by investigating a variety of factors. Yet not all of the factors are part of the causal 
history of the accident.   
45 The idea of separating the main thesis of a historical text from the arguments for these thesis is 
presented in Kuukkanen (2015). 
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The answer to these worries can be found in Tosh (2003, 656): “The selection of 
criteria we adopt when defining a discipline need not affect how the selected material 
is then investigated.” Furthermore, Loison (2016, 33) points out that these are prob-
lems for what he calls “descriptive presentism” not for causal-narrative presentism 
defended in this book.46 Loison defines “descriptive presentism” as “the compari-
son/transcription/translation of the structure of a past explanation in terms that are 
understandable in the present” (2016, 31). We can generalize descriptive presentism 
here – as we are not dealing solely with explanations but many different kinds of fac-
tors - to be the comparison/transcription/translation of the structure of some cognitive product 
or process of the past in terms that are understandable in the present. Tosh and Loison are 
right: no need for descriptive presentism is built into the causal-narrative presentism. 
We can do justice to a historical actor and see the world from her point of view even 
if we study her as a part of the developments that led to the present science. The claim 
that an agent was involved in non-scientific (or proto-scientific) activities does not de-
mean these practices or the actor. It is not obvious why one should consider scientific 
practices to be the most valuable ones, and even if the scientific practices are the most 
valuable ones, we cannot do justice to a historical actor by changing the conception of 
science in such a way that it can be used to describe the actor. If science is valuable 
when understood in the present sense, it may not be valuable when understood in 
some other sense. Moreover, we have seen, in Chapter 2, that it would be a serious 
historical distortion to describe the past practices as the sciences in the past. We also saw 
that the presentist approach is tailor-made to avoid such descriptions.  
However, it must be noted that not everything studied in close relation to the 
historiography of science is relevant to the developments of the present science. Only 
certain parts of the actions of the past actors have turned out to be relevant to those 
developments and thus count as parts of the history of science. (Notice, however, that 
there is not a straightforward connection between the causal relevance and correctness, 
                                                 
46 The reader might also consult the papers of Hall (1983), Hull (1979), Moro Abadía (2009) and 
Pickstone (1995). 
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as we shall see below). Surely, the actors could not have known which aspects of their 
practices would turn out to be relevant to the development of science – they were not 
intentionally planting seeds for the future science. However, this is irrelevant to the 
actual influence they had. Thus, we must adjust Tosh's point: Past practices can be 
studied on their own terms, but we must distinguish which aspects of these practices 
count as a part of the history of science and which aspects deserve to be described for 
some other reason. In other words, we can study every aspect of past actors and prac-
tices in their own terms but – from the presentist point of view – not every aspect 
should be studied and presented as a part of the history of science. To repeat the point 
made in connection with the objection of boring list of causes: pinpointing causally rel-
evant factors is the true task of the study of the historiography of the science, but these 
studies must also display more or less complicated argumentative structures and ac-
curate descriptions of the past that warrant the claims about causal dependencies. 
Moreover, as historians are always products of their own historical context and 
as they always write to their contemporaries, it is impossible to write about the past 
completely on its own terms (e.g. Hull 1979). Thus, it is difficult to tell when a descrip-
tion of the past is adequate and when it is distorted by the present viewpoint of a 
historian. An advantage of the presentist approach is that it can answer this question: 
a description is distorted when it does not capture the causal structure of the given historical 
situation correctly. If someone claims that Darwin’s theory was accepted because its 
truth must have been obvious to the readers, we have not even begun to capture the 
complexities of the process leading to the acceptance of that theory. Debate about Dar-
win’s evidence and even his moral status were important factors in the process (see 
Bellon 2011).47 The claim, that Darwin’s theory was accepted because it was obviously 
true, would be unacceptable since it would not bring us a correct understanding about 
the causal structure of the history of science.  Thus, presentism is not only compatible 
with the idea that science of the past must be understood in its own terms but also 
explains why and when such descriptions are needed.  
                                                 
47 This topic is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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As a final note, descriptive presentism was defined as “the comparison/tran-
scription/translation of the structure of some cognitive product or process of the past in 
terms that are understandable in the present”. We now see why. This follows from the 
criterion that a description is distorted when it does not capture the causal structure of the 
given historical situation correctly. Historiography of science makes history understand-
able for us in the present and therefore explanations must be based on our explanatory 
resources. We cannot go beyond our own conditions; neither can we turn back the 
clock. Historiography of science attempts to build a picture of the causal networks of 
the past on the basis of current knowledge (I discuss this further in Sections 6.6-6.7).48  
Almost all of the causal structure of the universe must be described in our own terms, 
not in terms of historical agents, since the only causal picture of universe we currently 
have is described in our own terms. However, this is not the end of the story. Histori-
ography of science fits the historical actors into a causal nexus of the universe as we 
conceive it. That the historical actors had different ways of thinking is a component of 
our conception of the causal nexus of the universe and therefore we would distort our 
picture if we did not recognize how the historical actors were thinking (unlike us). The 
cognitive products and process are therefore a special case: they must be described in 
their own terms if we want to achieve a correct description of the causal structure of 
the history. Notice, however, that in the process the cognitive products and process of 
the past are incorporated as parts of our causal worldview. In the end of the process, 
there is no difference between “their own terms” and “our own terms”. 
                                                 
48 Notice that historical actors did this themselves: “Neptune was not known but we discovered it, 
and it explains the positions of Uranus”; “They believed that the surface of Moon is smooth, now 
we know that it is not”; why should we not? Accepting the benign difference between what was 
believed to be true at different times (or by different people) is nothing new. Moreover, it is nec-
essary to recognize that difference if we want to understand the past in its own terms as the historical 
actors surely recognized the difference. Therefore, I see no reason why we should attempt to avoid 
accounts that show that difference. 
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Blind alleys: It might be argued that we can learn many things about science by 
studying past developments that turned out to be blind alleys. The presentist ap-
proach ignores these blind alleys. 
In order to answer this, we must separate two versions of this objection. The first 
one is that there have been research programs in the history that (seemingly) turned 
out to be on wrong tracks or fruitless and were then replaced by (seemingly) more 
progressive programs. This case is not a problem for presentism. The process of re-
placement surely is a causal process that contributes to the development of science. 
More generally, this also means that Kuhn’s worry that  
Scientific development becomes the piecemeal process by which these items have been 
added,  singly  and  in  combination,  to  the  ever  growing  stockpile  that  constitutes  
scientific  technique  and  knowledge.  And  [historiography]  of  science  becomes the disci-
pline that chronicles both these successive increments and  the  obstacles  that  have  inhib-
ited  their  accumulation. (1970, 1-2.) 
does not arise in the presentist approach. 49 The view that the history of science 
must be explained causally does not imply anything about progress, cumulativity, or 
linearity. Which turns have taken place and which kind of causes have been at work 
in the history of science is an empirical question and must be answered case-by-case 
(I discuss this issue further in Chapters 5 and 6). Replacements and steps backward 
surely can be parts of the causal history of science.  
The second version is that there have been research programs that ended for 
some reason and were never replaced but just faded away. There are two possible 
answers. The first is to say that these blind alleys can be causally relevant to the de-
velopment of science in the sense that they may have informed people what they 
should not attempt to do. That a blind alley provides information is surely a causal 
connection. If this is the case, these blind alleys can be studied as a part of the history 
of science. The second answer is to bite the bullet: these blind alleys do not count as a 
                                                 
49 Kuhn’s worry also relates to the objections, The past on its own terms and The history of winners 
and triumphalism (see below). 
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part of the history of science. They can be studied, as I have argued, for their own sake 
– and we can even learn and find inspiration from them (Chang 2009, 256) – but they 
should not be studied or presented as a part of the history of science (see also Section 
3.6). They certainly are part of the history of epistemological practices, but we must re-
member that not every epistemological practice is a scientific one and that claiming 
some practice as science-in-the-past is seriously problematic historiographical move.    
Notice that the distinctions between different types of blind alleys is based on 
their causal role in the history of science. Such distinctions are important to our his-
torical understanding of those blind alleys and to our general views of science.50 For 
example, both phrenology and the phlogiston theory seem like blind alleys. However, 
their respective roles in the development of science, the factors behind the abandon-
ments of the theories, and our retrospective views on the theories differ.51 Equating 
phrenology and the phlogiston theory because they were blind alleys does not seem 
to serve any real historiographical insight. Therefore, causally structured historio-
graphy of science has an advantage in its ability to make those distinctions.  
 
History of winners and triumphalism: It could be argued that presentism only finds 
the winners from the history and celebrates those who got things right and contrib-
uted to the present science. This point was made famous by Herbert Butterfield in his 
legendary work The Whig Interpretation of History (1931). 
This is closely related to the two previous objections. In order to answer, we must 
notice that there are two ways of judging who was a winner at certain point of time. 
We may consider as a winner a person whose thoughts influenced the following gen-
eration the most. It is obvious that from the presentist point of view these persons 
should capture our attention in the history of science. Yet these persons could have 
been completely wrong from our point of view and thus their scientific achievements 
                                                 
50 For example, the theoretical continuity between successive theories is an important topic in the 
debates concerning scientific realism. See Psillos (2009).  
51 See Parssinen (1974) and Chang (2009). 
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are not worth celebration. The motivation for this definition of a winner is clearly de-
batable. Alternatively, we can consider as winners those who were right from our 
point of view. These persons could be celebrated if one wishes to do so (personally, I 
have no need for that) but it is clearly possible that these persons were not very influ-
ential and thus do not get our attention as a part of the history of science. (Again, they 
certainly are part of the history of epistemological practices, but we must remember that 
not every epistemological practice is a scientific one). Therefore the set of people we 
might celebrate and the set of people who are an important part of the history of sci-
ence is not coextensive.52 
To be sure, one of the main advantages of the presentist approach is that it gives 
objective criteria for which practices count as a part of history of science.53 Presentism 
ensures that one cannot pick one's subjects of study just as one wishes and thus pre-
sentism restricts the possibility of celebrating the historical actors one happens to fa-
vor for some reason. If the choice of the subjects of study were purely a matter of 
convention, it would be possible to ignore some historical actors who deserve atten-
tion. The kind of ignorance that could be based on an ideology or a subjective bias is 
surely something that every respectable historian of science wants to get rid of. The 
presentist approach gives concrete tools to avoid these biases. (This issue is also dis-
cussed in the next chapter.) 
Finally, one could argue there is a deep-level “winnerism” in the presentist ap-
proach: our present science is, in as sense, a winner as it became established rather 
than its alternatives. The history of science is then a history of a winner. If this is the 
definition of winner, then all historiography is necessarily winnerist. Every actor one 
                                                 
52 The formulation of the answer is based on the points made by Hasok Chang (2009). 
53 Of course, if our conception of science changes, then different practices might count as part of 
history of science. There is no mystery here. The past remains the same but different parts of that 
past become explanatory due to the change in the explanandum. That different explananda require 
different explanation is nothing to be worried about. Again, nothing forbids historians to study 
other parts of the past. 
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studies was an actual historical actor unlike her possible alternatives and therefore a 
winner. Such deep-level winnerism is therefore no argument against presentism. 
 
The problem of the Big Picture: One could argue that presentism is a form of big-
picture thinking since it defines the history of science as a comprehensive account of 
the developments that have led to present science. This kind of big picture should be 
rejected (Shapin 2005, 242). 
It is true that the ideal goal of presentism is a comprehensive account of the 
causal history of present science. Yet it is not committed to the usual sins that make 
the big-picture thinking questionable. Shapin (2005, 242) writes: “Big pictures imply 
coherence [and] in old versions [--] scientific coherence [means] the conceptual unity 
and universality of science, narratives of rational and linear progress, a specifiable and 
efficacious scientific method [--].” Presentism is not committed to the claims that the 
history of science has progressed linearly or that the development of science is driven 
by rational decision making and by use of clear methods. What turns have taken place 
and what kind of causes have been at work in the history of science is an empirical 
question and must be answered case-by-case (I discuss this issue further in Chapters 
5 and 6). 
We can say even more: Compare the presentist approach to some other frame-
work in which a historian approaches the history of science by some (perhaps implicit 
or intuitive) definition of science. If we allow this kind of approach to the history of 
science, it is difficult to say what prohibits a historian to define prior to the research 
science as a rational practice that is driven by clear methods. Thus, the distortions of 
the big picture would reappear since it would be possible for the historian to describe 
the history of science as consisting of activities driven by rationality and clear meth-
odology. This description would follow directly from the definition that the historian 
has chosen. Again, one of the main advantages of the presentist approach is that it 
provides objective criteria for which practices count as a part of history of science. 
Presentism makes sure that one cannot simply pick one's subjects of study as one 
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wishes and thus presentism can get rid of the biases of considering the history of sci-
ence as a history of rational activities driven by clear methodology (and any other 
unjustified biases).  
 Presentism as a Historiographical Tool 
As the previous sections indicate, the presentist approach can be seen as a (con-
ceptual) tool for historiography of science. There are three questions that every histo-
rian of science must ask and that can be clarified or bypassed with the presentist ap-
proach:  
1. What is the nature of science? In other words, what are the properties, if 
any, that make certain activities scientific?  
 
2. What are the driving forces of the history of science, or, more mundanely: 
what kind of causes have produced scientific developments?  
 
3. What are the results that the historians of science are expected to pro-
duce? In other words, should the historians of science just describe the past 
as it happened (and from the point of view of the actors involved) or should 
there be some more specific results to be communicated? 
Presentism is a useful approach to avoid the debates that are concerned with the 
first question. These debates appear as a distracting kind of philosophical pondering 
from the perspective of historiography of science, no matter what their philosophical 
weight. As noted, we can bypass the discussions about the nature of science when 
selecting the targets of studies in historiography of science. We simply focus on the 
practices that are considered as scientific by our society. One may or may not have a 
notion of “science” that she prefers but in the presentist approach this should not af-
fect how the targets of studies are chosen. The discussion about the nature of science 
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is not about which of our practices are considered as sciences. The most critical over-
views and the most triumphant celebrations of science discuss the same activities, the 
sciences of our society, even when they disagree about the nature and status of this 
activity. Thus, presentism allows us to set the disagreements aside and to focus on the 
same thing: to understand the present sciences and their history. Historians may dis-
agree after their studies but these disagreements do not need to complicate the begin-
ning of fruitful research projects. 
Secondly, the presentist approach and contrastive explanations help to escape 
the discussions about what are the real driving forces in the history of science. One 
does not need to decide what kind of causes drive the history of science before one 
begins the search for causal explanations.54 What kind of causes were behind the fact 
that some X happened rather than some Y is an empirical matter and depends on what 
X and Y are. For example, one could say that the belief in atoms was to a large extent 
produced by explanatory and experimental considerations, whereas the acceptance of 
eugenics was dominantly due to social forces. Moreover, in the cases where historians 
offer different explanation for the same episode in the history of science, the model of 
contrastive explanation helps to explicate the differences between these explanations 
and leaves as an empirical question which of the explanations is the most plausible 
one (see Chapter 6). This means that the historians do not need to build their studies 
on mutually incommensurable models of explanations that have as built-in features 
certain assumptions about what kind of causes drive the historical developments. We 
see that, again, presentism allows the historians of science to have a (minimal) shared 
starting point and leaves the most heated debates to be solved after the relevant stud-
ies are carried out. 
Finally, presentism allows the past to be described in its own terms and still de-
mands specific results in the form of causal explanations. As argued, to find out and 
to justify certain conclusions about the causal structure of the past requires detailed 
understanding and descriptions of the past. This means that the studies produced by 
                                                 
54 However, see Section 6.6. 
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the historians of science must be rich in detail and yet useful for those who want to 
understand the present situation. Therefore, a reader who simply wants to gain un-
derstanding about some era for its own sake will be satisfied by these studies as well 
as a reader with more present-minded concerns. This benefits everyone.  
 Presentist Historiography and the Philosophy of Science 
Now that we have outlined the presentist framework, one important philosoph-
ical question remains to be discussed. It is the relationship between historiography of 
science and the philosophy of science. How does the presentist approach affect our 
picture of philosophy of science? 
It has been widely thought that philosophical theories55 of science must stand 
tests56 against the history of science in order to be accepted (see e.g. McAllister [2018, 
239] and Donovan et al. [1988, 3–8]). An important consequence of presentism is that 
the testing of philosophical theories against the history of science is not a straightfor-
ward matter. In the presentist approach, a practice is a part of history of science if and 
only if it has been part of the causal history leading to the present science. Therefore, 
there are practices that are not scientific themselves but belong to the history of science. 
This means that studying these practices tell us not about the nature of science but 
how science came to be. It seems that we should not demand that our philosophical 
theories of science capture the nature of practices that were not scientific in the strict 
sense. This means that being a part of the history of science is not sufficient for a prac-
tice to serve as evidence for the philosophy of science. This may sound deeply prob-
lematic since it is usually being thought that the compatibility with the actual history 
                                                 
55 By philosophical theories of science I mean theories that philosophers of science usually are in-
terested in, such as theories of confirmation, explanation, scientific realism, scientific progress, and 
conceptual change. 
56 We need not bother what the testing exactly involves. The basic idea is that there are evidential 
links between history of science and philosophy of science. 
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of science is one of the best tests for the philosophical theories of science. If we lose 
this way of looking at the epistemology of philosophy of science, what is left?  
There are five points that mitigate the worries: First, it can be argued that the 
philosophy of science – at least some branches of it – has not paid enough attention 
even to present science (Woodward 2014). Moreover, the number of relevant historical 
cases is not the problem, as it is unclear how any historical study can serve as evidence 
for the philosophy of science (see e.g. Pitt [2001], Schickore [2011], Kinzel [2015B] and 
JPH 12 (2) [2018]). 
Secondly, it is not necessarily a bad thing if certain episodes and practices cannot 
be used as evidence in the philosophy of science. For example, it is not plausible to 
make the case that religion and science cannot be separated (or that religion can even 
improve scientific thinking) since in Newton's thinking science and religion were in 
close contact.57 In general it seems to be a good conjecture that the accounts of the 
older historical practices are less relevant for the philosophy of science than the ac-
counts of the more recent ones. Even if one is willing to describe (in an anachronistic 
way) these older activities as scientific, this does not make them relevant for the phi-
losophy of science. Falling back to the science-in-the-past view does not solve the 
problem. The fundamental problem, that the past was different from the present, is 
built also in this view, although in a deceptive manner.58 
In the third place, we can test a philosophical theory against certain past practice 
even if that practice is not a scientific one (in the strict sense). It is sufficient that the 
                                                 
57 For example, we can find this kind of argumentation in Brooke (2014, especially on page 24) and 
in Dembski & Ruse (2006, 44). My claim is not that there is no connection between the present 
science and religion – that is an empirical matter. I only argue that facts about Newton's practices 
are not relevant for establishing this connection. 
58 Moreover: assume, for the sake of argument, that science in the past was very similar to the pre-
sent science. If this was the case, there would be no reason to test our theories against history of 
science, as we would get the same results from studying the present science. We are facing a seri-
ous dilemma here. 
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past practice is similar to the present science with respect to some relevant feature.59 
What these relevant features are depends on the theory we are testing and the ques-
tions we want to answer. One chooses a feature of science that is to be analyzed and 
then studies the historical practices that share the feature. One does not need to con-
sider these historical practices as scientific. It is enough that the practices are similar 
enough to the present science for the purposes of the research problem at hand. If, for 
example, we did not consider Newton as a scientist in the present sense (due to his 
views about the connection between religion and physics, for example) we could still 
study his practices in order to understand how, for example, theories are formulated. 
Newton's practices with empirical data and mathematical models that were associated 
with the data are prima facie similar enough to present science with respect to the fea-
tures relevant to the formulation of theories (i.e. with respect to the use of empirical 
data and mathematical models). In other words, a practice might not be scientific yet 
still work as evidence for the philosophy of science. 
However, there is a complication: the problem of biased selection of favorable 
historical cases (see Pitt 2001) is magnified. First, the number of cases available for the 
philosophy of science becomes much larger once we allow that philosophical theories 
can be evaluated against “scientific enough” historical episodes. It seems that one 
could find support for any imaginable philosophical theory from such vast resources. 
Secondly, the notion of relevant similarity seems to guarantee that there cannot be a 
genuine counterexample for one’s theory. If such a counterexample is suggested, one 
can always claim that the example is not a relevant historical episode. Because there 
is not a fixed set of historical scientific episodes, there is nothing that a theory of sci-
ence must be able to capture. In a sense, a philosophical theory can never be incorrect. 
And if a theory cannot be incorrect, it cannot be correct either: if there were not scien-
tific episodes in the past (in the strict sense), then there is nothing that a philosophical 
                                                 
59 Sometimes a difference can be interesting: one could compare the history of science and the 
history of some other practice in order to find out important things about science. 
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theory could capture. However, it does not follow that historical considerations can-
not play part in evaluating philosophical theories of science. What follows is that there 
is no distinct set of historical episodes, “sciences in the past”, that have a privileged 
evidential status in the philosophy of science. Once this is accepted, we need a new 
picture of how philosophical theories of science can be evaluated against any 
knowledge we have, not just against knowledge of history of science. In a sense, there 
is nothing new in this conclusion. It is a plea for full-blown naturalism. 
I accept such naturalism. After all, science is a human practice and thus shares 
features with other human practices. We should be able to use the knowledge about 
these practices to inform our philosophical theories of science. I discuss this issue in 
Section 6.6. There I argue that all explanatory knowledge, ignoring disciplinary 
boundaries, can be relevant to historiography of science. It is not difficult to extend 
this thought from the historiography to the philosophy of science.  
In the fourth place, while tests requiring multiple cases seem necessary in eval-
uating general philosophical theories of science (McAllister 2018), it is unclear why 
we should build such general theories with wide applicability rather than answer par-
ticular questions. If we do not seek theories but understanding about some particular 
feature of science, the necessity of testing a philosophy of science against a wide range 
of historical cases loses its force. If quantitative testing is no longer required, historio-
graphical studies can be used in varied ways to answer any particular question. The 
amount of evidence is no longer a pressing concern as we no longer attempt to gener-
alize the results. I find this suggestion, that philosophy of science can be fruitful with-
out general theories, appealing. Not only the problem of lack of evidence is bypassed 
but the suggestion also captures the state where many philosophical debates stand. 
Take an example: In Chapter 8, I discuss how to approach the question “Could science 
be different?” I argue that this question must be answered in a piecemeal manner. 
Surely the exact notations used in science can be highly contingent while development 
of astronomy is almost inevitable. We do not need – and it might be impossible to get 
– a general theory of contingency of science. We need – and we can achieve – under-
standing about the inevitability/contingency of particular features of science. Take 
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another example. Similar piecemeal manner of solving philosophical problems is sug-
gested in the debate concerning scientific realism. It is not possible to give a general 
theory that tells whether realist attitude toward every theory – and toward everything 
those theories claim – is the correct one. As suggested, we should only focus on mature 
and successful theories (Psillos 1999, xvii), and, what is more, we might need to sort 
out in a piecemeal manner what parts of those theories deserve realist reading. (Psillos 
(1999, 103-109) discusses this “divide et impera move”). What first seemed like a philo-
sophical theory, scientific realism, now seems like a set of answers to particular ques-
tions concerning the status of particular theoretical claims.60 A unified picture might 
or might not arise, and yet our intellectual needs to understand particular cases under 
discussion is satisfied.61 
The idea that philosophy of science gives answers to particular questions recog-
nizes that the very nature of science as evolving human practice goes against general 
theories.62 Epistemological practices in the past were different from present science. It 
                                                 
60 Of course we need a theory (or rather a definition) of what scientific realism is before we can 
judge which theoretical components of science deserve realistic reading. My point is that we can-
not take scientific realism as a descriptive theory that attempts to capture all the theoretical claims 
in science.  
61 It even seems confused to ask whether scientific realism is a good general theory after we have 
decided which theories deserve realist reading. What should this general theory be about besides 
the cases already decided? There are not too many candidates as theories competing for realist 
reading anyway – or at least their number is lower than the number required for testing scientific 
realism once and for all, and therefore we should examine those theories one-by-one anyway. 
62 There is an analogy to the evolutionary contingency thesis: “all distinctively biological generaliza-
tions describe evolutionarily contingent states of nature [--]. This means that there are no laws in 
biology”. (Beatty 1995, 46). I do not think that it is correct to describe philosophy of science as 
searching for “genuine laws of science”. Yet, the more general philosophical theory one attempts 
to build, the closer that theory comes to an attempt to establish “the laws of science”. The fact that 
the guiding principles of science have developed through a complex history should make one 
cautious of their existence in the future.  
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might very well be that the development continues and with that development the 
need to reshape our understanding of science persists. Taking the historical nature of 
science seriously, there probably cannot be any interesting general theory of science, 
formulated now, that will be useful in the future. If the historical developments did 
not matter, we could attempt to build a general theory of science by studying only 
Aristotle’s work. This is absurd. Therefore, it is obvious that later developments are 
relevant. This should also be our attitude toward the future development. For example, 
artificial intelligence may change scientific practices fundamentally. It is therefore bet-
ter to have the ability to give admittedly limited but insightful answers than to seek a 
theory that has great applicability now. Presentism, therefore, goes somewhat against 
the spirit of general philosophical theories of science. However, the way in which the 
presentist approach orientates us in time enables us to anticipate our future philo-
sophical needs.  
Finally, we may question the fruitfulness of descriptive theories of science. Sup-
pose we had a theory of science that captures many episodes in the history of science. 
It seems that we could still ask whether science should have developed in accordance 
with that theory. It seems that it could be more fruitful – although much more difficult 
– to ask what would have happened in the past, had science developed in accordance with some 
philosophical theory. If we take a look at Krige (2001), it seems that different groups of 
scientists  claim that a new fundamental particle (the W boson) had been discovered 
at CERN after a series of events that was driven by (among other things) political 
pressures and hurrying. Should we accept the view that political pressures and hur-
rying are important factors leading to interesting results? This view would be descrip-
tively adequate; yet it seems that it should not be our philosophical take on science. 
We should ask what would have happened without political pressure and without 
hurry: if the result of the series of events had been at least equally preferable as the 
actual result, then we should not accept the descriptively adequate view. This means 
that: (i) our philosophical theories should have a normative tone, and (ii) therefore we 
should test those theories against counterfactual scenarios. Counterfactual scenarios 
are always difficult to work with. However, as we have seen (and as we will develop 
59 
 
 
 
further in Chapter 6), explanations in historiography of science have the form “(Actual) 
X rather than (counterfactual) Y, because (actual) Z rather than (counterfactual) W”. 
Testing philosophical theories against counterfactual scenarios is therefore a “mirror 
image” of explanations and therefore no more challenging: we ask “What would have 
happened, had W rather than Z been the case?” (the answer is “Y”) and decide 
whether it would have been preferable that Y was the case. On the basis of a philo-
sophical theory of historiography of science, we have here a suggestion of new ways 
of thinking about philosophical theories of science. 
Such a counterfactual account of testing is most naturally suited for theories of 
scientific development. However, it is not limited to those theories. For example, in 
the philosophy of biology, there are arguments in favor of explanatory pluralism (e.g. 
Théry 2015; Mekios 2015). One common theme in such arguments is that some partic-
ular account of explanation does not capture some of the important explanatory prac-
tices of biology. These arguments seem to have the form (F):  
Had scientists followed the philosophical account A, they would not have 
achieved some important (actual) results.  
More generally, there are many philosophical arguments that claim that some 
philosophical account does not capture the practices of scientists and they all seem to 
share the form F (i.e. they are F-claims). In fact, it seems that a commitment to an F-
claim follows automatically from any argument that proceeds to show that certain 
philosophical account is not satisfactory. If the claim “Had scientist followed the ac-
count A, they would have achieved the same results as they actually did” is true, then 
it is difficult to see what is wrong with the account A. For sure, the account may not 
fit the actual case at hand but this only means that there are many equally fruitful 
ways to proceed in science (which would be an interesting result in its own right). 
Only if one equates important factors with the actual ones it becomes possible to claim 
that something important is missing from the account A. However, in this case, one 
would achieve philosophical excellence by adding more and more details into one’s 
account. It is much more natural to suggest that an important factor is one that makes 
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a difference to the outcome, and therefore an account can be defective only if the pro-
cess described by the account would have led to a different outcome than the actual 
course of events.  
The presence of F-claims in wide variety of cases indicates that many philosoph-
ical debates have counterfactuals in their deep-structure. Once we notice this, an ar-
gument of the form F*: 
Had scientists followed the philosophical account B, they would have 
achieved some important (counterfactual) results.  
seems to be on par with “normal” philosophy of science. A counterfactual ac-
count of testing does not seem that exotic after all. 
Moreover, counterfactuals are also needed in interpreting particular features of 
science. For example, the divide et impera move has a modal aspect: “Theoretical con-
stituents which make essential contributions to successes are those that have an indis-
pensable role in their generation.” (Psillos 1999, 104 [emphasis added]). Our interpreta-
tion of a theoretical constituent depends on what would have happened without that 
constituent. We will also see in Chapter 8 that answering questions of contingency/in-
evitability of science involves counterfactual considerations. 
Conclusion of the section: In the presentist approach, being a part of the history of 
science is neither necessary nor sufficient for a practice to count as evidence for a phil-
osophical theory of science. Therefore, presentism is not the best partner for develop-
ing (descriptive) philosophical theories of science. However, as the discussion above 
indicates, it enables us to see clearly the relationship between historiography of sci-
ence and the philosophy of science against a conceptually clarified background and 
suggests therefore new directions for the philosophy of science.  
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4 WHAT  IS  SIGNIFICANT  ABOUT  SCIENCE? 
In this chapter, I develop further the idea that historiography of science should 
focus on significant features of science. Historiographical studies should be connected 
to our values and preferences. I argue that there is a serious need for selecting the 
subjects of studies in a systematic and intersubjective way. Such selection will lead to 
highly motivated and bias-correcting historiography of science. Moreover, the prob-
lem of demarcating science and non-science in historiography of science can be miti-
gated once we focus only on the significant features of science. 
 Why We Need Judgements of Significance? 
Science has many significant features. As a first approximation, the significant 
features are those  that are somehow important or valued – features that stand out 
when science, as an epistemological practice that has wide connections to various as-
pects of life, is reflected on. For example, the features of science that have an impact 
on our practical matters are significant as well as the features that bring meanings and 
understanding to our lives. In the presentist historiography of science, we study the 
causal history of the significant features of present science, as we saw in Chapter 2. 
Focusing on the significant features is important for three reasons: 
First, science is such an enormous enterprise that the history of every detail can-
not be studied. The study of the history of significant features helps to connect the 
results of different historians with each other, with the interests of scholars in other 
fields, and with the wider social concerns. Historiography of science can and should 
be interesting to a wide range of people.  
Secondly, in the absence of clear demarcation criteria between science and non-
science, it is important that we have some rationale to ignore the borderline cases of 
                                                 
I thank Helena Siipi and Juha Räikkä for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 
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science in historiography of science. In this chapter, we see that borderline cases can 
be usually ignored due to their insignificance. 
Thirdly, even if there were clear criteria for demarcation, the historians of science 
do not focus only on those features of the present science that are constitutive of it 
being science. In order to capture those features that are not constitutive of science but 
still require explanation, we need a new category: the significant features.63 For exam-
ple, we might want to explain why science has been powerless to affect the tobacco 
industry (see Rego [2009], discussed briefly in Section 5.3) but it would be incorrect to 
define science by citing that feature. In other words, we would like to know why sci-
ence is so powerless and yet it does not seem right to say that if the researchers had 
such power, they would no longer be practicing science (which would be the case if 
the powerlessness was a constitutive feature of science). The powerlessness is there-
fore a non-constitutive significant feature. Science has much more significant features 
than it has constitutive ones (or features that are serious candidates for constitutive 
features, as there might not be a clear-cut set of constitutive features, see Section 4.7).  
These reasons suggest that the judgment that a certain feature, F, of science is 
significant must be based on an intersubjective and transparent decision procedure. 
Otherwise there is (i) the risk that the study of history of F has no relevance outside 
the scholarly circles of historians, (ii) and the risk of biased historiography of science. 
64 The first would be the case, for example, if some historians focused on the sporting 
habits of scientists due to their training as historians of sports. This study would 
                                                 
63 Constitutive features are a subcategory of this wider category. We will see in Sections 4.3-4.4 
that a significant feature is one whose replacement would lead to an interesting different situation. 
A (counterfactual) situation in which science does not exist would surely be an interestingly dif-
ferent situation, given the widespread impact of science in our lives. Therefore, constitutive fea-
tures are significant features. 
64 By “biased” I mean historiography that deliberately or without sufficient reflection produces 
one-sided historical accounts on topics where such one-sidedness has potentially harmful effects. 
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hardly tell us anything illuminating about science to those outside the history depart-
ments (no matter how entertaining such a book could be in itself).65 The second would 
be the case, for example, if some historians, sharing a common political agenda, de-
fined as significant only those features that are directly connected to their agenda. This 
would lead to a biased historiography and our understanding of science would be 
distorted. 
However, it is not pragmatically possible that the historians of science first ana-
lyze in depth which features of science are significant and only after that begin their 
studies. Making warranted judgements about significance is sometimes a difficult and 
time-consuming process. Moreover, it would have a paralyzing effect on historiog-
raphy of science if it was required that a historian of science should not make judge-
ments of significance herself. Due to these observations, I suggest that we can be sat-
isfied if the following conditions hold: 
First, it must be possible, in principle, to check whether the feature F of science 
that a historian studies counts as significant or not. Thus, a historian of science must 
explicate the reasons which led her to judge the feature F as significant. In a further 
discussion by the society, these reason may turn out to be bad or it may turn out that 
the judgment that F is significant cannot be justified in any way. However, these 
should not prevent the historian from studying F if her reasons are at least prima facie 
acceptable. The explication of the reasons, then, serves as kind of a mark that enables 
other people to recognize and evaluate the possible relevance/irrelevance of a histo-
riographical work 
Secondly, in order for there to be a legitimate judgement of the significance of F, 
the reasons given for the judgement must be judged as good reasons at least by some 
                                                 
65 This is just an example. The judgement can be corrected by using the method of RE (see below). 
For example, physical sports may help the scientist understand anatomy. If this is the case, we can 
then say that the principle of significance that captures the significance of sporting activities is not 
“feature F is significant if it is related to sports” but “F is significant if it is serves as a source of 
insight.” 
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society that shares a reasonable value-system. As we live in a multi-value society, 
which consists of different groups that share different values, we cannot expect that 
everyone should agree about the significance of some feature F after a (necessarily, as 
a fact of life) imperfect discussion. However, explicating the reasons in the historiog-
raphy makes the process possible. Moreover, even if the historians can never achieve 
a point of agreement in their judgements of significance, the historians can at least 
understand why other historians make particular judgements once the reasons for 
these judgements are made explicit.66 This enables us to prevent misunderstanding 
each other. The explication of reasons also enables us to track down the changes in the 
judgement of significance in situations where the values of a society change. This pro-
vides us with a reflective understanding about our own historical situation. These 
achievements are all that we can hope for – a philosophical theory of historiography, 
such as the one in this book, cannot be based on the ideal that all the human societies 
share the same values. However, it is still worthwhile to attempt to give a framework 
within which the values of a field, such as historiography of science, can be discussed 
and evaluated. In this chapter, I show how this can be done. 
 The Method of Reflective Equilibrium 
Due to the considerations above, I suggest that the method of reflective equilib-
rium (RE) is suitable for deciding which features of science are significant. This 
method goes back to the writings of Goodman (1954) (who wrote about inductive logic) 
and Rawls (1951 & 1971) (who wrote about justice). Scanlon describes the method of 
RE (in the context of philosophy of justice): 
                                                 
66 Once we understand the values that a group has, we can also decide whether these values are 
dangerous or not from our perspective. However, my hope is that, in the historiography, different 
values do not lead to situations where societies form a threat to one another except for any intel-
lectual sense. What to do in situations where different groups form a serious non-intellectual threat 
to one another cannot be solved here, but belongs to political and moral philosophy. 
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One begins by identifying a set of considered judgments about justice. [--]. The second stage 
is to try to formulate principles that would “account for” these judgments. [--]. [The] third 
stage in which one decides how to respond to the divergence between these principles and 
one’s considered judgments. Should one give up the judgments that the principles fail to 
account for, or modify the principles, in order to achieve a better fit? (2003. 140–141.) 
In historiography of science, this method would proceed as follows: Historians67 
begin with the features of science that seem prima facie to be significant. Then they try 
to formulate principles that capture these features as significant. If it happens that 
these principles do not allow the historians to judge as significant some features that 
seem to be prima facie significant, the historians need to replace the principles or to bite 
the bullet and say that the significance of the features is illusory. The more the histo-
rians study the science, the more features of it we recognize. These newly recognized 
features can seem to be prima facie significant and if the accepted principles do not lead 
to this judgment, the historians need to reconsider which principles and prima facie 
judgments of significance they accept.  
It is important to notice immediately that the use of RE requires that historians 
and other people already judge some features of science as significant. There is noth-
ing dubious here. Such judgements are always involved when the targets of study are 
chosen. Moreover, as my purpose is to provide tools for historiographical thinking, 
not to create a competing historiographical tradition, I see no reason to put the quality 
of those judgements into systematic doubt (see also Section 4.6). For the purposes of 
this chapter, we can understand RE as a procedure that enables historians to make 
their judgements explicit and therefore to analyze what commitments are made by 
judging that certain features of science are significant and what is the cost of these 
commitments. By using RE, historians can follow the implications of their judgements 
of significance and adjust these judgements if the implications are unacceptable. In the 
                                                 
67 I will write about how historians in particular can use RE. However, everyone can use RE to 
analyze which features of science are significant, and the discussion about significance should not 
be understood as an exclusive task of historians. In fact, it would be preferable if a wide range of 
people with diverse backgrounds and educations were involved in the discussion about signifi-
cance. 
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same way, other people can use RE to analyze the judgements of the historians and 
find out whether a historical study discusses issues that the people are interested in.  
Let’s take an illustration. We might say that the fact that scientists believe in at-
oms is a prima facie significant feature of science as well as the use of mathematical 
tools. Then we could formulate the principle: a feature of science is significant if it affects 
a wide range of everyday practices of scientists. We could also come to believe that gender 
inequality is a prima facie significant feature of some sciences. Our principle would 
account for this: inequality affects a wide variety of everyday practices of scientists. 
However, consider then the structure of the lunch and coffee breaks in scientific com-
munities. These affect the everyday practices of scientists but do not seem to be sig-
nificant. It can be noted that our initial principle is too general. We need to specify our 
principle: a feature of science is significant if it affects a wide range of epistemological practices 
of scientists. Our initial judgements of significance about belief in atoms, the use of 
mathematical tools, and the gender inequality would still be correct in the light of this 
principle.68 (Note that this is not intended as the only principle that should be used; 
another example is given below). 
This example gives an idea of how a wide range of features of science might be 
considered as significant. We can look again at the sketch of aspects of science which 
are worth historical studies, as this list gives a good idea of the areas where significant 
features can be found: 
Social: How is science organized? What kinds of social roles are there in the 
sciences and how do these roles guide the practices? Which and whose val-
ues are built in the science? 
 
                                                 
68 The case can be made that an unjustified inequality between different groups of people affects 
negatively almost every goal-directed practice and thus also the epistemological practices of sci-
ence. I cannot argue for/against this claim here; this is just an example. 
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Science and society: What is the relationship between science and politics, 
science and the economy, science and different social groups? How 
global/local is science?  How accessible is science for different groups? 
How are the results of science communicated to and understood by society 
in general? Which and whose values are built into the science? 
 
Science and culture: What is the relationship between science and other as-
pects of culture (religion, for example)? What and whose values are built 
into science? 
 
Science and technology: What is the role of science in the making of new tech-
nologies? How does technology shape scientific practices? 
 
Psychological: How do individual scientists understand themselves? What 
kind of thoughts and emotions do scientists have during their work and 
about their work? 
Take another example. We may say that the observation of gravitational deflec-
tion69 is a significant feature of science because it plays an important part in the ac-
ceptance of relativistic physics (and thus in the overall shape of our physics) and in 
the understanding and technology that it provides. The principle would be: F is signif-
icant if it gives us understanding and provides technology. Then a sociologist can point out 
that, since the contribution to the technological state of our society is significant about 
science, the origin of the funding in science is also a significant feature of science be-
cause it shapes the distribution and use of technology in a way that matters (specified 
by the sociologists).  
 
                                                 
69 See Chapter 8. 
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 Contrastive Explanations  and  the  Canonical  Form  of Signifi-
cant Features 
We saw that it is important that the principles of significance are made explicit 
so that we can evaluate the judgements of significance made by historians in a trans-
parent way. However, there is also a technical reason to make the principles explicit 
and to track down the uses of these principles: A historical explanation is always con-
trastive (see Chapter 6). When we explain “Why F?” we in fact explain “Why F rather 
than F*?” where F* is an alternative that would make science interestingly different.70 
Thus, the principles on which we base our judgements of significance must be visible 
in the choice of contrast features. If we claim that gender inequality is a significant 
feature of science on the basis that it affects the epistemological practices, then we 
need to choose the contrast in a way that this contrast would mean interestingly dif-
ferent epistemological practices (in this case: better practices). We could, for example, 
ask why there is gender inequality in science rather than no inequality at all – equal 
scientific communities would be interestingly different from the actual with respect to 
epistemological practices (assuming that inequality has a negative impact on such 
practices). However, it would be pointless to ask in this context why there exists a 
gender inequality rather than inequality between people from different backgrounds, 
since there would still be an inequality and probably as problematic epistemological 
practices as in the other case. There is no relevant difference, with respect to episte-
mological practices, between two types of inequality; there is such a difference be-
tween equality and inequality. If we choose the first contrast, we do not explain why 
science has an actual feature F rather than an interestingly different feature F*. Such 
                                                 
70 See Section 4.4 on the notion of an interesting alternative. See also Chapter 8. 
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explanation is irrelevant.71 To prevent such irrelevant explanations, we need to stay 
on track with our principles of significance. 
To prevent situations where a principle and a contrast do not match, we should 
proceed as follows: When we use the method of RE, we began by prima facie significant 
features and explicate what alternatives to these are the interesting ones. The princi-
ples we then formulate must capture in what sense a significant feature and its inter-
esting alternative differ. Moreover, when we recognize further features of science that 
seem prima facie significant we must, again, explicate the interesting alternatives to 
these and then see whether our principles are able to capture the importance of this 
difference. For example, it may seem prima facie that gender inequality is significant 
and that an interesting alternative to it would be completely equal scientific practice. 
It may also seem prima facie that some other form of inequality is not an interesting 
alternative. If this is the case, the principle that a feature of science is significant if it affects 
a wide range of epistemological practices of scientists captures the sense in which one of 
these alternatives is interesting and one is not: with respect to the epistemological 
practices, removing inequality altogether would lead to an interesting alternative un-
like changing the form of the inequality. 
We are touching an important issue here. To understand the choice of contrast 
better, we need to note the following:  
The significant features can be captured by the canonical form: 
Subject S does P in location L at time T.  
 
The subject can be a cognitive agent (e.g. Newton or a computer); a group 
(e.g. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen); a community (e.g. contemporary phys-
icists); or an object (a particle accelerator). 
                                                 
71 We should not confuse explanatory irrelevance with irrelevant explanation. The first notion refers 
to a intrinsic failure of an explanation to find causally relevant factors, the later refers to a situation 
where we have a true explanation that is irrelevant with respect to an external purpose.  
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The “P” can be an action (e.g. looks at the sky); an activity (e.g. observing 
the movement of heavenly bodies); a having of something (having an air-
pump); an instantiation of some property/relation (e.g. being a good cal-
culator/being a part of a group); or simply existence (e.g. the existence of a 
particle accelerator). 
 
Locations range from a very limited area (e.g. a particular observatory) to 
a global distribution (e.g. teaching of mathematics) and to the whole ob-
servable universe. 
 
Time can also vary from a brief instance (e.g. a particular sound of a Geiger 
counter) to a period of thousands of years (e.g. the existence of mathemat-
ics). 
 
However, not everything in the canonical form must be essential72 to any given 
significant feature. An example: Even if it is – in canonical form - significant that the 
Laws of Motion have been incorporated in science by Newton in some particular location at 
particular time, we may want to abstract away some details, and say for example that 
that the Laws of Motion are incorporated into science is a significant feature of science. Here 
we have abstracted away the actual subject, the actual location and the actual timing 
of the creation of those laws. (We can also make the feature more vague; for example 
we could say that it is significant that the Laws of Motion have been incorporated into science 
for more than two hundred years and that they were formulated in Britain). We could per-
form such an abstraction if we thought that some part of our present science would 
                                                 
72 The use of the term “essential” is not meant to be read in a metaphysical sense. Something is not 
essential if changing it does not give us an interesting alternative. 
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not be interestingly different even if the subject, location or timing was different.73 
This process of abstraction is important for the subsequent strategies of explanation 
of the significant features: If we have concluded that some part of the canonical form 
is not essential to some significant feature, a causal explanation of that feature should 
not mention that part in its choice of contrast. For example, if we think that the identity 
of the subject (Newton) is not essential to the significance of that the Laws of Motion 
have been incorporated into science by Newton in some particular location at particular time, 
then answering the question “Why did Newton rather than someone else formulate 
the Laws of motion?” does not explain why science has the significant feature.74 
(Causal explanations are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). Even if someone else 
had formulated the Laws, the essential parts of the significant feature would still be 
the same and therefore we would not live in an interestingly different world. 
We have now seen how a coherent picture of significant features of science can 
be approached. We have seen that we must have an account of (i) the significant fea-
tures of science, (ii) interesting alternative(s) to each of the significant features, and (iii) 
a set of principles that allow us to judge the significance of features and explain why 
some alternatives to them are interesting. 
 Preferable Scientific Practices 
At this point, we need to ask what stands behind the intuitions and principles 
that determine what counts as an interesting alternative to some feature of present 
                                                 
73 I discuss such maneuvers in Chapter 8. 
74 This is similar to a case where we want to explain why a car accident happened but end up 
getting an answer to the question “Why did the cars collide in place L and not 1 cm to the left of 
L?” The exact location is not essential to the car accident; if someone died, it would be banal to 
suggest that an interesting alternative to the accident would have been one where the location of 
the fatal accident was slightly different. 
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science. I suggest that we should understand this as reflecting on our ideas of prefer-
able75 scientific and science-related activities. That we considered mathematical tools 
as significant is based on the idea that without these tools, our understanding of the 
world would be undesirably limited in comparison with the present state of science; 
that science has made nuclear weapons possible is significant because we would pre-
fer to live in a world without the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe. An account of 
what is and what should be preferred cannot be given here. However, what kind of 
futures are and should be preferred are the kind of questions that the field of futures 
studies has been asking (Marien 2002). Many workable methods of finding out and 
evaluating preferences have been developed (see e.g. Bell [1997] and Hicks [1998]). 
Even if it is the case, as Niiniluoto (2001) argues, that the question of what is preferable 
is a question that philosophers, not science, can answer, we can still think that histori-
ography of science should also reflect the actual preferences of people. We may con-
sider this as a democratic duty of the historians. Historiography of science can be seen 
as a field that answers the questions of the form, “Why does science have the prefera-
ble/undesirable feature F rather than the undesirable/preferable feature F*”, where 
the preferences that are built into the question can come from (i) the reflections of the 
historians themselves, (ii) the reflection of the philosophers, or (iii) the reflections of 
some group that is interested in the present state of science for some particular reason. 
However, we should not require that the questions about what is really preferable and 
what is not be answered before there can be fruitful historiographical studies. Instead, 
we should see historiography of science as a field of expertise that can help us answer 
preference-based questions when such questions are asked.  
 Science as an Epistemological Practice 
We saw that historiography of science must somehow reflect our notions of pref-
erable/undesirable scientific practices. Even though science is a multidimensional 
                                                 
75 The term ”desirable” could be used as well. 
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practice that has many connections with diverse aspects of life, we should not forget 
that science is first and foremost an epistemological practice. We already saw, at the end of 
Section 3.1, that historiography of science derives its raison d’être from the importance 
of epistemological practices in our lives. Our preferences and what we judge to be 
significant about science must take into an account the epistemological nature of sci-
ence.  
I suggest that there are four classes of judgements of significance that can be 
made if we take seriously the epistemological nature of science: 
1. We can assert that some feature F of science is directly significant because 
it is a part of the epistemological framework of science that consists of the-
ories, models, concepts, methods etc.  
 
2. We can assert that some feature F of science is significant because the 
epistemological framework depends on that feature. For example, the so-
cial structures of science and technological resources are such features. 
 
3. We can assert that some feature F of science is significant if it is the result 
of an epistemological framework of science. For example, nuclear weapons 
and medical treatments are such features.  
 
4. We can assert that the feature F of science is significant if the existence of 
F is somehow puzzling, given the epistemological framework of science. 
For example, scientific frauds belong to this category, as they go against the 
methodological rules and ethos of science. Another example is the inability 
of scientific results to affect the tobacco industry (see Rego 2009).  
This taxonomy shows how some particular features of science derive their sig-
nificance from the epistemological nature of science. The significance of science is 
based on its epistemological nature, and historiography of science should not ignore 
this. However, not every detail of science connected to the epistemological nature of 
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science is equally significant.76 Thus, we still need the method of reflective equilibrium 
to evaluate the significance of particular features of science. Next, I answer a set of 
problems that is associated with the method of RE.  
 The  Minimal  Method  of  Reflective  Equilibrium  in  the        
Historiography  of  Science  
RE has been criticized as a method. Here I discuss some of the main objections 
and answer them by arguing that, in the philosophy of historiography of science, we 
need only a very minimal version of RE.  
We may begin by noting that the method can be said to be conservative in that it 
relies on pre-theoretical beliefs that we have now (Cath 2016, 221). What if our intui-
tions about what is significant about science are based on the wrong beliefs that are 
influenced by our contingent past? Discussing RE in ethics, Brandt writes:  
Our normative beliefs are strongly affected by the particular cultural tradition which nur-
tured us, and would be different if we had been in a learning situation with different parents, 
teachers, or peers. Moreover, the moral convictions of people derive, to use the words of 
Peter Singer, “from discarded religious systems, from warped views of sex and bodily func-
tions, or from customs necessary to survival of the group in social and economic circum-
stances that now lie in distant past” [1974, 516]. (1979, 21).  
By analogy, the problem in the philosophy of historiography would be that our 
prima facie acceptable judgements of significance are shaped by a tradition and thus 
cannot be trusted. For example, assume that individual geniuses do not, in fact, matter 
very much is science. We could still have, based on an erroneous tradition of thinking 
about individuals and their place in science, the idea that the life of this or that genius 
                                                 
76 For example, the experiments in CERN are more significant than the fact that I read a popular-
science magazine on the origins of Finns even though neither would be possible without the epis-
temological aspects of science.  
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was a significant one. We thus make the wrong judgement because of the tradition in 
which we live.  
To answer this worry, we may first note that it would be ironic if historians at-
tempted to transcend their historical situation. Moreover, the idea that human beings 
are always shaped by historical traditions is arguably one of the greatest motivations 
to write history.  
Secondly, and more seriously, we can hope that the results of historical studies 
direct our considerations of significance – the more we know about the history of sci-
ence, the more enlightened judgements we are able to make about what is significant. 
For example, even if a historiography of science is written in reference to individual 
geniuses, nothing prevents these studies from concluding that this or that individual 
was not that significant after all. Moreover, as Cath (2016, 221) points out, it is built 
into the RE that we may sometimes need to abandon our initial beliefs. 
Of course, one might wonder whether conservativism and the possibly false 
ideas of significance could lead, in the end, to an erroneous but coherent system of 
ideas about significance. However, this objection is much more general. Even if we are 
not conservatives and our initial beliefs are not based on some tradition, we might ask 
what guarantees that we achieve correct judgements of significance if our prima facie 
judgements are false for any reason. Moreover, we can ask what to do if different prima 
facie judgements lead to a disagreement in the end of RE. (See Cath 2016).My answer 
is that the principles and judgements of significance we arrive at with RE need not be 
part of our final77 (and supposedly correct) position in order to be useful. The more 
we apply RE to our principles and judgements, the more these principles and judge-
ments allow us to be coherent and understand each other’s reasons. This can be expli-
cated as follows: 
                                                 
77 We, our culture and  nature change all the time and thus it might not even be possible or desir-
able to achieve a final position with respect to principles and judgements of significance that do 
not change.  
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By coherence, I mean the possibility of accepting or criticizing historiographical 
choices that are made on the basis of certain principles. The RE can be seen as a method 
that reveals the value-commitments of the historians (and the cost of these commit-
ments). Some feature of science might seem prima facie significant but a closer look 
could reveal, for example, that they lead to a historiography of science that is no longer 
connected in any way to the view of science as an epistemological practice. This would 
be an unacceptable cost in historiography of science (see the previous section) and the 
commitments of such historiography should be rejected. Moreover, coherence also 
means the possibility of taking someone’s principles and applying them to study 
things that this person does not study. For example, if someone writes, due to a polit-
ical agenda, only about the history of European scientists and justifies this (insincerely) 
with the principle feature F is significant if it is connected to the accumulation of knowledge, 
we could also study the history of non-European scientists using this principle. This 
would balance the politically biased history. In this way, the explication of principles 
of significance can at least prevent biased historiography, whether our principles are 
right or wrong in the end. 
Moreover, mutual understanding is important in order to avoid disagreements 
that reflect only different (non-malevolent) functions that different historiographies 
serve. Suppose that somewhere science has led to an environmental catastrophe. In 
the society living in the middle of the catastrophe, historians might well accept the 
principle F is significant only if it has the potential to cause an environmental catastrophe. 
This would be reasonable: the environment is the first and only priority which the 
society has at that moment. However, another society, living in a healthy environment 
and practicing only, say, mathematical astronomy, would not accept this principle. 
However, this lucky society could understand the principle of the other society and 
thus the motivation of their historiographical works. There would be a disagreement 
but it would not be threatening. 
If we allow that principles and judgements of significance can be used in a his-
toriographical work even before the method of RE is followed until the very end, we 
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must also accept the possibility that we sometimes use false principles and make er-
roneous judgements. However, everything said above about the problem of disagree-
ment also applies to worry about errors that RE might generate. Explication of the 
principles and judgements used in a historiographical study, even if erroneous, is the 
only way to understand and then evaluate these principles and judgements. We can-
not but accept that there might be disagreements and errors, but the hope is that these 
can be solved at some point in time, and before that we are able to voice some tentative 
justification. Moreover, even if there are always disagreements and errors, we can con-
jecture that the use of RE can diminish their number and severity. There might never 
be a completely correct (whatever this means) picture of significant features of science, 
but this does not mean that we cannot at least exclude the most erroneous lines of 
thought (based on dangerous politics, for example) that can hardly be accepted no 
matter how our considerations proceeds.  
As a fact of life, there will probably always be disagreements about and errors in 
our principles and judgements of significance. We saw above that disagreements and 
errors are not automatically problematic. Moreover, it can be argued that, in a philos-
ophy of historiography, disagreements and errors would not be as bad as they are in 
ethics. We would not do anything wrong (except writing misleading histories) on the 
basis of our errors and disagreements, we would simply have non-justified judge-
ments of significance. Thus, we can accept more tentative justification in the questions 
of significance than in the question of ethics. This means that the critique of RE as a 
method in ethics does not imply that RE cannot be fruitfully used in historiography. 
Of course, one might now ask what the point of evaluating principles and judgments 
is, if disagreements and errors are not very serious problems. The answer, as we have 
seen, is that (i) the principles and judgements can be updated and corrected by RE, 
and (ii) RE helps us to make the principles and judgements transparent. Even if we 
can allow errors and disagreements (to avoid paralyzing historiography), it would 
still be preferable to avoid them as far as we can.  
We can conclude that RE required in the philosophy of historiography is mini-
mal: The judgements and principles of significance are required only to: (i) make the 
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evaluative considerations of historians transparent, (ii) be acceptable by some reason-
able group and (iii) help us to get rid of the lines of thought that are the least plausible. 
Perhaps we could connect (ii) and (iii) and say that judgements and principles of sig-
nificance that are completely erroneous according to many groups can be rejected 
even if some groups accept these. These three conditions exclude the possibility that 
a historian can work on solely subjective grounds, the possibility of pushing hidden 
agendas on some seemingly acceptable basis, and the possibility that matters of sig-
nificance cannot be discussed rationally. These are the main risks once we accept that 
historiography is a value-driven activity. Everything that RE accomplishes beyond 
this is a further achievement that deserves to be sought for. Only the actual practices 
can show how far we get, but I see no reason to think that these further achievements 
are only a utopia. 
 Significance and the Problem of Demarcation 
It has been proven to be difficult to formulate the criteria that separate science 
from non-science. “[No] one agrees on whether there exists an adequate criterion of 
demarcation, that is, a reliable decision procedure for deciding whether something is 
a science (or, more modestly, genuinely scientific), and, if so, what that criterion is” 
(Nickles 2013, 101). However, this does not mean that the presentist historiography of 
science is a field built on an untenable conceptual framework even though it is the 
study of the causal histories of the present sciences. First, there seems to be broad 
agreement on which practices are science and which are not. The discussions about 
the demarcation problem is concerned with the criteria that are formulated to distin-
guish these types of practices from each other. (e.g. Hansson 2013, 61). Secondly, there 
have been interesting suggestions as to what separates science from non-science and 
it is plausible to assume that detailed enough criteria for the purposes of historiog-
raphy of science can be given. These two observations help us to bypass the demarca-
tion problem in historiography of science. 
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First of all, there are clear cases of science and non-science. In the historiography 
of the clear cases, there is no problem of demarcation for a historian. The historian can 
be satisfied with the fact that these cases are judged to be science. It is a philosophical 
problem what makes them science. Moreover, it does not seem to be a meaningful task 
for a historian of science to suggest that the practices that are considered as clear cases 
of science in our society are not really a science but something else is (this topic was 
discussed in Section 3.2).  
Secondly, not much depends on the question of whether some borderline activ-
ity is considered as science or not. As we have noted, historiography of science should 
be about significant features of science. This means that the historians of science do 
not need to make judgements about whether some borderline activity is really science 
or not (and thus spent their time in old-fashioned philosophical reflection). As the 
historians focus only on the significant features of science, there is no need to write 
the history of everything in science. Given this, they should not worry too much about 
the scientific status of some borderline cases. The history of borderline cases can be 
studied as part of historiography of science only if these cases can be judged as signif-
icant. I conjecture that most of the possible borderline cases are such that even if they 
can be considered – in some sense – as science, they do not satisfy the criterion of 
significance. This is an intuitively plausible conjecture once we notice that the signifi-
cance of science is mostly derivative from its nature as an epistemological practice. We 
can support (although not prove) this conjecture by considering a set of criteria that is 
suggested to separate science and non-science. It can be shown that these criteria are 
such that the line from science to non-science is parallel to the line from significance 
to insignificance. Thus, the features of the borderline cases do not have the same sig-
nificance as the clear cases of science and historiography of science should not focus 
on the features of the borderline cases.  
We can begin by noting that, even though Popper’s falsifiability (see 1962), 
Kuhn’s puzzle-solving (see 1974), or Lakatos’s idea of progressive research programs 
(see 1970) are no longer considered as a final word on the problem of demarcation, 
they align well with the ideas of significance. The connecting idea behind these criteria 
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is that science gives us new, informative, and useful knowledge. There might be some 
non-scientific practices that satisfy these criteria to some extent, but the ability to cre-
ate new, informative, and useful knowledge on a regular and robust basis is clearly a 
sign of scientific status. Now, if we did not have these robust knowledge-creating 
practices, we would not know as much as we do nor would we be able to set attainable 
research agendas. This means that robust knowledge-creating is a significant feature 
of science. However, it is difficult to see how these epistemological achievements 
would suffer if we did not have the borderline practices that also produce knowledge 
but only in a feeble manner in comparison to the clear cases of science. This means 
that the borderline practices are not significant with respect to our epistemological 
situation. The line from science to non-science is parallel to the line from significance 
to insignificance if we accept the classical views on demarcation.  
Secondly, and more interestingly, Hansson notes that 
Science (in the broad sense) is the practice that provides us with the most reliable (i.e., epis-
temically most warranted) statements that can be made, at the time being, on subject matter 
covered by the community of knowledge disciplines (i.e., on nature, ourselves as human 
beings, our societies, our physical constructions, and our thought constructions). (2013, 70). 
What is interesting to us here is the idea that some practice can be scientific only 
if it is connected to other “knowledge disciplines”. Scientific practices are dependent 
on each other, and if some field is isolated from other sciences then its scientific status 
is questionable. If scientific practices are closely connected to each other, then a differ-
ence in some of these practices would have a widespread impact on our epistemolog-
ical situation in general. This suggests that changes in some science would have an 
interesting outcome. On the other hand, changes in the borderline cases between sci-
ence and non-science would not have a widespread impact on our epistemological 
situation in general due to the relative isolation of these borderline practices. A change 
in the borderline practices would not lead to an interesting alternative but only to a 
local alternation. Once we remind ourselves that significant features of science are 
such that they have interesting alternatives, we can conclude that the ability to articu-
late, with the method of RE suggested in the previous sections, genuinely significant 
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features of some practices indicate that these practices are scientific along the demar-
cation line suggested by Hansson.  
Thirdly, Pigliucci writes: 
Presumably if there is anything we can all agree on about science, it is that science attempts 
to give an empirically based theoretical understanding of the world, so that a scientific the-
ory has to have both empirical support [--] and internal coherence and logic [--]. (2013, 22) 
Taking this suggestion seriously, we can evaluate how scientific some practices 
are by estimating how much empirical knowledge and theoretical understanding they 
give. Again, it is difficult to see how there could be any borderline practices that are 
significant. If a practice is poor in its empirical content and theoretical understanding, 
this kind of practice probably does not have much significance to us.  
We see that only if there is a borderline practice that has a significant feature, the 
question of whether the history of this practice should be studied as a part of histori-
ography of science would arise. According to the demarcation criteria suggested 
above, having significant features and clear scientific status go hand in hand. Moreo-
ver, it is difficult to see how such a borderline activity could have a significant feature. 
Assume (at least for the sake of argument) that astrology is a borderline practice be-
tween science and non-science. We could perhaps say that astrology is significant be-
cause it informs people in their decisions. The principle behind this judgement would 
be F is significant if F helps people to make decisions. However, this principle cannot be 
justified by reflecting on prima facie significant features of science in general. It is prima 
facie insignificant that scientists schedule meetings and thus help one another to make 
decisions when to arrive at a laboratory. We should say that F is significant if it helps 
people to make non-arbitrary decisions with detailed information about the factors that affect 
the decision. No feature of astrology satisfies this principle. The point here is that the 
borderline activities must be judged to have significant features on the basis of princi-
ples of significance that capture the significant features of science. Principles drawn 
independently of the reflection on the significant features of science are not relevant. 
This underlines how unlikely it is that the borderline activities have any significant 
features. We can conclude that if we can establish that some practice has significant features, 
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this indicates that the practice is also scientific. It is, then, unlikely that borderline cases 
enter historiography of science from the backdoor once we are careful with our prin-
ciples of significance. 
This, admittedly limited, discussion about the demarcation problem indicates 
that at least most significant features are part of the practices that are clear cases of 
science. All the answers to the demarcation problem discussed above gives the sense 
that the further we move from the clear cases of science, the less significant the features 
of the practices are. This gives us confidence to hold that as long as only the significant 
features of science are discussed, there is no need to worry about whether this or that 
borderline practice should be studied as a part of historiography of science. 
 Conclusion 
In the presentist approach, historiography of science is a practice that tracks 
down the causal history of the significant features of the present science. In this chapter, 
a process for deciding which features of science are significant was explicated. The 
process begins by judging that certain features are prima facie significant. Then we for-
mulate principles that attempt to capture why those features are significant. As the 
process continues, we adjust both our judgments of significance of particular features 
of science and the contents of the set of principles that we accept. The target is to bal-
ance the set of principles and our prima facie judgments.  
We noted that there are many aspects of significance and therefore we need 
many different principles to capture these aspects. For example, some features are sig-
nificant because they are related to epistemological practices of science (such as the 
use of a mathematical model by some group of scientists) in which some are signifi-
cant because they are related to our everyday life (such as nuclear waste). Yet, I argued 
that the common core that ties together all the different principles and judgements of 
significance is that they can be seen as connected to the nature of science as an episte-
mological practice even if they do not directly influence those practice. Science affects 
many aspects of our lives, but we should not forget the fact that even these seemingly 
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non-epistemological implications, such as the powerlessness to affect the tobacco in-
dustry, are a result stemming from the epistemological practices of science. 
At a more technical level (connecting to the argumentative structure of this book), 
this chapter has two implications:  
1) We do not need a sharp demarcation between science and non-science. Even 
if there are borderline cases of activities which are difficult to categorize as science or 
as non-science, this does not make the presentist approach, with its focus on the his-
tory of “what is considered as science in our society” an ambiguous one by allowing 
historians to focus on whatever someone might consider as science (i.e. on the border-
line cases). The ambiguity is solved by focusing on the significant features of science: 
I argued that there are good reasons to think that not too many borderline-cases would 
be judged to have significant feature once we have a well-established set of principles 
of significance. We can remain silent about the question of whether the borderline 
cases are really science and expect that the principles of significance will enable us to 
ignore those borderline cases. 
2) Our principles of significance should be such that they tell us what alternative 
F* to an actual feature F of science would make science interestingly different. Expli-
cations of such contrasts is a necessary pre-condition for causal explanations in histo-
riography of science once we build our theory of explanation on the notions of coun-
terfactual scenarios and contrastive question-answer pairs. Moreover, the contrasts 
between actual features and interesting alternatives to these features become espe-
cially fruitful when we attempt to answer questions of contingency and the inevitabil-
ity of science. In the chapters to come, I focus on these issues. 
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5 THE   NEED   FOR   A   GENERAL   ACCOUNT OF 
EXPLANATION   IN   HISTORIOGRAPHY   OF 
SCIENCE 
In this chapter, before formulating an account for explanations in historiography 
of science in the next chapter, I discuss some central topics concerning such explana-
tions. My strategy is to point out that there has been much explanatory talk in the 
historiography of science without any reference to the theories of explanation, and 
that this has led to many confusing claims, unnecessary restrictions, and unjustified 
distinctions. The literature surrounding the topic is enormous and I cannot do justice 
to its complexity here. Rather, my strategy is to highlight some relevant dimensions 
from the previous discussions in order to locate my own position in the field. Once 
these dimensions are made explicit, we are able to understand what kinds of questions 
a framework for explanations in historiography of science must address. Moreover, 
the discussion in this chapter points out the need for a completely general framework 
that does not exclude a priori any of the existing perspectives on the explanations in 
historiography of science but rather enables us to appreciate the richness in the variety 
and, more important, see the strengths and limitations of those perspectives. 
The discussion begins with Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientific development. I 
point out four possible perspectives on the history of science in Kuhn’s account. I say 
“possible” because I do not claim that my reading captures what Kuhn really thought. 
However, the perspectives stem directly from passages in Kuhn’s work and, more im-
portant, they touch issues that have been debated heatedly and that are directly re-
lated to the nature of explanations in historiography of science. These debates, rather 
than producing a fresh or detailed reading of Kuhn, are my main concern as they show 
how loose explanatory-talk has muddied the waters in the philosophy of historiog-
raphy of science. My aim is to show that the four perspectives in Kuhn’s account re-
veal four associated families of philosophical and historiographical issues: (I) the scale 
of a historiographical explanation; (II) the aspect of science that the historiography 
focuses on (i.e. the nature of the explanandum); (III) the role of notions of reasons and 
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rationality in historiography of science; and (IV) the role of causal explanations in his-
toriography of science. To widen our understanding of these four families, I discuss 
(a) some existing trends in the current historiography of science, (b) historical philos-
ophers of science, Lakatos and Laudan, and (c) the sociology of scientific knowledge. 
That discussion underlines alternative perspectives to those of Kuhn (or perhaps dif-
ferent readings of Kuhn and their derivatives). My aim cannot be to tell who was right 
and who was wrong; rather I will point out (i) valuable insights that should be appre-
ciated and (ii) damaging shortcomings that must be avoided when we build an ac-
count of explanations in historiography of science. 
I have chosen these four families of issues because they show how many unnec-
essary restrictions, irrelevant distinctions, and even confusions have been built into 
the philosophical reflections on historiography of science. The topics are also of the 
utmost importance when we attempt to understand the nature of explanations in his-
toriography of science. The nature of relevant explananda78 and explanantia79 in the 
field are the most fundamental questions we might address in this context and the 
issues (I)–(IV) are directly related to those questions. 
To make the connection between this and the next chapter more understandable, 
we should note that the account of explanations formulated in the next chapter  
(1) is completely indifferent to the nature and scope of the thing to be ex-
plained; 
 
(2) can be used independently of assumptions about the rationality in/of 
science;  
 
(3) is able to accommodate many kinds of factors as explanatory 
 
                                                 
78 Things (features) to be explained. 
79 Things (factors) that explain. 
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(4) defines two notions of explanatory relevance: one related to the explan-
atory depth and other related to explanatory goals;  
 
(5) explains how the explanatory resources should be managed. 
In this chapter, I explain why such a general account is needed. I began by shortly 
introducing all four perspectives and then I discuss each perspective and the associ-
ated family of philosophical issues in more detail. 
 Perspectives  from  Kuhn  on  the  Nature  of Explananda  and  Ex-
planantia 
Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970 [1st edition 1962]) had an enormous 
impact on the historiography and philosophy of science. In Kuhn’s work, there are 
many themes that are highly relevant to the philosophical reflections on explanations 
in historiography of science. It therefore serves as a valuable starting point for our 
discussion about the topic. 
According to Kuhn, there are (mainly) two kinds of periods in the development 
of science: normal science and revolutionary science. A normal science period is a one in 
which a paradigm defines the research in a scientific field. A paradigm is a "univer-
sally recognized scientific achievement that for a time provides model problems and 
solutions to a community of practitioners" (Kuhn 1970, viii). A paradigm, then, is the 
condition under which science can develop in a steady fashion. Revolutionary science, 
on the other hand, is a period in which an existing paradigm is challenged due to its 
inability to solve certain problems and a new paradigm is established. Different para-
digms are mutually incommensurable, as there are no shared standards that enable 
scientists to choose between competing paradigms in the period of revolutionary sci-
ence. Kuhn makes the point dramatically: “the proponents of competing paradigms 
practice their trades in different worlds” (1970, 150).  It is understandable, then, why 
a change of paradigm constitutes a scientific revolution.  
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Perspective 1: Macro-level picture 
Kuhn’s account attempts to establish a macro-perspective on science (Golinski 
1988, 14). The development of science is seen as a cyclical process where two types of 
periods – normal and revolutionary – alternate. To give just some idea of the temporal 
scales in Kuhn’s account, a normal science may continue over many generations: 
“many [--] works served for a time implicitly to define the legitimate problems and 
methods of a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners” (Kuhn 1970, 
10). It is important is to note that Kuhn seems to think that very general structures (the 
workings of normal science) and wide-ranging changes (revolutions) deserve the 
greatest attention in historiography of science – or at least they form the basic lines of 
research. As we will see later in this chapter, this perspective was soon replaced by its 
exact opposite in historiography of science. 
 
Perspective 2: Contents of science as explananda 
The main target of Kuhn’s account is to explain how certain ways of looking at 
the world become dominant (in the form of paradigms) in science. This means that 
when it comes to explananda the focus is on the contents of science. Kuhn writes:  
[We] shall deal repeatedly with the major turning points in scientific development associ-
ated with the names of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, and Einstein. More clearly than most 
other episodes in the history of at least the physical sciences, these display what all scientific 
revolutions are about. Each of them necessitated the community’s rejection of one time-hon-
ored scientific theory in favor of another incompatible with it. Each produced a consequent 
shift in the problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards by which the profes-
sion determined what should count as an admissible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution. 
(1970, 6 [emphasis added]). 
When it is said here that Kuhn’s focus is on the contents of science, this is meant 
in the wide sense as including not only facts (Kuhn 1970, 25) and theoretical claims (or 
“symbolic generalization”) but also metaphysical commitments, values and standards, 
and exemplars (e.g. Nickles 2003, 3). It is important to add problems to this list, as sci-
ence is dedicated to solving problems (see the citation above). This means that the con-
tents of science refers not only to explicit contents that are communicated through more 
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or less official channels, but also to a more general framework of views, “a disciplinary 
matrix”, that governs science.   
Of course, the notion of paradigm already points toward the social conditions of 
science. However, it seems that social aspects are discussed in Kuhn’s work only be-
cause those aspects are closely related to the contents of science. Throughout the book, 
the main explananda in Kuhn’s account are contents of science, and the social structures 
are discussed only in order to understand how the contents of science develop. In 
other words, when Kuhn sheds light on factors besides the contents of science, these 
factors are presented as explanantia. Moreover, there is hardly any discussion about 
the connections between science and other human practices. Kuhn did not seem to 
think that such connections are relevant, as he even mentions what he sees as “the 
unparalleled insulation of mature scientific communities from the demands of the la-
ity and of everyday life” (1970, 164). Later in this chapter we will see that, while some 
philosophical debates about historiography of science shared this perspective, the ac-
tual historiography of science did not. 
 
Perspective 3: Limits of rationality and the need for “external factors” 
Kuhn’s account of the development of science is based on the idea that only a 
normal science is a clear rule-driven activity where a community of scientists, sharing 
a paradigm, solves problems and evaluates the status of those solutions. When science 
falls into a crisis (when the existing paradigm is challenged), there are no shared 
standards left to evaluate how to proceed – no shared premises or values (Kuhn 1970, 
94). If we take rationality – in the strict sense - to consist of such rule-driven activity80, 
then there are developments of science that cannot be understood in terms of its ra-
tionality. Something besides rationality-based accounts is needed. 
For a moment (when discussing Kuhn), we can use the term “external factor” to 
refer to any factor that affects the development of science without belonging to the 
                                                 
80 This has been questioned, even by Kuhn himself (1977). 
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rational processes governed by a shared paradigm. We can divide these external fac-
tors into two categories.81 The first consists of reasons that are not based on a paradigm. 
Kuhn writes:  
Individual scientists embrace a new paradigm for all sorts of reasons and usually for several 
at once. Some of these reasons—for example, the sun worship that helped make Kepler a 
Copernican—lie outside the apparent sphere of science entirely. Others must depend upon 
idiosyncrasies of autobiography and personality. Even the nationality or the prior reputa-
tion of the innovator and his teachers can sometimes play a significant role. (1970, 152-153). 
The second group consists of causes. This point deserves its own treatment and 
we will discuss it next. However, we can conclude the discussion here by pointing out 
that a dualistic picture of explanation, often cast in terms of external vs. internal factors, 
is already present in Kuhn’s account. 82 That dualism, as we will see later, casts its 
shadow on many philosophical debates concerning historiography of science. 
                                                 
81 Someone might argue that reasons should be identified with internal factors, and causes with 
external factors. Such an argument does not succeed. First, the above citation from Kuhn (1970, 
152-153) shows that Kuhn did not think so. Secondly, in Lakatos’s philosophy (1978), rival meth-
odologies make the distinction between internal and external differently and therefore what is 
internal with respect to one methodology might be external with respect to another methodology. 
If internal factors are reasons, then some reasons can be external factors, depending on the meth-
odology. In principle, no identification of reasons with internal factors can be made in Lakatos’s 
philosophy. These are only two examples, but the identifications are doomed once we realize that 
reasons are present in any area of human life. If any such area affects science, then some reasons 
have an external influence on science. As Shapin writes: “More fundamentally, the division of the 
e/I explanatory world into the cognitive (science) and the non-cognitive (society) has never been 
systematically defended. Nor can one imagine a plausible reflective defence against the observa-
tion that both “society” and “science” (naturally construed) are systems of cognizing agents, col-
lectively arrayed, doing thing on the basis of what they know.” (1992, 349.) I will abandon the 
distinction between reasons and causes and between internal and external below, but the impos-
sibility of identifying reasons with internal factors must be noted as long as we use the traditional 
terminology before abandoning it altogether.  
82 The internal vs. external debate has never been unambiguously defined despite the widespread 
use of the terms (see Shapin 1992.) I use the distinction as a hermeneutic tool that helps the reader 
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Perspective 4: Causal explanations 
There are hints in Kuhn’s work that causal explanations are regularly needed 
when the developments of science are explicated. Even if the periods of normal science 
can be understood mainly in reference to the paradigm-bound rationality, Kuhn sug-
gests that even then there are causal factors that affect science. Kuhn writes: “An ap-
parently arbitrary element, compounded of personal and historical accident, is always 
a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a given scientific community at a 
given time.” (1970, 4). However, whether or not normal science needs to be sometimes 
explained causally does not matter much. The crucial point is that a scientific revolu-
tion can be explained causally, at least to some extent. There are explicit statements 
where Kuhn endorses the possibility of a causal explanation. He writes:  
One need [--] look no further than Copernicus and the calendar to discover that external 
conditions may help to transform a mere anomaly into a source of acute crisis. The same 
example would illustrate the way in which conditions outside the sciences may influence the 
range of alternatives available to the man who seeks to end a crisis by proposing one or 
another revolutionary reform. (1970, x [emphasis added]). 
Moreover, a search for causal explanations is seen as a valuable way of analyzing 
science: 
Explicit consideration of effects [of the conditions outside science] would not, I think, modify 
the main theses developed in this essay, but it would surely add an analytic dimension of 
first-rate importance for the understanding of scientific advance. (Kuhn 1970, x). 
These passages show that the idea that causal explanations are needed in histo-
riography of science is already present in Kuhn’s work. However, the exact workings 
and the role of such explanations were left unclear and, as we will see later in this 
chapter, this lack of clarity has hampered the philosophy of historiography of science 
ever since. 
                                                 
to understand what my account is not committed to. The possibility that there never existed a well- 
defined internalism vs. externalism distinction is therefore not a problem for my account as the 
account does not build on that distinction but abandons it. 
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Now that we have extracted the perspectives, we need to widen our understand-
ing about the issues generated by those perspectives.  
 Macro and Micro Historiography of Science 
We have seen that Kuhn’s account provides a macro-perspective on the history 
of science. It discusses long periods and very general themes: how a normal science 
proceeds under a paradigm, how a paradigm is challenged and a new one is estab-
lished. The account also seeks to establish repeating patterns of development in sci-
ence and “it purports to draw general lessons from the unfolding of our collective 
cognitive development” (Fuller 1992, 272).  
It is remarkable how dramatically the historiography of science has moved away 
from such macro-perspectives. In 1992, Steve Fuller observed that Kuhn’s Structure 
was the last book written from such perspective. Cunningham and Williams, while 
arguing for the necessity and desirability of such perspectives, also confirm the decline 
of macro-perspective or “big pictures”: “Big pictures are, of course, thoroughly out of 
fashion at the moment; those committed to specialist research find them simplistic and 
insufficiently complex and nuanced, while postmodernists regard them as simply im-
possible” (1993, 407). The trend has continued, as everyone can observe by going 
through “Current Bibliography of the History of Science and Its Cultural Influences 
2016” (Isis 107). More recently, explicit discussions about the status of the macro-per-
spective are found in Isis 96 (2) (2005). The discussion was raised by the observation 
that “[the] ideal of a general history of science seems gradually to have waned” 
(Kohler 2005, 204). Moreover, a section in Isis 107 (2) (2016) discusses the booklet His-
tory Manifesto (2014) from the perspective of historiography of science. This booklet by 
Jo Guldi and David Armitage argues that short-termism has “killed” the relevance of 
historiography (2014, 11). The need to discuss such a general thesis about historiog-
raphy in Isis indicates that the move from macro-perspective to micro-perspective has 
remained an acute concern in the historiography of science. 
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However, we should not overly dramatize the nature of the move toward micro-
histories. There have been many good reasons – for example, the problems in the sci-
ence-in-the-past view (see Chapter 2) – to be suspicious toward macro-perspectives. 
Moreover, microhistory has offered extremely valuable insights into the workings of 
science.  Therefore, I do not think that there is any a priori reason to be concerned about 
the marginalization of macro-historiography of science. Yet there is no more a priori 
reason to think that there does not exist any interesting questions that need macro-
historical answers. Whether or not we need micro- and/or macro-perspective de-
pends on the questions we need answers to.  We have seen (in Chapter 4) that histori-
ography of science should explain significant features of science. We also saw that a 
significant feature has the canonical form 
Subject S does P in location L at time T. 
L and T are not limited in any particular way. This means that it is possible that 
some significant features require explanations from macro-perspective. Whether or 
not this is the case is not dependent on the value of macro-perspective in itself. It de-
pends solely on what principles and judgements of significance we accept and what 
questions we ask on those basis. This is in accordance with reactions in the literature 
concerning the issue of macro-perspectives: Shapin notes that “[the] problem is not 
the scale of what we write about but our interest in writing about our subjects and the 
connections we make as we write about them” (2005, 242), and Gaukroger notes that  
[the] difference between what might be termed micro-history/short-termism and longue du-
rée history lies not so much in the length of the period studied but, rather, in the kinds of 
questions asked and the resources needed to answer them. Some questions, when properly 
formulated, require a very different kind of approach, as well as different resources, from 
others. (2016, 340).  
The choice between micro and macro-perspective cannot be based on the intrin-
sic merits of these perspectives but on the questions that the historians find interesting 
to answer.  
It must be noted that if it really is the case that “those committed to specialist 
research find [macro-history] simplistic and insufficiently complex and nuanced” 
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(Cunningham & Williams 1993, 407), then macro-history might very well be at an epis-
temological impasse. If there are interesting questions that require a macro-historical 
answer and if macro-history is impossible, then there are interesting questions that 
cannot be answered. This would be a sorry state of affairs. However, we should re-
main aware of the fact that even if some questions cannot be answered, the question 
might still be important. Otherwise we lose our epistemological modesty. The frame-
work developed in Chapter 4 enables one to discover those questions that deserve an 
answer. I leave it to the historians to decide which questions can be answered. Yet I 
would be surprised if it turned out that some questions are unanswerable only be-
cause they require answers from macro-perspective, given the heterogeneity of ques-
tions that our principles and judgements of significance allow us to ask (see Chapter 
4) and the associated heterogeneity in the possible ways to answer such question.83  
To sum up: According to the framework of this book, there is no need to decide 
whether historiography of science should use macro-perspective or micro-perspective 
or both. This is a false dichotomy. The question can be reduced to the questions about 
significance. Adopting the framework of this book, both perspectives are possible and, 
what is more, we can explicate an independent rationale for choosing between the 
perspectives case-by-case. 
 Moving Beyond the Contents of Science 
Kuhn’s explananda were the contents of science in a wide sense (see above). We 
saw that when he discusses the development of science changes in facts, theories, met-
aphysical commitments, values and standards, exemplars, and problems are to be ex-
plained. It is possible to go beyond Kuhn’s account and add, for example, causal mod-
els and data sets to the list of the contents of science. 
                                                 
83 An analogy: from the fact that we cannot know anything about some animals that lived 200 
million years ago does not imply that we cannot know anything about any animal. That those 
things were animals does not constitute the main epistemological obstacle. 
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It might be useful if we did not associate the contents with the conscious cogni-
tion of human beings.84 We could make a (admittedly rough) distinction between the 
contents that appear in someone’s conscious cognition and the contents that do not 
appear so. It is not difficult to think that a data set on a computer, developed automat-
ically from a given input, would count as a content of science even if no one ever 
checks the data. Moreover, the deductive consequences of a theory seem to belong to 
the contents of science even if no one has ever made the deductions – otherwise it 
would be impossible to reach a situation where an inconsistency was discovered. This 
means that the contents do not need to be explicitly formulated or cognized. 
Kuhn took the contents as the explananda whereas other dimensions of science 
were among the explanantia in his account of development of science. This is a crucial 
distinction since explanations provide direct understanding only about explananda.85 
It is remarkable to notice that such a content-centered view – even on the explanandum-
side – is not dominant in the existing historiography of science. Multiple aspects in 
addition to the contents of science have been viewed as worthy explananda in them-
selves. The attempt is not to understand science through them but to understand those 
dimensions themselves. In this book, I have built on this observation and argue that 
there is much more to be explained in science than its contents (no matter how broadly 
contents is understood). I cannot give a catalogue of topics that are not directly related 
to the contents of science here, but I hope that one example is enough: Brianna Rego 
discusses in the study “The Polonium Brief: A Hidden History of Cancer, Radiation, 
and the Tobacco Industry” (2009) the relationship between scientific research and the 
actions of the tobacco industry. Rego argues that: 
                                                 
84 Kuhn’s rhetoric (1970, 72 & 175) points to this direction. 
85 We might say that we gain a first-order understanding by explaining explanandum M by explan-
ans E, and second-order understanding by noting that E is explanatory. In Sections 6.4 and 6.6, I 
discuss how the choice of explanans might provide such a second-order understanding in two dif-
ferent ways. 
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While external scientists worked to determine whether polonium could be a cause of lung 
cancer, industry scientists silently pursued similar work with the goal of protecting business 
interests should the polonium problem ever become public. Despite forty years of research 
suggesting that polonium is a leading carcinogen in tobacco, the manufacturers have not 
made a definitive move to reduce the concentration of radioactive isotopes in cigarettes. 
(2009, 453). 
This seems like an explication of a prima facie significant feature of science, “the 
inability of science to affect harmful industry”. Yet, this issue has only indirect con-
nection to the contents of science. To exclude this kind of study from the historiog-
raphy of science would show the incompleteness of a philosophy of historiography of 
science.  
However, there is a complication in this innocent-looking issue. It has been sug-
gested that explanations of beliefs of scientists deserve distinct philosophical attention. 
Here I refer to The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK). David Bloor writes:  
The sociologist is concerned with knowledge, including scientific knowledge, purely as a 
natural phenomenon. [--] [Knowledge] consists of those beliefs which people confidently 
hold to and live by. In particular the sociologist will be concerned with beliefs which are 
taken for granted or institutionalised, or invested with authority by groups of people. (1991, 
5). 
We can for a moment set aside the issue of whether sociology has the explanatory 
force that SSK argues it has (I return to this topic multiple times in the rest of the book). 
The remarkable thing here is that it was suggested that scientists’ beliefs are important 
explananda if we want to understand science – even if the perspective on science comes 
from sociology. This focus on beliefs was also adopted by Larry Laudan who strongly 
opposed SSK. According to Laudan, both SSK and the “intellectual historians” are 
trying to explain “the belief of some historical agent” (1977, 193). There seems to exist 
a shared and discipline-independent idea that the beliefs of scientists deserve special 
explanatory attention. 
Of course, advocates of SSK did not claim that the beliefs are the only things that 
need to be explained. A special focus on beliefs was brought up because no one has 
ever doubted that other aspects of science, the non-cognitive ones, can be explained 
by sociology. (Bloor 1991, 3; see also Laudan 1977, Chapter 7). However, the mere ex-
istence of a distinct debate concerning the explanations of beliefs indicates that beliefs 
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are taken as a particularly important case within historiography of science. Moreover, 
we will see in the next section, 5.5, that David Bloor gave four tenets that outlined how 
beliefs are to be explained. Here we face another dichotomy, one that exists between cogni-
tive and non-cognitive features of science.  
The problem is that, while everyone seems to agree that many aspects of science 
deserve explanations, beliefs were taken as the only philosophically problematic ex-
plananda. For example, while formulating his tenets, Bloor suggested that the tenets 
are based on “the values which are taken for granted in other disciplines “(1991, 7). 
The tenets are an attempt to extend certain features of explanations in other disciplines 
to the explanations of beliefs. It seems that Bloor attempted to downplay the distinc-
tion between cognitive and non-cognitive features of science. However, his approach 
does not achieve this unambiguously. In order to derive an account of explanation of 
beliefs from other disciplines, one must understand how the explanations in other dis-
ciplines work. As we will see in Section 5.5, this makes Bloor’s tenets extremely diffi-
cult to interpret. There are many possible ways to interpret the tenets, only some of 
which are compatible with the nature of explanations in other disciplines. If one sug-
gests that explanations of beliefs must follow the same strategies as explanations in 
other fields, then vague conceptions of the strategies of explanation in other fields lead 
to a situation where explanations of beliefs in fact follow different strategies. The dis-
tinction between cognitive and non-cognitive remains, but only unnoticed this time. 
Moreover, Bloor also implicitly preserves the distinction between beliefs and the rest 
of science as he attempts to apply principles formulated in the tenets within the cate-
gory of beliefs, whereas those principles can be applied to beliefs only if beliefs are 
included in a much wider category where the principles already hold (see Section 5.5).   
I suggest that we should be more modest and problematize also the nature of 
explanation of non-cognitive features of science. As we will see in the rest of the book, 
the nature of explanation is never a matter that can be trivially explicated. Only by 
accepting such modesty are we able to seek a general account of explanations that 
captures how both cognitive and non-cognitive features of science can be explained. I 
take the fact that the explanations of beliefs have seemed obscure as evidence about 
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the insufficiency of the (sometimes intuitive) accounts of explanations that attempt to 
capture such explanations. It seems mysterious how we could have at the same time 
a plausible and fully formulated account of explanation as well as difficulties in un-
derstanding how beliefs should be explained (see Section 5.5 for such ambiguous sug-
gestions).86 Moreover, we should not expect that some principles that hold within the 
category of explanations in general hold also within the subset of explanations of be-
liefs. Therefore an account of explanations of beliefs cannot be explicated after a more 
general account has been explicated. Rather, the general account must incorporate be-
liefs from the beginning.  
To sum up, the discussion in this section indicates that the historiography can 
and should explain many aspects of science from the beliefs and contents to the wide 
connections that science has with other aspects of our lives. We have seen that in the 
presentist approach, historiography of science explains significant features of science. 
In Chapter 4 we saw that different kinds of features of science can be significant. 
Therefore, the framework of this book is well suited to capture the variety of topics on 
which the historians of science can focus on. Again, the issue is not whether some topic 
is about beliefs, contents, or something else. The only thing that matters is the signifi-
cance of the topic. Moreover, we should not expect that only belief-explanations are 
philosophically problematic. If explanations of beliefs seem difficult to understand, 
we have a much deeper problem in our account of explanation. The traditional dis-
tinction between cognitive and non-cognitive should not be allowed to put any weight 
on us. In order to build a general account of explanations, we must downplay the 
importance of this traditional distinction. 
                                                 
86 If we never achieve an account that can explain both cognitive and non-cognitive features of 
science, then we should perhaps admit special status for beliefs. This would be an extremely in-
teresting result. However, such a result can be achieved only by formulating different accounts of 
explanation (as I formulate one in this book) and refuting them. This is the ultimate reason why I 
think that the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive is unjustified at the moment and 
should not be built into the philosophy of historiography of science. (See also Section 5.1 Perspective 
3: Limits of rationality and the need for “external factors”.) 
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 Rationality in Historiography of Science  
My discussion concerning the perspectives on the role of rationality is mainly 
negative. In this book, I do not discuss the theories of rationality and the question 
whether science can or should be seen as rational. One reason for such an omission is 
that the account of explanation formulated is that this book does not focus exclusively 
on explaining the contents of science, as we saw in the previous section. It is an account 
that can be used to explain whatever is taken to be a significant feature of science. 
Therefore, the account must be much more general than those built around rationality 
(see below). Moreover, it is a “monistic” account where every explanation has the 
same counterfactual and contrastive form; explanations track down patterns of coun-
terfactual dependencies. The account does not include categorical distinctions be-
tween things that can be explained by rationality or reasons and things that are ex-
plained in some other way. The generality and the monistic nature make the separate 
category of rationality-based (or, more generally, reason-based) explanations redun-
dant. This does not mean that the account implies that science is not rational. Rather, 
the account makes no assumptions about the issue.  
Notice that what was said above goes against some well-known views. For ex-
ample, Robert K. Merton argues that “Specific discoveries and inventions belong to 
the internal history of science and are largely independent of factors other than the 
purely scientific” (Merton 1938, 75). Moreover, Imre Lakatos argues that we should 
first attempt to “rationally reconstruct” the history of science as far as possible and 
only after such reconstruction use “external factors” to explain what could not be fit-
ted into the rational reconstruction (1978, 102). Finally, Larry Laudan argues that “ap-
plication of cognitive sociology to historical cases must await the prior results of ap-
plication of methods of intellectual history to those cases” (1977, 208 [emphasis re-
moved]). All these positions imply an explanatory dualism between rationality-based 
and other kinds of explanations.  
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As already hinted in Chapter 3 (and as is fully explained in the next chapter), the 
account of historiographical explanations developed in this book is based on counter-
factuals of the form “Had W rather than Z, Y rather than X would have happened”. I 
take it that such counterfactual can also cite reasons or beliefs and therefore my ac-
count can incorporate explanations that cite reasons and beliefs. Moreover, we can 
follow rational, as well as non-rational, reasoning (no matter how the notion of ration-
ality is understood) of some historical actor step-by-step and tell how the agent’s con-
clusion would have been different, had a different step been taken. Therefore, my ac-
count is completely compatible with the reason-based (rational as well as non-rational) 
explanations. 
Consider the following passage (Krige 2001, 537). It describes the final steps be-
fore it was claimed that a new fundamental particle (the W boson) had been discov-
ered at CERN: 
According to Schopper's account, then, two factors [sic] left the CERN directorate little op-
tion but to place their faith in Rubbia's results and claim that the W had been discovered. 
One was intrinsic to the internal politics and institutional logic of a contemporary high-en-
ergy physics laboratory like CERN. The Stanford physicist Stanley Wojcicki has described it 
well: "UA1 decided to go public and publish–that certainly was their decision alone–and 
once that was done the news was in the public domain. In light of its importance it would 
have been very unusual for CERN to officially ignore this fact and not have a press confer-
ence." The second factor was Schopper's promise to Thatcher and the need to avoid doing 
anything that might offend one of the major contributors to the CERN budget. When the 
laboratory was established in the early 1950s the British government had had grave doubts 
about its participation in the venture; in the late 1960s it had initially refused to participate 
in the construction of the SPS. Now the Conservative government was hesitating about its 
engagement in CERN's next big machine, the LEP, plans for which had been adopted in 
principle by the member states a few months before. The discovery of the W helped dispel 
any remaining doubts about the quality of the physics being done at CERN and hastened 
the final agreement to finance the electron-positron collider.  
Krige’s study, taken as a whole, discusses many types of factor that led to the 
claim that the W boson was found (see Sections 3.1 and 7.2). Here it is obvious that 
reasons were an essential part of the unfolding of the process. There are no distinctions 
between causes and reasons; both are parts of the same narrative. Even the exact term 
“factor” is used in the passage. Moreover, it is quite natural to interpret the claims 
here as having implicit counterfactual form: “Had the subject matter been less im-
portant, CERN could have ignored the maneuver of UA1 team”; “Had there not been 
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a need to be cautious with major contributors, different decision could have been 
made”.  
What needs to be taken seriously is Lakatos’s view that we need some way to 
compare different explanatory frameworks. Lakatos thought that this problem con-
cerns only the choice of a framework of rationality. (Lakatos 1978; see also Kuukkanen 
2017). However, as historiography of science explains the features of science that be-
long to different kinds, not just the contents of science, the discipline also needs to 
incorporate multiple kinds of factors – not just reasons and rationality – to its explan-
atory resources (i.e. the kinds of factors that can be cited in the explanations). There-
fore, the choice between explanatory frameworks is a much more complex task than 
a Lakatosian comparison of the theories of scientific rationality. I discuss the issue of 
explanatory resources in Section 6.6. The outcome of that discussion is that our ex-
planatory resources should be balanced between power and simplicity; whether or 
not some notion of rationality is a part of such resources is a matter that can be decided 
only after we have studied the history of science. 
Conclusion: I do not distinguish reason- or rationality-based explanations from 
other kinds of explanations nor do I assume that we need to have a theory of rational-
ity before studying the developments in science. An account of rationality might 
emerge from historiographical studies if they are conducted in accordance with the 
framework of this book.87 This means that the framework developed in this book is 
independent of any particular theory of rationality in science and even from the as-
sumption that scientists are rational. In this sense, it is suitable for scholars with dif-
ferent assumptions. However, it carries a promise of convergence of opinions about 
the rationality of science. Again, the framework shows its ability to unify many differ-
ent perspectives on science and to avoid unnecessary distinctions.  
                                                 
87 Note that I am not suggesting that we test philosophical theories against a history of science (see 
Section 3.6).  The emergence of a theory of scientific rationality would be more a fortunate side-
effect of my framework rather than an explicit goal. 
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 Causal Explanations 
We have seen that Merton, Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan all argued that “external 
factors” – something outside the domain of scientific reasoning – are, at least some-
times, needed to explain scientific developments. However, what counts as an exter-
nal factor varies between the accounts. For Merton, such things as military, economic, 
and technical influences counted as external factors (1938, 557). For Kuhn, everything 
outside paradigm-bound processes can be counted as an external factor – even reasons 
if they are not embedded in a paradigm. For Lakatos and Laudan, external factors are 
whatever is needed to fill the explanatory gaps in the most successful rational account 
(although Lakatos and Laudan seem to think that sociology or “socio-psychology” are 
the disciplines that will fill the gaps (Laudan 1977, 202; Lakatos 1978, 102)). This indi-
cates that there is a wide variety of explanatory factors that might be needed in histo-
riography of science, even under the assumption that internal and external history can 
be distinguished. External factors might include anything from reasons to social struc-
tures to technology.   
This variety of external factors - not to mention their historical changeability 
(Shapin 1992, 351) - already points toward the artificiality of the distinction between 
internal and external factors. The artificiality becomes even clearer when we remem-
ber that there is much more to be explained in historiography of science than the con-
tents of science. If we were to stick to the category of internal explanations, these ex-
planations would explain only one kind of explanandum (the contents of science) and 
they would do so in an incomplete manner (as we saw, everyone cited above thinks 
that there would be an explanatory use for external factors). Moreover, we saw in the 
previous section that the explanations citing reasons and rationality can be subsumed 
under a wider category of explanations that is based on counterfactuals. This means 
that internal explanations (as rationality/reason-based explanations) do not have a 
distinctive explanatory structure and therefore internal explanations do not deserve a 
distinct category due to their explanatory structure. For these reasons, I will abandon 
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the distinction between external and internal explanations as an analytical tool.88 We 
need much more general tools to understand historiographical explanations. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the nature of causal explanations in historiog-
raphy of science. This account is based on a counterfactual account of explanation, 
where explanations have the form “Had W rather than Z happened, Y rather than X 
would have happened”. If one feels uneasy about calling reason-citing explanations 
“causal explanations”, one may simply forget the terminology used. The terminology 
does not matter much. The terminology is mainly based on the origins of the account 
(Woodward 2003). However, I prefer to speak of causal explanations, as one of the 
main target of this book is to clarify the structure and role of causal explanations (in 
the sense of not including reason-based explanations) in historiography of science – 
and since I discuss causal explanations anyway and since I see all the explanations as 
having the same form, I use the term “causal explanation” to include all the explana-
tions sharing that form. This is simply a matter of convenience, and it has no anti-
quated implications that it might be thought to have – that there are strict laws of 
nature, similar to those in physics, that govern human actions, etc. As we will see in 
the next chapter, the account of causal explanation formulated in this book carries no 
such metaphysical commitments – it is a methodological tool. 
An account of causal explanations that explicates many important notions re-
lated to such explanations has an intrinsic philosophical value. However, it is even 
more valuable once we notice how often there has been explanatory talk in the histo-
riography of science without any reference to the theories of explanation. This situa-
tion is, of course, familiar everywhere in human life. The problem becomes pressing 
once we notice that loosely formulated explanatory claims in the historiography of 
science are sometimes seen as having extreme power to change our views on the na-
ture of science. This makes them worthy of special attention and systematic treatment.  
                                                 
88 Now historians of science do not need to ”wish away” the distinction (Shapin 1992, 334), here 
are the systematic philosophical reasons to abandon it. 
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Moreover, the lack of a general account of explanations is not only a problem for 
the philosophical debates about the nature of science. Without such an account, it is 
difficult to interpret the nature and the plausibility of explanatory claims made in the 
historiography of science. Consider the following claims: 
If we believe, as most of us believe, that Millikan basically got it right, it will follow that we 
also believe that electrons, as part of the world Millikan described, did play a causal role in 
making him believe in, and talk about, electrons. But then we have to remember that (on 
such a scenario) electrons will also have played their part in making sure that Millikan's 
contemporary and opponent, Felix Ehrenhaft, didn't believe in electrons. Once we realize 
this, then there is a sense in which the electron ‘itself’ drops out of the story because it is a 
common factor behind two different responses, and it is the cause of the difference that in-
terests us. (Bloor 1999, 93.) 
[Science’s] social, political, and religious respectability depended on the governance of im-
agination by consistently patient and humble behavior. (Bellon 2011, 396.) 
Distrust demanded independent replication; it also influenced the way in which the CERN 
Director-general managed the credibility of the results for the world's press, turning a plau-
sible but not yet widely accepted hypothesis into an undisputed fact. (Krige 2001, 517.) 
[The] larger significance of the expedition, both contemporaneously and in the present, was 
largely the result of Eddington’s contextual concerns. (Stanley 2003, 58.) 
British provincial urban cultural renewal and industrialization were important factors in the 
emergence of a distinctive developmental worldview. (Elliot 2003, 3).  
It is all but clear (i) what these claims exactly mean, (ii) what their value and 
implications are, and (iii) how these claims can be warranted. They are explanatory 
claims, but as long as the dimensions (i)-(iii) remain unclear, our understanding is 
hampered, even confused. In later parts of this book, I will show how we can clarify 
such claims once we have a general account of explanations in historiography of sci-
ence. 
To understand the state of the lack of clarity, we may take a look at David Bloor’s 
four tenets of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). The debates concerning 
these tenets illustrate the obscurity of causal thinking related to historiography of sci-
ence: Both the tenets and their criticisms share similar deficiencies in their assump-
tions on how explanations work and how an account of explanations can be built.   
The tenets of SSK are the following: 
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1. It would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which bring about belief or states 
of knowledge. Naturally there will be other types of causes apart from social ones which 
will cooperate in bringing about belief. 
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, success 
or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will require explanation. 
3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of cause would explain, 
say, true and false beliefs. 
4. It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be applicable 
to sociology itself. Like the requirement of symmetry this is a response to the need to seek 
for general explanations. It is an obvious requirement of principle because otherwise sociol-
ogy would be a standing refutation of its own theories. (Bloor 1991, 7) 
It is somewhat difficult to interpret these rather brief passages on explanations 
of beliefs. Different readings open different sets of issues concerning such explana-
tions. 
The main problem in Tenet (1) is that it leaves open what exactly is meant by 
“causal explanation”. It is easy (even trivial) to accept the tenet once we establish a 
general account of causal explanation that is able to capture the variety of factors that 
need to be used to explain heterogeneous features of science (see Section 5.3). The ac-
count developed in this book is compatible with the idea that many types of causes 
are cited in historiography of science.  
However, if one has a less general account of explanation that has built-in meta-
physical commitments about what kinds of things are explanatory, the tenet (1) makes 
substantial claims about science. However, it seems difficult to understand how the 
explanatory force of certain types of factors in the history of scientific beliefs could be 
established before that history is scrutinized. The idea that beliefs require causal ex-
planations does not mean that they can be explained by social factors. Therefore, if 
SSK is to succeed, it must be built on a non-committed notion of causal explanations 
and use that account to show the alleged central role of social factors. In fact, any ac-
count of causal explanation can be a successful historiographical tool only if it does 
not have built-in metaphysical commitments. Which types of causes are explanatory 
is an empirical matter. (I return to this point soon.) 
The problem that the tenet (1) does not clarify what is meant by “causal expla-
nation” is something that the critics of SSK share, albeit in a more sophisticated form. 
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Laudan criticizes the prospects of SSK by making claims about the nature of causal 
explanations: 
(I) Explanations can never be complete and thus we should choose the fac-
tors that are relevant. Laudan dismisses SSK on that basis without an ex-
plicit account of the degrees explanatory relevance (1977, 209-210). 
 
(II) SSK has not provided us with general laws and therefore no explana-
tions (1977, 217-218). Neither has it explicated the general mechanisms con-
necting social factors and the contents of science (1977, 219). 
Laudan seems to have some implicit idea about the nature of causal explanations, 
but is obvious that his criticism can be established only if we have tools to (i) define 
the degree of relevance and (ii) analyze the role of laws and mechanisms in explana-
tion. Therefore, not only does SSK require a general account of explanations to lean 
on but also the critics of SSK. The question is not who is right but how certain claims 
can be made in the first place. 
 Tenet (2) can also be accepted. However, we need to distinguish between what 
can be explained and what in fact is explained. We could be (and probably are) able 
to explain both true and false beliefs. However, it does not follow that we should be 
impartial towards those beliefs. Not even natural sciences are completely impartial 
with respect to the phenomena they explain. They might be able to explain many types 
of phenomena, but usually they actually explain only those types that we happen to 
be curious about or that we want to learn to control. What is more, not even natural 
sciences explain every singular occurrence in the universe; nowhere can I find a ready-
made explanation why the temperature in my room is 21 Celsius degrees at this mo-
ment. In a similar vein, we should seek to be able to explain both true and false beliefs 
but we should also direct our explanatory efforts since explaining everything is im-
possible. My framework offers the tools for this task: We have seen that the signifi-
cance of a feature is the only thing that matters when we consider whether it should 
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be explained or not. The truth or falsity is not directly relevant to such choice. Moreo-
ver, as discussed in the previous section, I do not postulate a unique category of “ra-
tional explanations”, and therefore there is no distinction between the kinds of expla-
nations that are offered for true or false beliefs as both must follow similar patterns. 
Notice, however, that this follows from an explicit account of explanation and not 
from a loose derivation from “what other sciences do”.  
 Tenet (3) is the most difficult one to understand. We might begin by distinguish-
ing a substantial and a methodological reading. According to the substantial reading, 
the history of science has been shaped by factors that belong to a limited set of types89 
and those types have been the causes of both true and false beliefs.90 Sometimes claims 
about the content of such explanations have been added to the substantial reading. 
For example, it has been claimed that “the electron ‘itself’ drops out of the [causal] 
story [explaining a belief]” (Bloor 1999, 93). Moreover, we can distinguish strong and 
weak readings of the substantial claim. The strong reading says that if T is a type of 
cause that is sometimes explanatory, T is always explanatory (and therefore the sym-
metry follows.)91 If we find out, for example, that social interests explain (i.e. are 
among the explanatory factors) one thing, they must explain (i.e. be among the ex-
planatory factors) everything. The weak reading says that a limited set of types ex-
plain everything without every type being explanatory with respect to every particu-
lar occurrence. It is enough for the symmetry, the reading continues, that the types 
                                                 
89 “Symmetry principles have always [recommended that] certain treatments should not be ap-
plied to any beliefs” (Bycroft 2016, 21). 
90 The language of “types of causes” might seem cumbersome. Lewens paraphrases this as: “the 
same family of explanatory concepts should work to explain all kinds of belief formation” (2005, 
463).  
91 Bycroft (2016, 19) calls this view the “restrictive approach”. He defines it: “[the] historian [as-
sumes] that all beliefs really can be explained in the same way” (2016, 19). Notice that it is unclear 
whether Bycroft is making a substantial or methodological reading. Use of the terms “approach” 
and “really” pull in different directions. 
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occur roughly evenly in the explanations of true and false beliefs (see Bycroft 2016, 21). 
The problem with the substantial claim is that it is difficult to see how either the strong 
or weak reading, let alone claims about the contents of the explanations, can be war-
ranted before we have explained relevant parts of the history of science. And before 
we can conclude that we have explained the relevant parts of the history of science, 
we must understand how explanations work. Therefore, the substantial reading can 
be established only after a well-formulated account of explanation is in place.  
Notice that both the substantial reading seems extremely dubious once we ex-
tend our explanations beyond beliefs: for example, how could the public understand-
ing of Einstein’s works and the formalism in those works be explained by citing the 
same factors? Surely, Bloor did not discuss such explanations as they do not refer to 
beliefs, but we surely do not want “asymmetrical symmetry-principle” according to 
which true and false beliefs are explained in one way and the rest of the science in 
whatever way is suited. We need a more general symmetry-principle than that pro-
vided by Bloor according to which all explanations are based on the same explanatory 
resources. I discuss this topic in the next chapter. We should notice that this problem 
is derivative from the unnecessary distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive 
features, discussed in Section 5.3. Bloor’s strategy to extend some ideas concerning 
explanations from other disciplines to explanations of beliefs preserves the distinction 
between beliefs and the rest of science and mistakenly takes the central principles, 
such as symmetry, impartiality, and reflexivity (see below) to apply only within the 
category of beliefs, even though those principles make sense only if we look on our 
stock of explanations as a whole. We should not attempt to use principles concerning 
explanations within the category of different kinds of beliefs. Rather we should at-
tempt to put the beliefs within a system where those principles already hold. 
The methodological reading says that we should try to explain true and false 
beliefs in the same way and use only a limited set of types of causes because this ap-
proach carries the promise of a satisfactory stock of explanations (whatever is meant 
by “satisfactory”) where no type of explanation belongs (or is excluded) a priori. (See 
discussion in Pinch 2008). This is a sound principle if we want to keep our explanatory 
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resources as simple and powerful as possible. However, one cannot establish the types 
of causes that are needed in explanations before having a reasonable sample of good 
historical explanations. And, again, to be able to conclude that one has such a set, one 
needs an account or explanation that warrants the judgement. Moreover, the method-
ological reading cannot be as naïve as is sometimes suggested. For example, some 
have been willing to ignore one set of factors in order to establish the relevance of an-
other set (Labinger 2001, 173). This is obviously a mistake (Bricmont & Sokal 2001, 
181), and we need to have an account or explanation that enables us to avoid such 
mistakes. 
Notice that also the methodological reading becomes extremely dubious once 
we extend our explanations beyond beliefs. It does not seem promising to assume that 
both (i) true and false beliefs and (ii) the rest of science could be explained by citing 
same factors. If we cannot assume this, we need to extend our explanatory resources 
anyway to capture explananda beyond beliefs. Once this extension is added, why 
should we assume that explanations of true (or false) beliefs do not cite the factors we 
just added to our explanatory resource? (Notice that this could lead to asymmetry 
within the category of an explanation of beliefs). The reason can no longer be that we 
do not want to complicate the explanatory resources, as the resources are already com-
plicated. We should notice, again, that this problem is derivative from the unnecessary 
distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive features, discussed in Section 5.3. 
That distinction should not be used when an account of explanation in historiography 
of science is built. As both the substantial and methodological reading gets into trou-
ble when we do not focus only on beliefs, the tenet 3 cannot be part of a general ac-
count of explanations in the historiography of science in its original form.  
Criticism of the symmetry principle has usually been understood as a criticism 
of SSK alone. However, the criticism above underlines points that are important for 
everyone. Think, for example, the idea – expressed by Lakatos and Laudan – that his-
toriography of science should be explained as far as possible by rationality-based ac-
counts. On the one hand, if this is a substantial claim about historiography, it can be 
established only after some relevant parts of historiographical explanations has been 
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formulated. On the other hand, if it is a methodological claim, it is threatened by sim-
ilar problem of unwarranted ignorance of factors as the SSK. This shows that the lack 
of well-developed account of explanation is a shared problem for both ends of the 
continuum of philosophical positions on the nature of historiography of science. It is 
difficult to establish arguments about the explanatory structures of historiography of 
science without invoking some systematic account of explanation. My hope is that 
developing such an account will help to avoid many sweeping disagreements and to 
find a shared background for discussions. 
 Tenet (4) is, again, easily acceptable. The problem, however, is its unreasonable 
limitedness. We should demand that the totality of our stock of explanations is inter-
nally consistent. From this general demand it follows that SSK should be internally 
coherent. Seen from another direction, this means that that SSK does not need to be 
only internally coherent, i.e. be able to explain itself, but also coherent with every other 
field that provides explanations. Notice that this requirement does not apply to SSK 
alone. Every project devoted to explaining the history of science must satisfy the re-
quirement of consistence.  In the next chapter, we will see how this requirement fol-
lows from a general account of historiographical explanations. In Section 6.8, we will 
also see that, even though the demand for consistency is not an a priori reason to aban-
don SSK, it will turn out that this demand seriously undermines SSK when one takes 
seriously the explanatory resources of other fields.92 Again, a general account of ex-
planation will enable us to interpret and evaluate a claim made by SSK (as well as 
positions opposing it). 
                                                 
92 It would also damage most of the rationality-based explanations; however none of my analyses 
(Chapter 7) focuses on such explanations and the case remains unproven. The general problem is 
that no explanation that cites only one type of cause is prima facie promising, given the complexity 
of the world as it is described by the variety of our accepted sciences, social science, and humanities. 
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 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen some perspectives on the history of science and 
analyzed briefly the kinds of issues that are connected with each perspective. We have 
seen that there is no way of – and no value in – choosing between different perspec-
tives and, instead of forcing such a choice, we should aim to capture the valuable in-
sights from each perspective. Moreover, we should also avoid the controversial claims 
that have produced unnecessary rivalry between the perspectives. We need to go be-
yond the peculiarities of each perspective. 
We have already solved some of the problems related to the different perspec-
tives in the earlier chapters. In the next chapter, I will formulate an account of expla-
nations that shows how explanations can be analyzed and therefore their merits and 
credibility evaluated. The account  
(1) is completely indifferent to the nature and scope of the thing to be ex-
plained; 
 
(2) can be used independently of assumptions about the rationality in/of 
science;  
 
(3) is able to accommodate many kinds of factors as explanatory 
 
(4) defines two notions of explanatory relevance: one related to the explan-
atory depth and other related to explanatory goals;  
 
(5) explains how the explanatory resources should be managed. 
These five dimensions make the account suitable for approaching the history of 
science from different perspectives and enable one to see where the perspectives com-
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plete each other and where they genuinely disagree. The account of explanation de-
fines at the most general level possible what explanation in historiography of science 
is. 
One final note. Even though the account is completely general with respect to 
many issues in historiography of science, this does not mean that the account is a priori 
or unhistorical. The framework receives its justification from the ability to define im-
portant notions, connect different notions, and to clarify causal thinking. “Causal cog-
nition is [--] seen as a kind of epistemic technology—as a tool—and, like other tech-
nologies, judged in terms of how well it serves our goals and purposes.” (Woodward 
2014, 693–694.)  As we will see at the beginning of the next chapter, the account has 
many advantages, and these advantages are the justification for the use of the account. 
Moreover, it might be the case that patterns of counterfactual dependencies provide 
understanding for us but were irrelevant for some historical actors. This does not un-
dermine the account. Historiography of science makes the history of science under-
standable for us and therefore must be structured in accordance with our views on 
explanations and understanding. Notice also that there is no anachronism in the ac-
count: it does not imply that the historical actors thought that explanations are based 
on counterfactual dependencies. From the fact that explanations have the form “X ra-
ther than Y because Z rather than W” we are never forced (nor allowed) to infer that 
“A did b rather than c because A thought ‘X rather than Y because Z rather than W’ 
rather than something else”. That the account is built for us does not mean that it 
makes impossible to describe the past in its own terms in matters that are relevant (see 
Section 3.4 The past in its own term). 
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6 EXPLANATION   IN   HISTORIOGRAPHY   OF 
SCIENCE:  A  COUNTERFACTUAL  ACCOUNT 
We have seen that, in the presentist approach, historiography of science provides 
causal explanations for the significant features of science. In this chapter, the notion of 
causal explanation in historiography of science is made explicit. I argue that if, and only 
if, we are able to track down patterns of counterfactual dependencies concerning a 
historical process or event, we understand that process or event. This approach is 
based on James Woodward’s notion that “the underlying or unifying idea in the no-
tion of causal explanation is the idea that an explanation must answer a what-if-
things-had-been-different question, or exhibit information about a pattern of depend-
ency” (2003, 201). In my account, explanations in historiography of science are defined 
as explications of causal relations between certain factors. Causal relations, in turn, are 
explicated as counterfactual dependencies between these factors. Therefore, explana-
tions are explications of counterfactual dependencies.  
In this chapter, I show that there are many advantages in building the notion of 
historical explanation on this counterfactual theory of causation: 
1. By using the theory, we can see that historical explanations are structur-
ally similar to the explanations in everyday life and in special sciences. We 
do not need to posit a sui generis historical understanding. 93 Conceptual 
scarcity (a unifying theory of explanation) is preferable to conceptual com-
plexity (postulating a sui generis). Moreover, in a contested field with many 
debates such as historiography of science, a theory that has been developed 
independently of the field has the promise to serve as a neutral arbitrator 
in the debates.94 
                                                 
93 I return to this topic at the conclusion of the book (Chapter 9).  
94 Someone might argue that this is brings back the old unity of science –framework. I do not think 
that this is obvious. I think there is nothing wrong, in principle, in an attempt to find similarities 
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2. The theory enables the citing of different kind of factors in historical ex-
planations. Historians do not need to choose a priori what kind of factors 
are explanatory in historiography of science. 
 
3. There can be multiple explanations of the same historical event. The the-
ory of explanation suggested here allows that different explanatory prefer-
ences can lead to different explanations of the same event. However, in 
such a situation, it is always possible to find common ground between al-
ternative explanations in counterfactual dependencies.  
 
4. If there are genuinely competing explanations, the theory shows what 
kind of evidence and considerations are needed in order to choose between 
these explanations. In this way, the theory can direct historical research and 
clarify disagreements. 
 
5. Within the theory, we can explicate a suitable notion of explanatory depth 
in historiography of science. 
 
6. The theory tells us how explanatory resources should be managed.  
I begin the introduction of the theory by giving a set of examples. These exam-
ples illustrate multiple important features of the theory of causal explanation that are 
useful in historiographical thinking and in the philosophy of historiography of science. 
                                                 
between different fields of inquiry. My account unifies the historiography of science and other 
fields only at one level: it claims that explanations provide information about patterns of depend-
encies. There still remain fundamental differences between different fields. For example, in phys-
ics such patterns might be based on fundamental laws of the universe whereas in the historiog-
raphy of science such laws play very little part. This chapter exists for the very reason that the 
historiography of science has its own peculiarities when it comes to explanations. 
114 
 
 
 
The examples used in this chapter are mainly imaginary scenarios, and I begin with 
examples outside historiography to minimize the possible confusion that is brought 
by our pre-theoretical “historiographical intuitions”. In the next chapters, I analyze 
the existing historiography of science using the account developed here to tighten the 
connection between the philosophical theory and actual historiography of science. 
In what follows, I rely heavily on James Woodward’s theory (2003) of causal ex-
planations.95,96As my purpose is only to provide tools for explanatory thinking in his-
toriography of science, I do not present Woodward’s extremely rich and complex the-
ory in its full detail. Rather, I extract some basic insights from the theory that are useful 
in reflecting historiography of science. Woodward argues that his theory “recognizes 
that causal and explanatory claims sometimes are confused, unclear, and ambiguous 
and suggests how these limitations might be addressed”. I agree, and this makes 
Woodward’s theory suitable for historiography of science, as many claims in this field 
seem to be – if not confused and unclear – at least opaque enough to cause (unneces-
sary) intellectual conflicts and problematic views about the nature of science.  Moreo-
ver, Woodward’s theory has proven its philosophical worth in many fields.97 Thus, 
there is no worry that the account solves historiographical problems in an ad hoc man-
ner. My strategy is to focus on those aspects of Woodward’s theory that are related to 
clarification of causal claims and use Woodward’s ideas to show how many historio-
graphical claims and notions can be made clearer.98 Once this clarificatory task is per-
formed, I turn to discuss more methodological issues in historiography of science. 
                                                 
95 Mainly in Sections 6.1, 6.2, and 6.5. In other sections, discussions do not follow Woodward’s 
theory in any straightforward manner (although they are based on what is said in 6.1, 6.2, and 6.5). 
96 This is not the only possible account of counterfactual explanation that one can rely on to provide 
historiographical insights. See Maar 2016 for different approach. 
97 E.g. Woodward (2010), Ross and Woodward (2016), Rescorla (2017), Kuorikoski & Ylikoski 
(2010).  
98 For example, Woodward’s notion of intervention (see Section 6.2.) is most naturally applicable 
to context where experiments can be performed. However, Woodward’s notion’s clarificatory 
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Finally, it should be noted that the account formulated below is independent of 
the presentist approach (although presentism requires an explicit notion of causal ex-
planation): even if one does not accept the presentist assumptions, one can still use the 
theory to understand how explanations in the historiography work. 
 Illustrative Examples and the Outline of the Theory  
In this section, causal relationships are said to hold between variables. I simply 
follow Woodward on this:  
[The] theory is most naturally formulated in terms of variables—quantities or magnitudes 
that can take more than one value. Causal relationships, of course, have to do with patterns 
of dependence that hold in the world, rather than with relationships between numbers or 
other abstracta, but in the interest of avoiding cumbersome circumlocutions, I will often 
speak of causal relationships as obtaining between variables or their values, trusting that it 
is obvious enough how to sort out what is meant. (Woodward 2003, 14.) 
However, I will use my own terminology and distinguish between scenarios and 
situations. A scenario presents the variables V that are under consideration in a given 
case and their causal relationships.99 A situation describes a state of the world where 
the variables V have taken particular values. There are multiple possible situation 
within one scenario. 
Moreover, I use the term explanandum to refer to a question of the form “Why Y 
= y1 rather than Y = y2?”, and the term explanans to refer to an answer to this question. 
To get started, consider the following scenario (S1): 
 
                                                 
power is not restricted to such cases. The notion can be used to clarify causal claims even in the 
contexts where an intervention is only conceptually possible (Woodward 2003, 132). How to clarify 
causal claims with counterfactuals and how to confirm them are two separate issues.  
99 It would be necessary to distinguish type-level and token-level causal relations if we wanted to 
understand Woodward’s theory in its completeness. However, the philosophical content (that ex-
planations are answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions) I draw from Woodward’s 
theory to the philosophy of historiography can be understood without this distinction. 
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X is the cause of Y. By following Woodward’s theory (2003), this means that 
changing100 X will change Y.101 x1, x2, x3 are the values that X can take, and y1, y2, y3, 
are the values Y can take. Changing X from x1 to x2 (or x3) changes Y from y1 to y2 (or 
y3). The values of Y are counterfactually dependent on the values of X: had X taken 
value x2 (or x3) instead of x1, Y would have taken the value y2 (or y3) instead of y1. 
In my terminology X = x1 and Y = y1 is a situation within this scenario (as well as 
any X = xi and Y = yj).  
Let X be the number of workouts Smith performs per week and let Y be the 
amount of muscle Smith builds in a year. If Smith performs one workout per week, 
she gains one kilogram of muscle. If she performs two workouts, she gains two kilo-
grams, and so on. By changing X (the number of workouts per week) we can change 
Y (the amount of muscle Smith builds in a year). The amount of muscle Smith gains is 
counterfactually depended on the number of workouts per week. We can say, for ex-
ample, that had Smith done two (or three) exercises per week instead of one, she 
would have gained two (or three) kilograms of muscle instead of one kilogram. 
                                                 
100 It is necessary that X is changed in the right way, by intervention. I explicate this notion in the 
next section. 
101 “[A] claim such as "X is causally relevant to Y" is a claim to the effect that changing the value of 
X instantiated in particular, spatiotemporally located individuals will change the value of Y lo-
cated in particular individuals.” (Woodward 2003, 40.) 
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We can explain the amount of muscle Smith has gained by citing the number of 
workouts she has performed per week and adding the information about the counter-
factual dependencies between the values of X and Y. This information is a crucial part 
of the explanation as it helps to answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions.102 
For example, the question: “Why did Smith build two kilograms of muscle in a 
year rather than one or three?” is answered as follows: 
Smith performed two workouts per week. Had she performed 1 workout, 
she would have gained 1 kilogram of muscle, and had she performed three 
workouts, she would have gained three kilograms of muscle. 
It is important to note right away that we do not need to know how the number 
of workouts and the amount of muscle mass are connected (i.e. what kind of process 
or mechanism connects them.103) We could try to establish this relation and provide 
an additional (and a deeper) explanation. However, once we know the counterfactual 
dependencies between the number of workouts and the amount of muscle mass, we 
have an explanation. We are able to answer what-if-things-were-different question. 
That the threshold for explanatory status is not set very high is an advantage in histo-
riography of science. We should not set the bar too high and end up saying that there 
are very few explanations in historiography of science. Moreover, even though the 
threshold is not set very high, we can still seek deeper and deeper explanations (this 
will be discussed below). Therefore, explanations are best seen as a continuum from 
minimal to deep explanations. (Woodward 2003, 243). 
                                                 
102 ”[Explanations] locate their explananda within a space of alternative possibilities and show us 
how which of these alternatives is realized systematically depends on the conditions cited in their 
explanans. They do this by enabling us to see how, if these initial conditions had been different or 
had changed in various ways, various of these alternative possibilities would have been realized 
instead”. (Woodward 2003, 191.) 
103 E.g. Salmon (1984) and Machamer, Darden & Craver (2000). See also Woodward (2011). 
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Sometimes the values of Y are dependent on the values of X in a more compli-
cated manner.104 Consider the following scenario (S2): 
 
 
 
Here again the number of workouts per week is the cause of the amount of mus-
cle Smith gains per year. If Smith changes the number of workouts from one to two 
(or three), the amount of muscle she gains will change. However, changing the num-
ber of workouts between two and three does not change the amount of muscle Smith 
gains. Due to genetics, Smith is not able to gain more than two kilograms of muscle 
per year. Thus, there are counterfactual dependencies between the values of X and Y 
but we need to be careful when explicating these dependencies. 
In terms of explanation: we can explain the amount of muscle Smith gains in a 
year (Y) by citing the number of workouts she does per week (X) and adding infor-
mation about the counterfactual dependencies between the values of X and Y. An im-
portant part of this information is that change between x2 and x3 does not change the 
value of Y from y2. 
For example, the question “Why did Smith gain two kilograms of muscle in a 
year rather than one?” is answered as follows: 
Smith performed two workouts per week. Had she performed one workout 
per week, she would have gained one kilogram. However, if Smith per-
formed three workouts per week, she would still have gained two kilo-
grams of muscle in a year. 
                                                 
104 See, for example, Woodward (2003, 67–68). 
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It is important to note that this kind of scenario is possible in the history of sci-
ence. We can say that a certain experiment e1 convinced a scientist. Had she carried 
out a different experiment e2 instead of e1, she would not have had a convincing result. 
Change from e1 to e2 would have made a difference. However, there can still be an 
experiment e3 such that: had the scientist made e3 instead of e1, she would still have 
had convincing results. In this case, the e1 is explanatorily relevant, but it would be 
important to note that e3 would have also led to a convincing result while e2 would 
not. Take another example: it is almost a truism to say that the social context is an 
explanatorily relevant factor in historiography of science. What is needed, in addition 
to this truism, is detailed information about how changes in the context would have 
changed science.105   
Next, consider the following scenario (S3): 
 
Here X is not the only cause of Y. Z is also a cause of Y. Assume that X can take 
values x1, x2, x3, and that these are straightforwardly associated with the values y1, y2, 
and y3 of Y, as in scenario S1. Assume also that Z can take two values z1, z2. By follow-
ing Woodward’s theory, we can say that X is a cause of Y, since changing X changes 
Y if we fix the value of Z. It might be the case that when Z takes the value z1, no change 
in Y happens even if X is changed. If we fix Z to z2, and if changing X then changes Y, 
X is a cause of Y.106 
Let X be the number of workouts per week, Y the amount of muscle Smith builds, 
and Z the number of vitamin B12  pills Smith takes (z1 = 0; z2 = 1). Assume that Z takes 
                                                 
105 I discuss this in the next chapter. 
106 See Woodward (2003, 44–45). 
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the value z1. No matter how many workouts per week Smith performs, she does not 
gain more than one kilogram of muscle in a year (due to her deficiency of B12). How-
ever, if we fix Z to z2, changing the number of workouts per week changes the amount 
of muscle Smith gains.  
The value of Y is explained by citing the values of X and Z and by providing 
information about how different values of X and Z would have changed the value of 
Y. It is important to point out that if Z takes the value z1, changing X does not change 
Y. 
For example, the question “Why did Smith gain two kilograms of muscle in a 
year rather than one or three?” is answered as follows: 
Smith performed two workouts per week and took B12 vitamin pills. Had 
she taken the pills and performed one/three workouts per week, she would 
have gained one/three kilograms of muscle in a year. Moreover, had she 
not taken vitamin B12, she would have gained only one kilogram of muscle 
even if she had performed two or three workouts per week. 
Scenarios such as this are possible in the history of science. For example, the ex-
istence of fossil records and a society interested in them are both needed to achieve 
scientific results based on such fossils. The complete understanding of the results re-
quires that we track down the dependencies between the results, the fossil records, 
and the society. 
The importance of the notion of holding certain variables fixed at some value is even 
clearer in the following scenario (S4): 
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Here X is a cause of Y and Z, and Z is also a cause of Y. In a scenario like this, it 
is possible that the effect of Z on Y cancels out the effect of X on Y. If we only change 
X, there will be no change in Y, as the effect of X is cancelled out by the change in Z.107 
Let X be the number of workouts per week, Z the calories burned by Smith per 
week, and Y the amount of muscle Smith builds in a year. Increasing the number of 
workouts per week increases the amount of muscle that Smith builds. However, in-
creasing the number of workouts also increases the amount of calories Smith burns 
which in turn decreases the amount of muscle Smith builds. In a scenario like this, 
changing X alone does not change Y. However, changing X changes Y once we fix the 
calories (Z) at some level. Y is counterfactually dependent on X on the assumption that 
Z is fixed. 
In the history of science, this example could be about the following scenario: 
X = x1 is the publication of a study S supporting hypothesis H 
X = x2 is no publication of study S 
 
Z = z1 is the publication of a study R supporting not-H 
Z = z2 is no publication of R 
 
Y = y1 is the acceptance of H 
Y = y2 is no acceptance of H 
Assume that we start from a situation where Y = y2, X = x2 and Z = z2. Then the 
study S is published (X takes the value x1). Due to this change, R is published (Z takes 
the value z1). Change in Z then cancels out the effect of X on Y, and Y remains in y2. 
However, X is a cause of Y. Had X = x1 been the case while Z was fixed at z2, Y would 
have taken the value y1. Z is also a cause of Y: if we fix X = x1, changing Z would change 
Y. 
                                                 
107 See Woodward (2003, 49–50). 
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Assume that actually X = x1, Z = z1, and Y = y2. Assume also that we want to 
explain why Y = y2 rather than y1. The answer is: 
Because X took the value x1 and Z the value z1. Had X remained in x1 while 
Z was fixed in the value z2, Y would have taken the value y1.  
Let us modify this example. Consider the following scenario (S5):  Assume that 
X and Z can take three values and Y two values: 
X = x1 is the publication of a study S supporting hypothesis H 
X = x2 is no publication of study S 
X= x3 is the publication of a slightly different study S* supporting H 
 
Z = z1 is the publication of a study R suggesting not-H 
Z = z2 is no publication of R 
Z = z3 is the publication of a slightly different study R* supporting H 
 
Y = y1 is the acceptance of H 
Y = y2 is no acceptance of H 
Assume that x1 leads to z1, x2 to z2, and x3 to z3. This is arguably possible: for 
example, if different instruments were used in S and S*, different instruments could 
have been used also in R and R*, and as performers of R (or R*) might be more familiar 
with one set of instruments than the other, the result of the study can be different due 
to the instruments used.  
Assume that actually X = x1, Z = z1, and Y = y2. Assume also that we want to 
explain why Y took the value y2 rather than y1. The answer is: 
Because X took the value x1 and Z the value z1. Had X remained in x1 while 
Z took the value z2 or z3, Y would have taken the value y1.  
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Moreover, had X taken the value x3, y1 would have been the case if Z took 
the value z3 or z2. 
 
Moreover, had X taken the value x2, y1 would have been the case if Z took 
the value z3. 
Next, consider the following scenario (S6): 
 
Let the relationships between X, Z and Y remain the same as in S4. In addition, 
X is a cause of W, and W is a cause of Y. W and Z have opposite effects on Y. Assume 
that: 
X = x1 is the publication of a study S supporting hypothesis H 
X = x2 is no publication of study S 
 
Z = z1 is the publication of a study R supporting not-H 
Z = z2 is no publication of R 
 
W = w1 is the publication of a study P supporting H 
W = w2 is no publication of such result  
 
Y = y1 is the acceptance of H 
Y = y2 is no acceptance of H 
Assume that we begin from a situation x2, z2, y2, and w2. Assume that X then 
takes the value x1. Because of this, other variables take values z1, y1, and w1. X is a 
cause of Y: if we fixed both Z and W, changing X changes Y.  
124 
 
 
 
The question “Why did Y take the value y1 rather than y2?” is answered as fol-
lows: 
1. Had x2, w2 and z2 been the case, y2 would have been the case. OR 
 
2. Had x2, w2 and z1, y2 would have been the case. OR 
 
3. Had x2, w1 and z1 been the case, y2 would have been the case. OR 
 
4. Had x1, w2 and z1 been the case, y2 would have been the case. 
This example (together with the scenario S5) hints how complex a complete (or 
ideal) answer to an explanation-seeking question can be.108 Three binary variables 
produce four situations where the explanandum takes the value under review. This list 
of conditions answers many what-if-things-had-been-different questions. Each of the 
1-4 answers one such question. For example, we can answer the question “What if X 
took the value x2 and Z and W took values w2 and z2?” by using the first item on the 
list. Moreover, it must be noted that we have been given only a list of conditions under 
which Y would have taken the value y2. We could add also a list of conditions under 
which Y would still have taken the value y1. Such a list would be explanatory as it 
would answer what-if-things-had been-different questions.109 
The lesson to be learned is that the list of conditions under which an explanandum 
would have changed is usually extremely long.110 However, this should not frustrate 
                                                 
108 I leave it to the reader to produce the scenario S6 with three possible values for X, Z and W, as 
we did in S5. 
109 If the explanandum Y can take more than two values, it is important that our explanation tells 
when y1, y2, … yn, would have been the case. 
110 In the natural sciences, the information can be packed in generalizations. However, I do not see 
how this could be done in historiography. 
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us. Explanations form a continuum: A minimal explanation provides some information 
about at least one situation that would have changed the value of explanandum-varia-
ble, while a complete (or rather: ideal) explanation provides information about every sit-
uation that would have changed the value of explanandum-variable. Historical explana-
tions lie somewhere between these two extremes. Moreover, even if it is not pragmat-
ically possible to provide complete explanations in the historiography, we will see that 
this notion enables us to evaluate the quality of explanations (with respect to the in-
terests of questioners) and how further historiographical studies can deepen our un-
derstanding. However, before building that account, we need to clarify a few issues 
about the patterns of counterfactual dependencies that provide us explanatory infor-
mation. 
 Interventions in Historiographical Thinking 
We have used notion such as “changing X” and “fixing Z”. How should these be 
understood? 
Consider the following scenario (S7): 
 
Here A is the common cause of B and S. There is no causal relation between B 
and S. However, if we change the value of B by changing A, S also changes. Thus, we 
need to restrict the relevant notion of “changing X” (or “changing B” in our example).  
Let B be the reading of a barometer, S the occurrence of a storm, and A the at-
mospheric pressure. If we change the barometer reading by changing the atmospheric 
pressure, we also change whether a storm occurs. However, the barometer reading is 
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not a cause for the storm. The problem is that the way we changed B (by changing A) 
has a causal effect on S. 
According to Woodward’s theory, X (here B) is a cause of Y (here S) only if Y (S) 
changes when X (B) is changed by intervention: 
The intuitive idea is that an intervention on X with respect to Y changes the value of X in 
such a way that if any change occurs in Y, it occurs only as a result of the change in the value 
of X and not from some other source. (Woodward 2003, 14).111 
Changing A is not an intervention on B with respect to S, since A changes the 
value of S independently of B.  
Consider that we ask “Why did a storm occur?” 
We could answer  
Because the barometer reading fell. Had it not fallen, there would not have 
been a storm.  
This answer is not a satisfactory explanation even though it answers what-if-
things-had-been-different question. The relevant answer would be: 
Because the atmospheric pressure fell. Had it not fallen, there would not 
have been a storm.  
The difference between these answers is that the second one is true if an inter-
vention on the atmospheric pressure was performed, while the first one is false if an 
intervention on the barometer was performed: if we hold the needle of the barometer 
fixed, the storm would have occurred anyway (as the atmospheric pressure fell).  
Consider the following scenario (S8):  
                                                 
111 Details in Woodward (2003, 98). 
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Someone claims that the development of modern medicine (S) is caused by the 
development of homeopathy (B): if we changed the development of homeopathy by 
removing people’s interest in health (A), there would not have been modern medicine. 
However, this does not establish the causal relationship between modern medicine 
and homeopathy, as A is a cause of both B and S: 
 
Next consider the following scenario (S9):  
 
Z is Perrin’s empirical work and Y is the belief in atoms. Someone claims that Z 
is not a cause of Y: had Perrin not made the work because someone else did it first (X), 
scientists would still have believed that atoms exist. The problem with this claim is 
that the counterfactual does not describe an intervention because X is directly relevant 
to Y: 
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From these examples, we can draw the following tool for historical thinking: 
In order to evaluate the claim changing X would have changed Y, one has to 
provide a (counterfactual) situation where X is changed in a way that does 
not affect Y independently of the change in X. Otherwise X is not a possible 
explanans. 
 
Similarly, if some other variable(s) Z need to be fixed, a (counterfactual) 
situation where it is fixed in a way that does not affect other variables be-
side Z needs to be provided. 
Consider the scenario (of the type) S3 (see above): 
 
Let X and Z represent publications of studies, and Y the acceptance of a hypoth-
esis. Assume that X = x1 and Z = z1 are both publications of results that support hy-
pothesis H, and Y = y1 is the acceptance of H. In the actual case, x1, z2 and y1 took place. 
We can say that: 
X = x1 caused Y = y1: Had we (i) imprisoned the scientists behind the pub-
lication X and thus changed X from x1 to x2, and had we (ii) hold Z to z2 by 
imprisoning all the rest of scientists, Y would have taken the value y2.  
This might not be a very far-fetched situation. However, it might be the case that 
the situation with the imprisonment is not adequate to reveal the causal relations in 
the scenario. If H was a hypothesis that had wide social implications, it could have 
had been the case that the scientists in the prison thought that the correctness of H was 
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the reason they were put in the prison. This would have led them to accept H inde-
pendently of the studies.  Thus there remains a doubt about our original situation as 
a way to establish the causal relations. This means that we need to specify a new situ-
ation: 
X = x1 caused Y = y1: Had (i) the scientist behind the publication X suffered 
a brain damage in a bus accident, and had X thus changed from x1 to x2, 
and (ii) had Z been fixed to z2 by similar accident and brain damage, Y 
would have taken the value y2.  
This is admittedly a far-fetched situation, but we only attempted to specify how 
changing X changes Y. Only if there is a situation, no matter how far-fetched, where 
X can be changed by an event or act that satisfies the notion of intervention with re-
spect to Y, we have a genuine historiographical causal claim. Clarifying the content of 
the claim that X is (or is not) a cause of Y does not require more. This aim must be separated 
from the issues of (i) confirming causal and explanatory claims in the historiography, 
(ii) choosing interesting explanatory information, and (iii) evaluating the inevitabil-
ity/contingency in the history of science. However, it is not always pointless to ask 
such clarifying situations, as the problems associated with scenarios S8 and S9 indicate.  
To illustrate further the importance on intervention-based thinking, consider the 
claim (discussed in detail in Section 6.8) “that there are electrons explains Millikan’s 
belief”. It might be a counter-possible (and not just counterfactual) to assume that elec-
trons did not exist at all. If this is the case, the electrons cannot explain Millikan’s belief, 
since there is no possible intervention that removes electrons from the universe. We 
must therefore be more specific: we must specify the situation as local (concerning 
particular electrons in an instrument) rather than a global absence of electrons. Such a 
local absence of (free) electrons is clearly possible: it could have been brought about 
by the omission of ionizing radiation in Millikan’s experiment. The ability to make 
such a distinction is an advantage of interventionist thinking in historiography of sci-
ence. 
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 Counterfactual  Situations  in  the  Historiography  of  Science   
and  the  Explication  of  the  Notion  of  Historical  Explanation 
We have seen that it is important to clarify the claim “X is a cause of Y” by 
providing a situation that shows that an intervention on X with respect to Y is at least 
possible. However, scenarios and situations have an even more important role to play 
in historiography of science. 
Let us return to the scenario (S6): 
 
We assumed that: 
X = x1 is the publication of a study S supporting hypothesis H 
X = x2 is no publication of study S 
 
Z = z1 is the publication of a study R supporting not-H 
Z = z2 is no publication of R 
 
W = w1 is the publication of a study P supporting H 
W = w2 is no publication of such result  
 
Y = y1 is the acceptance of H 
Y = y2 is no acceptance of H 
 
The question “Why did Y take the value y1 rather than y2?” was answered as 
follows: 
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1. Had x2, w2 and z2 been the case, y2 would have been the case. OR 
 
2. Had x2, w2 and z1 been the case, y2 would have been the case. OR 
 
3. Had x2, w1 and z1 been the case, y2 would have been the case. OR 
 
4. Had x1, w2 and z1 been the case, y2 would have been the case. 
Once we notice that the change in the variables is explicated by situations where 
the change satisfies the conditions for intervention, we see that different items on the list 
correspond to different situations where the changes in the variables are due to interventions. 
Take, for example, the first item. It could correspond to the following situation: 
Had there been a fatal accident in the laboratory where S was performed, 
and had the groups that performed R and P lived on as usual, H would not 
have been accepted. 
The second item could correspond the following situation: 
Had there been a fatal accident in the laboratory where S was performed, 
and had group (P) lived on as usual (i.e. not performing P because S was 
not performed), and had one group performed R due to (non-suspicious) 
order from the government, H would not have been accepted. 
The fourth item could correspond to the following situation: 
Had the study S been performed, and had the group (R) lived as usual (re-
acting to S and publishing R), and had the group (P) withdrawn from per-
forming P due to (non-suspicious) orders from the government, H would 
not have been accepted. 
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A historiographical account does not have to, of course, specify how the varia-
bles are changed or fixed. However, it should tell what combinations of values of var-
iables, had these values been due to interventions, would have led to explanans and, if 
needed, clarify what kind of event or act would have counted as an intervention. 
The second item above could be framed as follows: 
Had X taken the value x2 due to an intervention [had there been a fatal ac-
cident in the laboratory where S was performed] 
 
and had no intervention on W performed [had the group (P) lived on as 
usual, W taking the value w2], 
 
and had Z taken the value z1 due to an intervention [had the group per-
formed R due to (non-suspicious) orders from the government],  
 
Y would have taken the value y2 (i.e. H would not have been accepted). 
Here the clauses in brackets describe an event or act that counts as an interven-
tion. 
I argued above that we distinguish minimal from complete explanation. We can 
now say that: 
A minimal explanation of “Why y1 rather than y2?” provides one combina-
tion of values of variables (i.e. one situation) such that (i) had these values 
been the case, Y would have taken the value y2, and (ii) all the explanans-
variables take their counterfactual values due to interventions (or as an ef-
fect of change of their causes by interventions).  
 
A complete explanation of “Why y1 rather than y2?” provides every combina-
tion of values of variables (i.e. all the situations) such that (i) had these val-
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ues been the case, Y would have taken the value y2, and (ii) all the explan-
ans-variables take their counterfactual values due to interventions (or as an 
effect of change of their causes by interventions).112 
 
A historical explanation of “Why y1 rather than y2?” provides some (but not 
every) relevant combinations of values of variables (i.e. some situations) 
such that (i) had these values been the case, Y would have taken the value 
y2, and (ii) all the explanans-variables take their counterfactual values due 
to interventions (or as an effect of change of their causes by interventions).  
Given the interests of some group searching for an explanation, complete expla-
nations are not always the preferable explanations, as they might include irrelevant 
parts. Consider the scenario S6. Assume that there are two universities, A and B. The 
groups behind the studies S and R are in the university A, and the group behind study 
P is in the B.  There is nothing that people in the A can do to affect what studies are 
performed in B. This makes the explanations of Y = y2 that cite the fixedness of variable 
W uninteresting for the people in A if those people are only pragmatically orientated 
with respect to the explanations at hand. For example, it would be uninteresting to 
say that: 
Had X remained in value x1, y2 would have been the case, if W was fixed to 
w2 and Z was fixed to z1. 
Since there is nothing that the people in A can do to fix W, this explanation would 
be uninteresting from a purely pragmatic point of view. 
To make the point more obvious, consider the following scenario (of the same 
type as S3): 
                                                 
112 It can be noted that the idea about historical text explicating many counterfactual situation ex-
plains why a historical text as whole, not a single sentence, is the cognitive unit in historiography, 
as is thought in narrativist historiography. 
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Let X represent the publication of a result R, Y the discussion about R, and Z an 
asteroid hitting the earth. It is true that there would not have been a discussion about 
R if an asteroid had hit the earth (i.e. change in Z is associated with change in Y). 
Moreover, this claim is a part of complete explanation (as would be claims about nu-
clear apocalypse etc.). However, in normal circumstances, this claim should not be 
mentioned in the explanation, at least not before the much more “mundane” relation-
ship between X and Y is explicated. Every historian and every historical text has cer-
tain limitations, and thus complete explanations cannot be provided. In practice, a his-
torical study is some collection of minimal explanations. (We can use the term historical 
explanation to refer to such collection.) This makes it very important that we can say 
when a historiographical study has provided a genuinely satisfactory collection of 
minimal explanations, and when one explanation is better than other. I return to this 
topic below. Before that, we need to consider when two explanations are competitors.  
 Explanations: Competitors and Goals 
The concept of explanatory competition, with respect to different levels of ex-
planatory scope, can be defined as follows: 
 
Competing minimal explanations (MC): Two minimal explanations are com-
petitors when they disagree about the counterfactual dependencies be-
tween the values of some variables. To be more precise, two minimal ex-
planations E1 and E2 are competitors if and only if: As an answer to the 
question “Why y1 rather than some yk≠1”, E1 claims that certain combination 
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C of the values of explanans-variables X1…n would have led to the value yi, 
while E2 claims that combination C would have led to yj (≠i). 
 
Competing complete explanations (CC) Two complete explanations CE1 and 
CE2 are competitors if and only if: the minimal explanation E1 is a part of 
CE1, the minimal explanation E2 is a part of CE2, and E1 and E2 are compet-
itors according to MC. 
 
Competing historical explanations (HC) Two collections of minimal explana-
tions (i.e. historical explanations) HE1 and HE2 are competitors if and only if: 
(i) minimal explanation E1 is a part of HE1, minimal explanation E2 is a part 
of HE2, and E1 and E2 are competitors according to MC, or (ii) HE1 and HE2 
include different minimal explanations (i.e. there is at least one difference 
between them) but are intended to satisfy the same explanatory goal E.113 
 
Consider the scenarios S1 (left) and S2 (right): 
 
 
 
The claim that Y depends on X as in S1, and the claim that Y depends on X as in 
S2 generate competing minimal explanations. If we ask “Why y1 rather than y2?”, we 
                                                 
113 It should be noted that here the choice of explanandum is not what is meant by an “explanatory 
goal”. We saw in Chapter Three how the explananda of historiography of science should be chosen. 
An explanatory goal describes which aspects of explanans historians want to shed light on. I return 
to this below. 
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get different answers. According to S2, X = x3 would lead to Y = y2, but according to 
S1, X = x3 would lead to Y = y3. 
An important feature of MC is that it shows that there cannot be competition if 
E1 answers the question “Why y1 rather than y2?” and E2 answers the question “Why 
y1 rather than y3”. For example, answers to the questions: 
Why did scientists come to believe that atoms exist rather than having no 
beliefs at all? 
 
Why did scientists come to believe that atoms exist rather than believing 
that atoms do not exist?  
are not really competitors because they have different explananda. If we ask “Why 
do scientists believe in atoms rather than not?” there remains the ambiguity between 
the two questions above. The definition MC is helpful here: it tells when the competi-
tion between explanations is real and not produced by elliptic formulations of expla-
nation-seeking questions.  
The limiting case of MC is one where the explanatory relevance of some variable 
Z to explanandum Y is denied. If the explanation E1 says that values of Y depend on Z, 
and if E2 says that all the values of Z lead to the same value of Y, E2 denies that there 
is an explanatory relationship between Z and Y. However, in this case MC still implies 
that E1 and E2 are competitors. We need this possibility when explicating CC and HC. 
The condition CC, in effect, is needed in addition to MC to point out that two 
complete explanations are competitors when they disagree about the explanatory rel-
evance of some variable Z while possibly agreeing on others. This happens, for exam-
ple, when the claim is made that “we should not refer to nature at all as an explanans 
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in the [historiography] of science” (Bouterse 2014, 298).114 In most of the cases, expla-
nations in historiography are best not interpreted as competing complete explanations, 
but merely as different (and perhaps competing) historical explanations.  
According to HC, historical explanations are competitors when they disagree 
about the counterfactual dependencies between the values of some variables. This is 
the straightforward sense of competition, and it is common to MC, CC, and HC. How-
ever, there is another, and arguably more interesting, sense in which two historical 
explanations can be competitors. It is that of providing different information but shar-
ing the same explanatory goal. 
Assume that there is a context of historical research where historians attempt to 
reveal the relevance of knowledge-sharing practices in science. In this context the ex-
planatory goal E1 of historians is to underline how knowledge-sharing practices work 
in science. 
Consider the following scenario (mentioned above): 
 
Let X represent the publication of a result R, Y the discussion about R, and Z an 
asteroid hitting the earth. It is true that there would have been no discussion about R 
if an asteroid had hit the earth. Assume that there are two historical explanations of 
the Y = y1 (discussion about R). 
1. Had the result R not been published, there would have been no discus-
sion about R. 
 
                                                 
114 I return to this topic below. Notice that Bouterse does not hold this thesis. Only the excellent 
formulation of the thesis is from Bouterse.  
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2. Had an asteroid hit the earth, there would have been no discussion about 
R. 
These explanations are competitors if they attempt to satisfy the same explana-
tory goal E1. Given the explanatory goal E1, it is obvious that (1) is a better explanation 
than (2). Asteroids are a peripheral phenomenon in the knowledge-sharing practices.  
Next, assume that there is a context of historical research where historians at-
tempt to reveal how great a cosmic coincidence science is. In this context, the explan-
atory goal E2 is to understand science as a part of the vast universe. Given the goal E2, 
(2) is arguably a better explanation than (1). 
It must be noted that when two very different explanations are offered (as in our 
example), the best reading of them is usually that they attempt to satisfy different ex-
planatory goals. It would be most natural to say that explanation (1) is targeted to the 
goal E1, while (2) is targeted to E2. This means that we can accept many different explana-
tions of the same explanandum. However, this does not mean that anything whatsoever 
can have an explanatory value. We already saw that only if there are counterfactual 
dependencies variables (under interventions), the relationship between the variables 
is explanatory. Moreover, asserting that something is always (or never) explanatory should 
make us suspicious. From the fact that X is explanatory/irrelevant with respect to a goal 
E, it cannot be inferred that X is explanatory/irrelevant with respect to every goal Ei.  
It is also important to notice that even if X is not explanatory with respect to some 
goal E, X cannot be ignored during a historical research. Consider the scenario (of the 
same type as) S8:  
 
A politician says that scientists’ interests in climate change (B) is the cause of an 
increase in measured temperatures (S). The politician is naturally interested in politi-
cal aspects of science and thus he wants to highlight them. However, it is mistake to 
139 
 
 
 
ignore the way the world is. There has been a global warming (A), and this is the 
common cause of both B and S.: 
 
If A is ignored due to the explanatory goal, an explanation is found where none 
exists – B is not a cause of S. Bricmont and Sokal make this point when they write: 
“The [--] practice corresponds to ignoring some relevant variables [--] not to holding 
them constant. One can’t hold constant a variable that one refuses to measure.” (2001, 
181.) 
Moreover, historians with different explanatory goals can always attempt to find 
a common ground in an explanation that is more complete than the explanations that 
the historians provide. For example, the discussion about the result R can be explained 
as follows: 
3. Had the result not been published OR had an asteroid hit the earth, there 
would have been no discussion about R. 
Two historians with different explanatory goals could both accept this claim 
about patterns of counterfactual dependencies.115 However, if they did not, then we 
would have a genuinely competing explanation. How to proceed in that situation will 
be discussed soon. 
But how should the notion of  explanatory goals be understood? No neat catalogue 
of such goals can be given. The notion is based on the idea that historians of science 
want to highlight certain aspects of a particular process that led to the explanandum. 
                                                 
115 See Woodward (2003, 56–57) on the idea that patterns of counterfactual dependencies are the 
base on which shared understanding can be built. 
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The explanatory goal is what the explanations may seek to establish in addition to 
providing information about conditions on which the explanandum depends on. An 
explanation may seek to pinpoint the role of some (types of) factors (F) in the history 
of science, and this attempt is centered around the (meta-) explanatory goal of under-
standing F in the development of science. In this sense, the choice of explanatory goal aims 
at second-order understanding (whereas an answer to a particular explanandum gives 
us first-order understanding). 
For example, giving practically useful information could be an explanatory goal. In 
the example above, the reference to asteroids could be omitted due to this explanatory 
goal. There is nothing that scientists (others than those directly involved with solu-
tions to the threat of asteroids) can do about asteroids and their effects on the research. 
However, purely pragmatic considerations are not all that is needed to satisfy our in-
tellectual needs. Different historians with different backgrounds might focus on high-
lighting different aspects of the explanans. The list of dimensions of science that are 
potentially historically interesting can be repeated here: 
Epistemological: What concepts, models and theories there has been in sci-
ence? What kind of practices were developed to establish those? What were 
the epistemological goals?  
 
Social: How is science organized? What kind of social roles are there in the 
sciences and how these roles guide the practices? What and whose values 
are built in the science? 
 
Science and society: What is the relationship between science and politics, 
science and the economy, science and different social groups? How 
global/local is science? How accessible is science for different groups? How 
are the results of science communicated to and understood by society in 
general? What and whose values are built into the science? 
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Science and culture: What is the relationship between science and other as-
pects of culture (religion, for example)? What and whose values are built 
into science? 
 
Science and technology: What is the role of science in the making of new tech-
nologies? How does technology shape scientific practices? 
 
Psychological: How do individual scientists understand themselves? What 
kind of thoughts and emotions do scientists have during their work and 
about their work? 
This list gives an idea of which aspects of explanans can be highlighted. For ex-
ample, one could focus on the values that played a role in a particular episode in sci-
ence116 or on the personal qualities of a scientist that shaped a scientific practice117. 
However, it should be noted that the historiography of science has its own history 
which should affect the way in which the explanantia are chosen. Nowhere in the sci-
ences (or humanities) can one seek to build an explanation ignoring the previous re-
search in the field. Neither is this possible in historiography of science. Therefore, it is 
necessary that the choice of an explanatory goal is based on the previous research that 
has (i) indicated that some aspects of science are worth focusing on, and (ii) left gaps 
in the picture that has emerged. 
Moreover, we have learned (in Chapter 3) that the significant features of science 
can (and must) be separated from the insignificant ones. The choice of explanatory 
goals should follow our understanding of significant features of science so that the 
choice is made in interesting and non-biased way. In other words, the aspects of ex-
planans that are highlighted should be in line with our judgements and principles of 
significance (that are used when explananda are chosen). 
                                                 
116 See Bellon (2011), discussed in the next chapter. 
117 See Krige (2001), discussed in the next chapter. 
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I suggest that we can accept, within some limits, that historians might have dif-
ferent explanatory goals. This means that a historical event or process can be explained 
in various ways and by focusing on different aspects of the past that led to the ex-
planandum. Even though I argued above that the idea that such explanations are com-
petitors is not the most natural one, it would still be desirable if something could be 
said about the relative merits of such explanation. I now turn to this issue. 
 Explanatory  Depth  in  the  Historiography  of  Science   
I develop the criteria for explanatory depth using the ideas introduced in Hitch-
cock and Woodward (2003) and Woodward (2003).118 We have seen that explanandum 
of the form “Why y1 rather than y2?” is explained by a collection of explanantia of the 
form “Because x1, z1 and … and w1 rather than x2, z2 and … and w2”. In science, these 
collections can often be read off from generalizations that describe the relationships be-
tween variables. Because of this, the notion of explanatory depth in Hitchcock and 
Woodward (2003) is defined with respect to such generalization. However, due to the 
nature of historiography, I do not characterize explanatory depth with reference to 
generalizations. Rather, I explicate criteria that enables us to compare the explanatory 
depth of two historical explanations (i.e. collections of counterfactuals). This change 
from generalizations to collections of counterfactuals requires that the criteria of ex-
planatory depth are somewhat rewritten from Hitchcock and Woodward (2003).119 
                                                 
118 There are other ways to analyze explanatory depth/power, e.g. Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010; 
Weslake 2010; Imbert 2013; Bhogal 2019. I follow Woodward and Hitchcock because their ideas 
are most closely connected to the ones discussed in the previous sections. 
119 Instead of writing about “more invariant generalization”, I write about “deeper explanation”. 
In Hitchcock and Woodward (2003), the relative depth of an explanation depends on the range 
invariance of the generalization that is used in the explanation. As the notion of generalization is 
rarely applicable in historiography, I do not use the term invariance. 
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However, we can still retain the core from the idea that “[one] generalization can pro-
vide a deeper explanation than another if it provides the resources for answering a 
greater range of what-if-things-had-been-different questions, or equivalently, if it is 
invariant under a wider range of interventions” (Hitchcock and Woodward 2003, 198) 
by connecting explanatory depth in historiography of science with the ability to an-
swer what-if-things-were-different questions. In what follows, I explicate when one 
historical explanation has better ability to answer what-if-things-were-different ques-
tions than another. 
Assume that E and E* both explain why Y = y1 rather than y2.120 We can say that 
a historical explanation E is deeper than historical explanation E* in the following 
cases: 
 
1. E and E* both relate the values of variables X and Y. However, E gives more 
information about what happens to Y with different values of X.121 
For example, if E says:  
                                                 
120 How to compare two explanations with different explananda is a question that cannot be an-
swered within this book. Moreover, such criteria could be misleading since there is no guarantee 
that everything can have an equally deep explanation. For example, purely chancy (singular) 
events cannot be explained at all. Saying that an explanation is not very deep, in a situation where 
no deeper explanation is possible, could lead to the false idea that there is something that could be 
added to the explanation. Thus I restrict the discussion to explanation depth with respect to the same 
explanandum. 
121 This is based on the following: “Let G be a generalization that includes X as one of its explanans-
variables, and suppose that G is invariant under interventions on the value of X within the range 
R. Suppose that G’ is a different generalization that purports to explain the same outcome. [--] G’ 
includes X, but it is invariant under interventions on X within range R’, which strictly contains R.” 
(Hitchcock and Woodward 2003, 184-185). 
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Y = y1 because X = x1. Had X taken the value x2, Y would have taken the 
value y2; and had X taken the value x3, Y would have taken the value y3. 
and E* says:  
Y = y1 because X = x1. Had X taken the value x2, Y would have taken the 
value y2. 
then E is a deeper explanation than E*. E answers more what-if-things-had-been-
different questions. 
 
2. E and E* both relate the values of variables X and Y. Both give the same amount 
of information. However, E gives information about what happens to Y with more 
interesting values of X.122 
For example, if E says:  
Y = y1 because X = x1. Had X taken the value x2, Y would have taken the 
value y2; and had X taken the value x3, Y would have taken the value y3. 
and E* says: 
Y = y1 because X = x1. Had X taken the value x2, Y would have taken the 
value y2; and had X taken the value x4, Y would have taken the value y4. 
then E is a deeper explanation than E*, if x3 is more interesting than x4.  
Consider that X represents a publication of a study: 
                                                 
122 “If the actual values of the variables fall within the range of invariance of both G or G’, it may 
be reasonable to prefer G’ if it is more accurate within the region of overlap, or if the actual values 
of the variables fall more squarely within the range of invariance for G’. (Hitchcock and Wood-
ward 2003, 185). I have replaced the “if it is more accurate [--] or if the actual [--]” with the notion 
of interesting values. (See also Chapter 8). 
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x1 = the publication of a study S supporting H 
x2 = no such publication 
x3 = the publication of a slightly different study S* supporting H 
x4 = the publication of study S with the proof that God exists and made the 
world the way in which H suggests. 
As x4 is not interesting (because it is extremely far-fetched), E* is not as deep an 
explanation as E. E answers more interesting what-if-things-had-been-different ques-
tions with respect to explanans. 
If E tells what happens when x1, and E* what happens when x2, and if both x1 
and x2 are equally interesting, there might not be a difference in depth. Reflection on 
whether x1 or x2 is more interesting with respect to historiographical research at hand 
is needed.  
Moreover, if E describes what happens when X takes interesting values but E* 
describes what happens under many different but less interesting values of X, judge-
ment about explanatory depth is complicated. For example, if E says (telling an indi-
vidual story about every person mentioned): 
Had the person S1 or S2 … or S100 (who are not actually scientists but could 
have been) explained Brownian motion, scientists would have believed in 
atoms. 
and E* says: 
Had Niels Bohr explained Brownian motion, scientists would have be-
lieved in atoms.  
 
then the comparison between explanatory depth is complicated and must be de-
cided case-by-case.  
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3. E relates X and Y, and E* relates Z and Y. E gives information about the values 
x1-xn of X, and E* gives information about the values z1-zk of Z, and (i) n > k (E gives 
more information), or (ii) the values of X are more interesting than the values of Z (i.e. 
E gives more interesting information).  
For example, if X represents the quality of some research and Z the size of a body 
that hit the earth, E could be preferable due to an interest in epistemology.  
 
4. E and E* both explain why Y took the value y1 rather than the value y2. (E 
relates X and Y, and E relates Z and Y; it is allowed that Z = X). However, E provides 
more information about when Y would take some other values besides y2, or E pro-
vides information about when Y would take some interesting value y3. E answers 
more (or interesting) what-if-things-had-been-different questions with respect to ex-
planandum.123 
For example, if E says: 
Had the result of a study been R, scientists would not have believed that H. 
Had the result been R*, the study would have been repeated. 
and E* says: 
Had an asteroid hit the earth, scientists would not have believed that H. 
Had a slightly smaller asteroid hit the earth, scientists would have forgot-
ten H. 
then E is a deeper explanation, if we assume that it is more interesting to know 
when a study would have been repeated than to know when it would have been for-
gotten. 
                                                 
123 These criteria are not directly mentioned in Hitchcock and Woodward (2003). However, it is 
natural to suppose that some values of explanandum-variable are more interesting than others, 
since we assumed this to be the case with the explanans-variable. 
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Again, if E tells when y2 would have happened, and E* when y3, and if both y2 
and y3 are equally interesting, there might not be a difference in depth. Reflection on 
whether y2 or y3 is more interesting with respect to historiographical research at hand 
is needed. Moreover, if E tells when Y takes interesting values but E* describes when 
Y takes many different but less interesting values, judgement about explanatory depth 
is complicated and must be decided case-by-case. 
 
5. E would still be true while E* would no longer be true, if there was a change 
in background conditions, due to the conceptualization of explanantia.124 
Assume that 1905 was a somewhat boring year, and therefore Einstein’s expla-
nation of Brownian motion was the most noteworthy event of the year. 
Now, if E says: 
Had Einstein not explained the Brownian motion, scientists would not have 
believed that atoms existed. 
and E* says: 
Had the most noteworthy event of the year not happened, scientists would 
not have believed that atoms existed. 
then E is a deeper explanation. This is due to the fact that E would still be true if 
the iPhone had been introduced in 1905, while E* would no longer be true.  The intro-
duction of the iPhone would have been the most noteworthy event in 1905. However, 
if the iPhone had been introduced, it would no longer be true that had the most note-
worthy event not happened [had the iPhone not been introduced] scientists would not 
have believed that atoms existed. E* is therefore fragile with respect to changes in the 
                                                 
124 This is not from Hitchcock and Woodward (2003). Instead, it is based on considerations in 
Woodward (2003, 217). 
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background conditions. We should prefer E as it provides (or, at least, building mate-
rials for) better possible-cause hypothesis125 than E* (see Woodward (2003, 217). 
 
6. E provides information about variable Z that is not provided by E*. In other 
words, E is a more complete explanation than E* as it makes explicit Z that is only a 
background conditions from the perspective of E*.126 
For example, if E* says: 
Had there been a study S, hypothesis H was ignored. Had there been a 
study S*, a further study would have been performed. 
and E says: 
(I) Given the actual scientists: Had there been a study S, hypothesis H was 
ignored. Had there been a study S*, a further study would have been per-
formed. 
(II) Had there been more cautious scientists: Had there been a study S, fur-
ther studies would have been performed. Had there been a study S*, a fur-
ther study would have been performed. 
E is a deeper explanation. It tells us how the ethos of scientists affects the explan-
ans (i.e. it incorporates more variables) and therefore answers more what-if-things-
had-been-different questions. It is important to note that Z can be also a variable that 
mediates the influence of X on Y. Therefore, we do not need to have knowledge about 
                                                 
125 Woodward uses the term, generalization. However, these generalizations that tell “[X] is among 
the possible causes of [Y]” (Woodward 2003, 214), should not be confused with explanatory gen-
eralizations that give somewhat detailed information about the relationship between the exact val-
ues of X and Y. Therefore, I choose to use the term hypothesis. 
126 “G’ makes explicit the dependence of the explanandum on variables treated as background 
conditions by G.” (Hitchcock and Woodward (2003, 187). 
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the mechanism that connects X and Y in order to have an explanation, but once we 
have that knowledge, we have a deeper explanation. 
According to Woodward and Hitchcock “[6.] is, perhaps, the most fundamental 
way in which one [collection of counterfactuals] can provide a deeper explanation 
than another” (2003, 188). The more variables we add, the more complete an explana-
tion we have. Therefore, complete explanations are the deepest explanations.  
However, there is a complication in this. In historiography, the historical context 
(whatever this means) where the explanandum is embedded needs to be somehow 
taken into an account when explanans is formulated. We cannot build every feature of 
a historical situation into an explanans and treat them as equally changeable. This 
would, in some sense, tear down the historicity of these situation. For example, it might 
not seem right to assume that the ethos of scientists in some era could have been dif-
ferent. The fact that scientists had that ethos might seem to be constitutive of that era. 
If we wanted to understand why something happened in the context of that era, it would 
be a distortion to provide a scenario where the ethos could have been different. We 
should thus give the following dimension of explanatory depth: 
 
7. E and E* are close in depth with respect to criteria 1-6. If E* incorporates vari-
able Z (while E does not) and if Z = z1 characterizes the historical context, then E is a 
deeper explanation than E*.127 
We have seen how the ability to answer (interesting) what-if-things-had-been-
different questions is relevant for the explanatory depth. This enables us to compare 
and choose explanations, independently of the respective explanatory goals, when they 
                                                 
127 This is somewhat a mirror-image of Woodward’s notion that “for different sorts of generaliza-
tions, applicable to different sets of phenomena or subject matters, there often will be specific sorts 
of changes that are privileged or particularly important or significant from the point of view of the 
assessment of invariance” (2003, 262). However, the idea remains that not all changes that would 
affect the explanandum are equally relevant for an explanation. We want to know what would have 
changed the explanandum, given that certain (important) things remained constant. 
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are not competitors. How to compare competing explanations, is a part of a more gen-
eral question about explanatory knowledge and explanatory resources in historiog-
raphy of science. 
 Explanatory Resources: Balancing Particular and General 
We have seen that explanations have the form: 
y1 rather than y2, because x1 rather than x2. 
It is obvious that this kind of claim needs to be substantiated with information 
that makes it plausible that x2 would have led to y2. That there cannot be information 
about counterfactual situations is a truism. However, this does not mean that we can-
not explicate what kind of considerations are relevant in substantiating counterfactual 
claims. Many excellent arguments, supporting the possibility of historical counterfac-
tuals, have been given128 and this encourages to believe that counterfactual claims can 
be warranted also in historiography of science. 
In this section, I provide the general outlines of the types of considerations that 
must play a part in the explanatory practices of historiography of science. In the next 
chapter, I analyze the existing historiography of science and show the relevance of the 
considerations explicated here. 
We can begin by noting that the argument that counterfactuals are epistemologically 
opaque cannot be used to argue for or against some particular explanation.129 Thus, I limit 
                                                 
128 On the use of counterfactuals in history, see e.g. Maar (2014), Tetlock et al (2006), Bunzl (2004), 
De Mey & Weber (2003), Lebow (2000), Bulhof (1999) and JPH 10 (3). See also chapter 8. 
129 This is, of course, a judgement from within the counterfactual account and some other account 
could perhaps proceed without counterfactuals. (It is obvious that I do not think how a powerful 
account could be explicated without counterfactuals, as I would have attempted to produce such 
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my discussion to the cases where there are competing explanations.130 The question is: 
How can we choose between two competing historical explanations? 
First, we saw earlier that the claim “x2 would have led to y2” can be argued for 
(or against) only if it is shown that there is a possible intervention on X with respect 
to Y. An explanation that cites X as an explanans-variable can be accepted only if this 
minimal condition holds. Presenting a plausible situation where X is changed by in-
tervention is therefore a requirement for X to be a candidate for an explanans-variable.  
In itself, the establishment of the possibility of an intervention on X (with respect 
to Y) does not have much evidential value. However, it becomes important once we 
notice that there exists a methodological rule that would lead to the abandonment of 
this crucial feature of causal thinking. We saw earlier that variables should not be ig-
nored during the research due to explanatory goals. This point can be generalized – 
variables should never be (consciously) ignored during the research. We saw that Bric-
mont and Sokal write: “The [--] practice corresponds to ignoring some relevant varia-
bles [--] not to holding them constant. One can’t hold constant a variable that one re-
fuses to measure.” (2001, 181.)  Bricmont and Sokal are answering Labinger, who 
writes:  
One frequently voiced objection is that the [social] studies [of science] are at best incomplete: 
by focusing on the social to the exclusion of the natural world they produce severely dis-
torted pictures or even miss the point altogether. I would agree with the part about incom-
pleteness, but how often do we expect a scientific study to be the last word on its subject? In 
fact, one typical strategy of scientific experimentation is isolation of variables: determining 
the effect of changing one while holding others constant. We are aware of the limitations of 
this approach—interactions between variables can well compromise any conclusions we 
might reach—but we do it anyway, as a useful strategy. (2001, 173 [emphasis added]). 
                                                 
an account if I did.) The point is, however, that one cannot take a counterfactual account (with all 
its advantages) and then use the opacity as an argument for/against some particular claim. 
130 The question of the credibility of a single explanation reduces to this question once we assume 
that an explanation is not warranted if there exists equally well a warranted competitor. If it seems 
that if the evidence for some explanation (that does not yet have a competitor) is extremely weak, 
one surely can formulate some alternative to it and show that the alternative is equally warranted. 
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The diagnosis, according to my account, is that Labinger gets things upside 
down: There is nothing wrong, in itself, to say, as an explanatory conclusion, that some 
variables are irrelevant (with respect to some explanatory goal). It is, however, a bad 
strategy to ignore those variables in an ongoing the research. For example, this could 
lead to a misjudgment in a scenario where there exists common-cause relation: 
 
If A was ignored, changing B could seem to change S if the change in B was 
caused by A. Establishing the possibility of an intervention on X (with respect to Y) is 
thus important because it establishes X as a candidate explanans-variable and because 
it is necessary for our causal thinking to stay on the right tracks.  
There are more central evidential considerations that play a role in historiog-
raphy of science. Discussion about them needs to be divided into two different ques-
tions: 
1. How to choose between “y1 rather than y2, because x1 rather than x2” and 
“y1 rather than y2, because x1 rather than x3”? 
 
2. How to choose between “y1 rather than y2, because x1 rather than x2” and 
“y1 rather than y2, because z1 rather than z2”? 
The first question concerns the choice between two explanations that map the 
values of X into Y differently. This question is less interesting philosophically. It can 
be answered only case-by-case, as is shown in the next chapters. Therefore, we begin 
with the second question. The second question concerns the choice between explana-
tions that cite different kinds of factors in explanation. 
Consider the following explanations:  
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1. Scientists came to believe in atoms (Y) because Einstein explained Brown-
ian motion (X). 
 
2. Scientists came to believe in atoms (Y) because the movie A Trip to the 
Moon was released (Z). 
It is clear that X (Einstein’s work) should be accepted as an explanation rather 
than Z. First, X can be said to be preferable in this particular case. The reason is that 
there are indications of the relevance of Einstein’s explanation. For example, Perrin’s 
works were closely connected to Einstein’s explanation (see Psillos 2011). Moreover, 
Perrin won the 1926 Nobel Prize for his work which clearly indicated that his work 
was widely appreciated. However, there are no indications that the movie played a 
role in this particular case. Secondly, and more importantly, Z does not seem to be a kind 
of factor that can play a role in historiography of science.131 The details of this particular 
case are not the only reason to reject the explanation (2). The other reason is that it 
does not fit our view of historical developments in general. 
Within the limits of this book, it is not possible to give useful philosophical in-
sights about which kind of considerations can be used to establish the explanatory 
relationships between some variables in some particular historical situations. 132 As we 
have seen, historians of science can ask a wide range of questions with different scales 
about different aspects of science. This means that there needs to be a variety of dif-
ferent ways of searching for the answers. Establishing the influence of some publica-
tion to a scientist is very different task from that of establishing the effect of the age 
                                                 
131 After writing this example, I heard that Interstellar has had an effect on science (see James et al. 
2015). It might be the case, then, that the release of movies might play a role in science. Instead of 
changing the example, I take this to confirm the approach in this section: Some factors might turn 
out to be explanatory when we consider many historical cases. 
132 In the next chapters, we will see that such considerations are not impossible. Using actual his-
toriographical studies, I show how such considerations can proceed. 
154 
 
 
 
structure of a scientific community to the rate of acceptance of a new idea. A diary can 
solve the first issue; the second could rely on the considerations of the credibility of 
Planck's principle133 and on the prospects of applying that principle to the case at hand 
– requiring demographic data and careful study of the views and discussions within 
the community. We also need to notice that sometimes historical counterfactuals are 
scientific counterfactuals and therefore equally tractable. For example, a historical ex-
planation can refer to the behavior of electrons in an instrument (see Section 6.8). 
Moreover, how the values of some variable X should be mapped into the values of Y 
is similar question concerning some particular historical situations. All these consid-
erations belong to the area of expertise of historians and scientists. However, there is 
a need for philosophical reflection about what kinds of factors can be explanatory in 
historiography of science. This is the reflection provided here, and the explanatory 
relevance in particular cases is discussed only when it is connected to the discussion 
about explanatory resources in general. 
I will use the term explanatory resources to describe the kinds of factors that can 
be used in explanations in historiography of science.134 The starting point for such 
concept is that historiography of science is not an ahistorical practice. It builds on the 
results of previous studies and there are (and have been) discernible trends in the 
field.135 These developments are not just a mindless river in which the historians swim; 
                                                 
133 “[A new] scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see 
the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is 
familiar with it.” (Cited from Hull et al. 1978, 718.) 
134 I discuss as if there were only one system of explanatory resources. If there are (or will be) many 
such systems (scientific pluralism), then the discussion indicates how one such system can be de-
veloped internally. How two interrelated distinct systems of explanatory resources cannot be dis-
cussed in this book. See Chang (2012, Section 5.2.3) discussing pluralism and interactions between 
different systems of practice. 
135 One of the most recognized of these trends is that “such ideals as truth, value-neutrality, and 
objectivity are neither eternally unchanging nor universally accepted. Rather, they are historical 
constructs, interpreted in a range of different ways, and coming into prominence at particular 
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they are conscious choices. The developments are based on a search for deeper under-
standing and unified pictures. Such search cannot proceed if nothing guides the re-
search question and unifies the answers. Explanatory resources have a twofold func-
tion. First, and more important, they give guidance to which kind of factors can be 
explanatory in historiography of science. Secondly, they provide research questions. 
If we know that Z was the cause of a significant feature of science, we may then ask 
what the cause of Z was. Z does not need to be a significant feature in itself. In this 
way, an explanation can provide interesting research question. I focus mainly on the 
first function, as it is epistemologically interesting. 
Our explanatory resources must be restricted. Otherwise they would not serve 
their role in guiding the kind of questions historians ask and in unifying our 
worldview. However, the explanatory resources must be rich (or powerful) enough to 
guarantee that we can answer many explanation-seeking questions with respect to 
different explanatory goal. This means that the explanatory resources must somehow 
be managed.  
The right way to manage the explanatory resources is to balance the factors that have 
worked (i.e. that provided explanatory understanding) in particular cases and the general ap-
plicability of those factors. Historians have built a stock of explanations. When novel 
explanations are formulated, the factors that seem to have worked in the historiog-
raphy previously should be used as heuristic that drive the ongoing research. If it 
turns out that those kinds of factors are not relevant in the research at hand, new fac-
tors must be used. This situation also means that the previous explanations must be 
re-evaluated in order to stop the inflation of our explanatory resources.136 
An example (I give a genuine illustration in Section 7.3): If some developments 
D in the history of science have been credited to crucial experiments (C), then some 
                                                 
times for particular reasons. Several important works of historical scholarship have mapped this 
terrain [--].” (Golinski 2012, 20.) 
136 The mapping of X into Y can be evaluated in this way. If it turns out that mapping some xi to yi 
in a particular case does not work, this should also make one re-evaluate the previous mappings.  
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new research on a development D* should check whether crucial experiments could 
be used to explain D*. If it turns out that D* cannot be explained by citing C, then a 
new factor F needs to be given. Moreover, historians should also re-evaluate the ex-
planations that were based on the notion of a crucial experiment, and the choice of F 
should be such that F can be used to explain a wider set of developments than C.137 In 
this way, the simplicity and power of explanatory resources can be balanced. We remove one 
kind of factor from our explanatory resources and replace it with another, presumably 
more applicable, kind of factor. 138 Management of explanatory resources is one way 
to gain a second-order understanding in historiography of science: We learn not about 
any particular explanandum but about explanations in historiography of science in gen-
eral. Management of explanatory resources enable us to find possible-cause hypotheses, 
i.e. hypotheses that tell us what kinds of things are most generally applicable in histo-
riography of science and where to start a research on certain issue. 
Moreover, historiography of science should also take note of philosophical con-
siderations. This is best seen when philosophy provides restrictive results.139 If the phi-
losophy of science has shown, for example, that the notion of a crucial experiment is 
incoherent, then this notion should not be used in historiography of science. This is a 
natural point, given that any explanatory resources in any given field must be concep-
tually and logically sound. 
                                                 
137 This wider set may involve D and D* but it can also include development D** besides them. In 
such cases, we need to re-evaluate the factors G that were used earlier to explain D**. Keeping our 
resources as strong and simple as possible is therefore a global task. 
138 If no other factor provides better understanding than C, we need further studies. Moreover, if 
C and F have a similar explanatory scope, we may compare their respective explanatory depths 
with respect to a set of explananda. 
139 The complexities of the relationship between historiography of science and philosophy of sci-
ence requires a more detailed account than can be given here. 
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More important is to notice that historiography of science should also use ex-
planatory resources of natural sciences.140 There are three main reasons for this: 
First, a historiography of science should show how science works as a part of the 
universe, including human beings, societies, the physical world and everything there 
is.141 Of course, the ways of the natural world cannot be the only explanatory resource 
in historiography of science but this does not mean that it can be ignored. In fact, un-
derstanding science as a human practice requires us to pay attention to the rest of the 
universe, as only hubris could lead one to separate humans from the rest of the uni-
verse. Refusing to see the impact of the universe on science leads to inadequate un-
derstanding of science as a human activity. Moreover, even if one could live with in-
adequate historiography, it would be irresponsible to refuse to see the effects of hu-
man beings and their science on the environment. If we ignore how nature is, we also 
ignore how humans have affected it. For example, if we want to answer “Why were 
higher carbon dioxide levels measured in 2017 than in 1967?” ignoring the changes in 
the atmosphere would be extremely misleading and dangerous.  
Of course, there are historical natural sciences, as Kuukkanen points out (2016, 
8–10).  Nature has changed (even in the short period of time of existence of Homo sa-
piens). However, knowledge of how nature was different in the past surely belongs to 
the explanatory resources of the current sciences. Moreover, if one claims that science 
does not adequately capture how nature was in the past since the possibility of fun-
damental change in the nature cannot be excluded, this amounts to nothing but 
Humean skepticism towards the very basic uniformities of nature. Neither scientists 
nor historians (or anyone else, for that matter) could work on the assumption of such 
a chaotic world. 
                                                 
140 The explanatory resources of human and social science should also be used. I focus on the nat-
ural sciences, as these are more controversial in historiography. Everything said below applies also 
to the use of other sciences in the historiography. 
141 I do not suggest non-physicalism. That discussion is irrelevant here. 
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Secondly, and more academically, historiography of science should be relevant 
for the scientific practices. At least, the ideal of such relevance should not be aban-
doned without strong reasons. Otherwise some of the great potential of historiog-
raphy of science is wasted and, in addition, scientists are left with an ahistorical per-
spective which is hardly ever a good position.  This would be the case if the explana-
tory resources of historiography of science were completely cut off from the explana-
tory resources of science. Scientists would have to live in two different explanatory 
worlds. In their scientific work, they would use the natural world as an explanatory 
resource, but in their historical reflections they would have to abandon their 
knowledge of nature and the explanatory trust put on that nature. It is difficult to see 
how these ways of life could be fruitfully connected. However, if the resources of his-
toriography and science are seen as interconnected, there is no need for such a double 
life.  
In the third place, the explanatory resources are, in fact, connected. For example, 
a scientist can use historical knowledge about some society to accept or reject a set of 
measurements. For example, if it is known that the instruments of that society were 
not detailed enough due to the technological state of the society, then their measure-
ments cannot be trusted. Notice that (i) this is a historical claim about a society, and 
(ii) this historical claim is based on our understanding of nature (i.e. on our under-
standing of the instruments and how the world is such that instruments like those do 
not measure it adequately). If the scientists can use the resources of historiography 
and successfully theorize using those resources, it seems odd to claim that historians 
could not do the same with science. The explanatory resources must be understood as 
forming a unity. Moreover, once we take seriously the historical nature of science and 
understand that science is always build on previous developments, there is no mean-
ingful way to separate the explanatory resources of science and historiography of sci-
ence. If a scientist knows, as a part of her work, why certain measurements were made 
in the past, the scientist has knowledge about the history of science. Similarly, if a 
historian knows why some measurements in the past were politically manipulated, 
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she knows why certain evidence must be rejected in science. One cannot know science 
and history of science separately if one understands the historical nature of science. 
We can formulate the super-symmetry principle: everything in the history of sci-
ence must be explained by using the explanatory resources that are shared between 
all explanation-seeking fields.142 There are no disciplinary boundaries when it comes 
to the explanatory resources. 
It must be noted that the use of scientific knowledge in historiography of science 
does not mean that we attribute our current beliefs to the historical agents. Science is 
about the universe around those past agents, not about the beliefs of the agents. Actu-
ally, this is why we need both science and historiography to understand the history of 
science: We need to combine what the agents believed, what their social and cultural 
structures were, and how the world was, in order to build a satisfactory account about 
the history of science. No single element is enough. Moreover, if we explain the devel-
opments of science by attributing current belief to the past agents, we simply fail in 
our explanatory task – the explanation would be simply false (see Section 3.4). There-
fore, the causal approach offered in this book gives a rationale for avoiding such anach-
ronist descriptions. 
 The  Historiography  of  Science,  Scientific Knowledge,  and  the 
Scientific  Realism  Debate.  
As the knowledge of the natural world needs to be part of the explanatory re-
sources (of course, it is not the only resource or a resource that must be always used) of 
historiography of science, the question of how to express that knowledge arises. I ar-
gue that the best way to express the facts about the natural world is to think in accord-
ance with the framework of scientific realism, consisting of three theses: 
                                                 
142 The original symmetry principle is formulated by Bloor: “[Sociology of scientific knowledge] 
would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of cause would explain, say, true 
and false beliefs” (1991, 7). 
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The Metaphysical Thesis: The world has a definite and mind-independent structure. 
The Semantic Thesis: Scientific theories should be taken at face value. They are truth-condi-
tioned descriptions of their intended domain, both observable and unobservable. Hence, 
they are capable of being true or false. The theoretical terms featuring in theories have pu-
tative factual reference. So, if scientific theories are true, the unobservable entities they posit 
populate the world. 
The Epistemic Thesis: Mature and predictively successful scientific theories are well con-
firmed and approximately true of the world. So, the entities posited by them, or, at any rate, 
entities very similar to those posited, inhabit the world. (Psillos 1999, 4). 
The advantage of this framework is that it allows the discourses in historiog-
raphy of science, in science itself, and in the everyday life to have a similar (surface) 
structure. Moreover, it helps to separate the philosophical interpretation of our ex-
planatory resources from their normal use. For example, consider the following expla-
nations: 
(I) The measurement of high levels of carbon dioxide were made because 
there was a certain amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
This explanation appears to be committed to the real existence of carbon dioxide. 
However, this explanation can be read in different ways: 
 (Ib) An instrument I had the reading R because the conditions C [one re-
places “C” with the preferred interpretation of “there is an amount A of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere”] obtained.  
One can then say “Had C not been the case, the measurement would not have 
been made” and specifies that the antecedent is the case due to an intervention. (For 
example, two persons could agree that burning less fossil fuels would count as an 
intervention even if they disagree on the reality of carbon dioxide.) For every realist-
looking claim there must be a corresponding re-interpretation as long as the disagree-
ment is philosophical and not scientific (both sides accept scientific theories and views 
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but disagree on their interpretation, see below). Therefore, the account of explanation 
that was explicated in the previous sections does not commit one to full-blown scien-
tific realism. All that is needed is a commitment to dependency relations holding be-
tween two states of affairs that science captures with more or less ontological depth. 
However, in providing explanations, it is much easier to speak about carbon dioxide 
as if it were a kind of entity that exists in a mind-independent world. Even if the talk 
about carbon-dioxide must be – in a philosophical sense – interpreted in non-realistic 
way (as anti-realist would claim), our explanatory resources must be packed so that 
we are able to use simple language in explanations and see the connections between 
different explanations. 
The philosophical point lurking behind these considerations is that the philo-
sophical considerations have no bearing on the first-order questions about which kind 
of things are explanatory in this or that historical research and how to communicate 
explanatory knowledge.143 One cannot claim, for example, that we should not cite car-
bon dioxide in a historical explanations because the realistic interpretation of the theo-
ries involving it is not possible (assume this impossibility for the sake of argument). 
The debate between scientific realism and another position is not whether to accept or 
reject certain scientific theories – that is a scientific question – but how to interpret 
them. Our explanatory resources are what they are – we have a certain very successful network 
of explanations – and a philosophical interpretation does not change it. Only skepticism to-
ward science could lead one to abandon such an explanatory framework, but it is dif-
ficult to understand how this skepticism could be derived from explanatory consider-
ations in historiography of science. Paradoxically, even the pessimistic induction, the 
argument that, since there were successful theories in the past that were not true, we 
cannot infer the truth of the present theories from their success (see Laudan 1981), 
implying that we can be successful even if the present sciences are not connected to 
                                                 
143 See Tosh (2007, 192-193) arguing for similar view. 
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the reality in an adequate way.144 Therefore, there is no reason to abandon the explan-
atory resources of the sciences (and, of course, this was never the target of the pessi-
mistic induction). Only if we claim that genuine historiographical explanations are 
those that cite only really (in realist sense) existing factors, can we abandon the explan-
atory resources of the present science due to the possible collapse of realism. However, 
if this was our definition of genuine historiographical explanation, then there proba-
bly would be no such explanation if the realism collapses, as we can conjecture that 
the collapse of scientific realism would also mean the collapse of historiographical re-
alism. Historiography is hardly more oriented towards mind-independent world than 
science. Now, if our notion of genuine explanation implies that there are no explanations, 
there is something wrong with that a priori notion. Therefore, the use of the explana-
tory resources of science cannot be abandoned. (I return to this topic in Section 6.8.)  
It must be noted that a realistic attitude does not imply that the past theories 
must be judged as similar (in their content) to the present theories.145 Thus, Arabatziz’ 
argument that  
[Scientific realists] are in a historiographically awkward predicament: they are compelled to 
maximize the continuity between past and contemporary science. To put it another way, 
they are hard-pressed to portray past successful scientific theories as imperfect versions of 
their contemporary descendants. In other words, they are forced to embrace Whiggism, a 
                                                 
144 Laudan is criticizing the No Miracles Argument: “The positive argument for realism is that it is 
the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle. That terms in mature sci-
entific theories typically refer [--], that the theories accepted in a mature science are typically ap-
proximately true, that the same term can refer to the same thing even when it occurs in different 
theories – these statements are viewed by the scientific realist not as necessary truths but as part 
of the only scientific explanation of the success of science, and hence as part of any adequate sci-
entific description of science and its relation to its objects.” (Putnam 1975, 73.) (See also Psillos 
[1999] and [2009] discussing this argument.) 
145 An analogy: even if psychology can explain some belief of mine, this surely does not mean that 
the content of my belief must be similar to the psychological theory. See also the end of the Section 
6.6. 
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historiographical stance rejected by the overwhelming majority of historians of science. 
(2018, 36) 
cannot be used against connecting the explanatory resources of historiography 
of science to the resources in other fields. If one defends scientific realism against pes-
simistic meta-induction or other historical challenges, then a move described by 
Arabatziz is arguably required. However, we saw that from the perspective of the 
philosophy of historiography of science, the issue is not whether or not realism is de-
fendable position. Rather, the issue is how to effectively connect historiography of sci-
ence to other fields of inquiry. 
To sum up, our explanatory resources should be seen forming a continuous 
whole and used as if they were descriptions of mind-independent reality with rich 
ontology. An eloquent way to communicate explanations in historiography of science 
is to use realistic mindset. Yet debates concerning the viability of scientific realism are 
irrelevant for the explanations in historiography of science. Knowledge about nature 
can (and should) be used in historiography of science even if one does not accept sci-
entific realism. An argument against scientific realism does not imply that scientific 
knowledge cannot be used in historiography of science. As we will see in the next 
section, a much stronger scientific case must be made if one is willing to exclude, say 
electrons, from the explanatory resources of historiography of science.  
 Millikan and the Electrons 
In this section, I illustrate how one widely discussed claim can be analyzed using 
the framework developed in the previous sections.  
In the history of science, it has been claimed that the way the world is – nature – 
cannot explain our beliefs about it. In this section, I show that this conclusion cannot 
be made.146 
 
                                                 
146 More detailed discussion of this issue is found in Bouterse (2016). 
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David Bloor writes: 
If we believe, as most of us believe, that Millikan basically got it right, it will follow that we 
also believe that electrons, as part of the world Millikan described, did play a causal role in 
making him believe in, and talk about, electrons. But then we have to remember that (on 
such a scenario) electrons will also have played their part in making sure that Millikan's 
contemporary and opponent, Felix Ehrenhaft, didn't believe in electrons. Once we realize 
this, then there is a sense in which the electron ‘itself’ drops out of the story because it is a 
common factor behind two different responses, and it is the cause of the difference that in-
terests us. (Bloor 1999, 93). 
 
First, notice that, in the explanatory account of previous chapter, the question 
“Why y1 rather than y2?” requires that y2 is a counterfactual alternative to y1. Therefore 
the explanation-seeking question “Why did Millikan believe but Ehrenhaft did not?” 
is an elliptical one. We need to fulfill the contrast; and that can be (i) that neither of 
them believed; (ii) both believed; (iii) Ehrenhaft believed but Millikan did not. It seems 
natural to suggest that (ii) is the implicit contrast. If we are interested in explaining the 
actual difference in Millikan’s and Ehrenhaft’s beliefs, we probably want to know in 
what counterfactual situation they would have had the same believes. This, however, 
does not change much, as explanations are supposed to answer many what-if-things-
were-different questions.  
Take 
P  =  the presence of an electron  
M  =  methods that Millikan actually used 
F  =  methods that Ehrenhaft actually used 
Bm =  Millikan believed in electrons 
Be =  Ehrenhaft believed in electrons 
Take the following set of counterfactuals: 
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1. Had P not been the case147 and had Millikan and Ehrenhaft used M, nei-
ther Be nor Bm would have been the case. 
 
2. Had P not been the case and had Millikan and Ehrenhaft used F, neither 
Be nor Bm would have been the case. 
 
3. Had P been the case (as it actually was) and had Millikan and Ehrenhaft 
used M, both Be and Bm would have been the case. 
 
4. Had P been the case and had Millikan and Ehrenhaft used F, neither Be 
nor Bm would have been the case. 
 
5. Had P been the case and had one of the scientists used F and other one 
M, either Be or Bm would have been the case. 
This set of counterfactuals shows that the electron is in itself causally relevant in 
the situation. Change the situation by taking the electron out and fix the methods that 
the scientists use, and the belief of Millikan will change. This means that electrons 
were causally relevant to the belief of Millikan and can thus be used in explanations. 
Nothing in the structure of the explanation forbids historians from using it.148 More-
                                                 
147 It might be a counter-possible (and not just counterfactual) to assume that electrons did not 
exist at all. This would be the case if electrons were taken as necessary beings. However, (i) the 
necessity of electrons is hardly something that advocates of the strong programme would accept (i.e. 
they would probably deny that science is in an intimate connection with necessary structures of 
the world), and (ii) we can specify the scenario as local (concerning particular electrons in an in-
strument) rather than global absence of electrons. The local absence of (free) electrons could have 
been brought by omission of ionizing radiation. The ability to make such distinction is an ad-
vantage of interventionist thinking in historiography of science. 
148 This shows that no matter how the details of particular examples are analyzed and who got it 
right in the Kochan-Tosh-Lewens debate (see Kochan [2010], Tosh [2006] and Lewens [2005]), the 
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over, counterfactual (5) tells us when it would have been the case that Ehrenhaft be-
lieved in electrons and Millikan did not, and the counterfactual (3) tells when both 
would have believed in electrons. The electron does not “drop out”. Answering what-
if-things-were-different questions requires that we do not ignore electrons: if we ig-
nore electrons, we cannot distinguish the antecedents of 1 and 3 even though they 
have different consequents. Moreover, the factors cited in each counterfactual 1-5 be-
long to same kinds. This means that the explanatory structure is super-symmetrical (see 
Section 6.6). 
Surely, one can give a minimal explanation that does not cite the electrons. How-
ever, an explanation that cites the electrons and the methods is a deeper one according 
to our principle (see the previous chapter): 
Explanation E is deeper than E*, if E provides information about variable Z 
that is not provided by E*. 
Of course, if we compare two minimal explanations, E1 citing the methods and 
E2 citing the electrons, we can say that E1 is sometimes the deeper explanation. Here 
we follow the principle from the previous chapter: 
E is deeper than E*, if E relates X and Y, and E* relates Z and Y, and the 
values of X are more interesting than the values of Z (i.e. E gives more in-
teresting information).  
and assume that information about methods is more interesting than infor-
mation about electrons. However, it seems that in a case like this, where we evaluate 
only very few variables, there is no need to choose between E1 and E2. It is more nat-
ural to connect them in order to formulate a deeper explanation. The case would be 
                                                 
idea of contrastive explanations is compatible with the citing of facts about nature in our explana-
tions in the historiography of science, if we choose the interventionist account to analyze causal 
explanations. 
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different if E and E2 were not minimal explanations but genuine historical explana-
tions.149 
Perhaps there is an epistemological concern: Since we believe in electrons be-
cause of Millikan’s work150, we cannot use our belief in electrons in the explanation of 
Millikan’s belief without circularity. We have no access to the reality that could con-
firm – independently of our Millikan-based tradition – whether or not electrons exist. 
(E.g. Kochan 2010, 136.) 
There is no circularity here. It is not our belief about the electron that the explanation 
cites but the electrons. If electrons exist, then Millikan was exposed to them (or to con-
ditions where electrons were present according to our theories of physics, see Section 
6.7) and our electrons-citing explanation of his belief is right. Whatever our level of 
confidence toward the existence of electrons is, the true value of the explanation does 
not change. Most certainly we cannot say that electrons did not affect Millikan because 
we are not absolutely sure that they did. Ignoring a possible factor is never the right 
way to proceed, as we saw in the previous chapter.  
It is also unclear whether we can justify a theory about some entity without at 
the same time committing ourselves to the explanatory status of that entity. We ask 
“What would an entity E cause in experimental setup S if E existed?”. If we then infer 
that it would cause phenomenon P, and if we observe P, then it seems that we have 
evidence for the explanatory status of that entity. (The exact form of the inference need 
not bother us here; the point is that it is difficult to see how there could be evidence of 
the existence of an entity without some (supposed) causal link between the entity and 
the evidence). If, after many such inferences, we accept the theory about the entity, 
then we, at the same time, accept that it was a causal factor in our setup. It would not 
be reasonable to ask “Well, we accepted the theory about the entity. But does it have 
any causal role to play?” as if we could separate these issues.  
                                                 
149 These notions are defined in the previous chapter. 
150 We can assume this for the sake of simplicity. 
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Moreover, if we admit our uncertainty – whatever this means - about the exist-
ence of electrons, not only are we forced to abandon our explanation of Millikan’s 
belief but also every other explanation that cites electrons and their properties. Be-
cause the fabric of scientific theories that use electrons in their explanations is very 
successful, this is an unreasonable thing to do. Once we acknowledge that electrons 
are worthy of belief there is no reason why they cannot be used in the case of Millikan.  
One does not even need to be a scientific realist, arguing from success to truth, 
to make the point. The only thing that is required is that the use of our explanatory 
resources is not arbitrarily divided between historiography of science and the natural 
sciences. Therefore, the formulation of underdetermination thesis that “the world can 
sustain diverse, and even contradictory, descriptions” (Kochan 2010, 133) does not do 
any trick here. Even if we accept the underdetermination thesis (despite the harsh crit-
icism151 it has faced), this has no bearing on the explanatory status of electrons. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, the debate between scientific realism and other position 
is not whether to accept or reject scientific theories – that is a scientific question – but 
how to interpret them. Our explanatory resources are what they are – we have a cer-
tain very successful network of explanations – and a philosophical interpretation does 
not change it. To see this, assume that under-determination thesis shows that claims 
about electrons, such as "electrons explain Y", cannot be interpreted as referring to 
entities and facts about mind-independent reality. If we were to reject explanations 
citing electrons because of this, then we should accept that natural sciences have not 
provided explanations when they claim "electrons explain Y". If we accepted this, then 
our philosophical theory of explanation would have led to the conclusion that the 
fields (natural sciences) that are taken to be exemplary places where explanations are 
found do not provide explanations after all.  One should wonder what the "explana-
tions" are that the philosophical theory talks about and what the value of such a priori 
theory is. 
                                                 
151 E.g. Laudan (1990), Okasha (2000). 
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Moreover, if underdetermination is true and we can choose whichever theory 
we want, we can equally well choose a theory that talks about electrons. Once this 
choice is made, we need only to be consistent with the choice in order to use electron-
citing explanations. Ironically, nothing can stop us from using electrons in our expla-
nations, if the under-determination thesis is true. 
The only argument that is left for not using nature in explanations in the history 
of science is that this restricts the explanatory space open to historians (Kochan 2010). 
Since acceptable explanations must refer only to what is true (or accepted, for that 
matter) and have certain structure, this worry about a restriction must be read as a 
methodological norm rather than as an attempt to justify every possible explanation 
as acceptable. As a methodological claim, it says: “Try using different sorts of factors 
in explanations in order to find those that suit the best”. This claim makes sense: the 
only way to find out whether, for example, economic or political factors are generally 
more explanatory, is to formulate explanations in terms of these factors and see which 
set of explanations gives us the most coherent worldview. This was shown in the pre-
vious chapter. However, it is difficult to see how electrons could drop out from the 
explanations once this methodological framework is in place. Electrons are so central 
to our worldview and explanatory practices that abandoning them would mean a 
complete change of worldview. Historians of science are probably not the ones who 
can accomplish a change of this magnitude. Thus, we had better stick with the elec-
trons and the rest of nature.152 
                                                 
152 Surely there might be cases where we are less confident about a description of nature produced 
by science than we are in the case of electrons. In such cases our historical explanation, citing fea-
tures of nature that are a part of this description, would stand on shakier grounds. However, there 
is nothing problematic in the idea that sometimes our explanations, including historiographical 
ones, are not completely reliable. In such cases, only time can tell – as we continuously update our 
explanatory resources – whether the explanation was correct or not. It is not compelling to claim 
that because we are sometimes on shaky grounds, we are always on shaky grounds. The issue 
must be solved explanation-by-explanation.  
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 Conclusion  
We have seen that an explanation in historiography of science has the form: 
y1 rather than y2, because x1 rather than x2. 
In this chapter, an account of explanation was built around this basic notion. This 
account was explicated mainly as a tool for causal thinking in historiography of sci-
ence. In Chapter 5, we saw that there are debates concerning the nature and prospects 
of historiography of science (and science studies in general) that require clarification 
and systematization. The account here provides the needed clarifications and system-
atizations, as the account (I) is completely indifferent to the nature and scope of the 
thing to be explained; (II) can be used independently of assumptions about the ration-
ality in/of science; (III) is able to accommodate explanatory factors from multiple cat-
egories; (IV) defines notions of explanatory relevance and depth; (V) explicates how 
the explanatory resources should be managed. 
Moreover, such a list is only the beginning of a philosophical work. There is 
probably a great number of problems related to historiography of science, some of 
which we might not be able even to think of yet, that require analysis. It is, therefore, 
valuable to have a general framework of explanations in place. Such a framework car-
ries the promise that the philosophical problems can be approached systematically.  
In the next two chapters, we will see how the framework can shed light on exist-
ing issues in history and philosophy of science. Both chapters illustrate the point of 
the previous paragraph: philosophical problems related to historiography of science 
present themselves from different perspectives once we approach them with an ex-
plicit philosophical framework.  
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7 SHEER   WONDER   WITH   SOUND   METHODOLOGY. 
ON   LOCAL   EXPLANATION 
In this chapter, I offer an explication of the notion of local explanation. In the liter-
ature, local explanations are considered as metaphysically and methodologically sat-
isfactory: local explanations reveal the contingency of science and provide a method-
ologically sound historiography of science. However, the lack of explication of the no-
tion of local explanation makes these claims difficult to assess. The explication provided 
in this chapter connects the degree of locality of an explanans to the degree of contin-
gency of the explanandum. Moreover, the explication is shown to be compatible with 
the methodological need for general consideration in historiography of science. In this 
way, the explication (i) satisfies the need to explicate an important notion, (ii) connects 
local explanations and contingency, and (iii) enables us to see how local explanations 
and general considerations can be connected. 
 The Need for an Explication  
The notion of local explanation is a topic of wide interest in historiography of sci-
ence. James Secord writes: 
 
As will be evident to anyone who has looked over publishers’ catalogues in 
recent years, historians of science have developed superb techniques for plac-
ing science in local settings of time and place. A standard model for historiciz-
ing science is to locate specific pieces of work in as tight a context as possible, 
binding them ineluctably to the conditions of their production. (2004, 657.) 
 
Moreover, Peter Galison notes that “the turn toward local explanation in the his-
torical, sociological, and philosophical understanding of science may well be the sin-
gle most important change in the last thirty years” (2008, 119). The idea behind the 
local focus is “that a science constructed in a locality reflects that locality and possesses 
different characteristics from a science conducted in another. This thought also has 
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fundamentally changed how one explains the practice of science.” (Kuukkanen 2011, 
591.) 
But what is meant by local explanation? Kuukkanen writes: “In general and as a 
first approximation, [local explanation] refers here to all the positions that regard sci-
ence and/or scientific knowledge as local in some sense, or explains them by reference 
to locally existing factors.“ (2012, 478). This definition allows us to separate two lines 
of philosophical problems. We need to distinguish between (1) the explication of the 
notion of local explanation and (2) the question of local applicability or validity of sci-
ence. Even if science is explained by locally existing factors, it does not follow that 
science is only locally valid or applicable. A further argument is needed to establish 
the link. Moreover, the line (2) is related to the questions of globality, circulation and 
movement of scientific knowledge. Often the discussions concerning local explanation 
focus on how locally produced science became global.153 I do not discuss the issues 
related to the line (2). In this chapter, I will focus on explicating the very notion of local 
explanation. The lack of an adequate explication of that central notion is a philosophical 
concern in its own right and the issues concerning the line (2) cannot be discussed 
without such explication.  
It seems that local explanations are attractive for two reasons. First, local expla-
nations are viewed as “metaphysically” satisfactory as they seem to describe in detail 
how science works.154 A very important aspect of this satisfaction seem to follow from 
the supposition that local explanations seem to provide us with a perspective on the 
contingency or even fragility of science. Local studies produce sheer wonder in the 
audience. Secondly, it has been claimed that local explanations are epistemologically 
preferable to their alternatives. Kuukkanen argues that  
 
                                                 
153 E.g. Galison 1997; Secord 2004; Kuukkanen 2011. 
154 I use “metaphysical” in a relaxed way here to refer to the idea that local explanations do not 
explain only their intended explananda but also show something (allegedly) deep about science 
and human practices in general. 
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[On] the methodological level, the essence of localism can be said to be its re-
jection of a priorism in historical studies of science. It is a movement for more 
intensive empiricism which, as a consequence of this, rules universalism out as 
an inaccurate and unwarranted description of science (2012, 481).  
 
According to universalism, “science and at least some of its production condi-
tions are universal” (ibid, 487). 
Suppose that everything exists somewhere, i.e. everything has some location. It 
follows that every explanation cites only locally existing factors. This proves that eve-
rything is explained by local factors. There is no need for a distinct notion of local ex-
planation. The end of the story. Not so quick! This “trivial localism”, even if true, does 
not capture the supposed aspects of local explanations: that they show the contingency 
of science and that they are methodologically preferable explanations. Explaining 
something does not automatically reveal the contingency of the explanandum which 
means that local explanations differ from other explanations because they are sup-
posed to reveal the contingency of science. Lorraine Daston writes:  
 
Probably most historians of science these days, if asked about an episode [--] 
would answer that such scientific practices are both socially constructed and 
real.  [They] capture some aspect of the world; they work. But they are neither 
historically inevitable nor metaphysically true. Rather, they are contingent to a 
certain time and place yet valid for certain purposes. [2009, 813. emphasis added] 
 
Also Kohler and Olesko argue that: 
 
This understanding [that science is a product of the society that creates and 
harbors it] was achieved not by abstract reasoning [--] but empirically, by de-
tailed study of local sites of knowledge making. These showed concretely how 
scientific findings were the products of particular local situations and communal 
practices with all their historical and social contingencies. (2012, 3 [emphasis added]) 
 
This relationship between local explanations and the contingency of science is 
not just a byproduct of the localist historiography. The wonder that contingency pro-
duces is great motivation for localist studies: 
 
 The contemplation of historicity – of the sheer singularity of places and times, 
situations and conjunctures, including all those you habitually take for granted 
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– will help you see that there are different ways of looking at the world, and 
that what is obvious in one perspective may be ridiculous in another. (Rée 1991, 
961.) 
 
Moreover, Kuukkanen argues that “[the methodological localism studies] bounded 
localities in order to acquire knowledge that would otherwise be difficult to formulate 
or be without proper warrant” (2012, 478). Local explanations are not just a better way 
to understand what happened in a particular location but they also carry the promise 
of “well corroborated (general) knowledge, the validity of which extends beyond a 
particular locality” (Kuukkanen 2012, 484). There must be a distinct category of local 
explanation if such explanations are methodologically better than other explanations. 
That local explanations are methodologically preferable and that they reveal the 
contingency of science indicates that the “trivial localism” is not what grounds the 
category of local explanations. What is striking is that, despite the general historio-
graphical interest in local conditions and despite all the philosophical discussion 
about the notion of explanation, detailed analysis of the notion of local explanation can-
not be found in the literature. In this chapter, I offer an explication of that notion. My 
strategy is to take a general account of explanation and use that account to explicate 
how the local in the local explanation can be understood. The assumption is that local 
explanations form a distinct class of explanations. As we saw, this assumption is made 
in order to avoid a trivialization of the notion on local explanation. One aim of this 
chapter is to satisfy our basic philosophical need for exact notions. 
However, we have seen that there are other needs that such an explication must 
satisfy. To motivate the explication further, I argue that without a detailed explication 
of the notion of local explanation we cannot understand what the connection between 
local explanations and contingency is. I will provide an explication of the notion of 
local explanation that (i) interprets locality as a matter of degree, and (ii) connects the 
degree of locality of an explanans to the degree of contingency of the explanandum. My 
argument is that if we assume that there is a connection between local explanations and 
contingency, then the notion of local explanation must be understood in particular way 
to guarantee that connection.  Notice that what are described as local explanations in 
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the literature may not satisfy the explication given here. This also means that the his-
toriographical studies that claimed to establish the contingency of science may not 
achieve much on that front. This is in line with the general aim of my book, that is, to 
provide analytical tools that help to interpret the implications of historiographical 
studies. 
Moreover, I argue that the methodological status of local explanations is not as 
clear as is supposed. I will point out three fundamental roles that generalizations and 
general considerations play in historiography of science as a field. Without generali-
zations and general considerations, the methodology of historiography of science re-
mains inadequate. We need to be careful when explicating the notion of local explana-
tion in order to keep the explication compatible with the need for such generalizations 
and considerations. The caution stems from the fact that, while generalization require 
that factors fall into general categories, local explanations put so much focus on a par-
ticular context that the general categories seem irrelevant and therefore the factors in 
the context are easily treated as unique. To establish my own explication, I will argue 
that strong localism, “a form of particularism, according to which only particular or 
individual objects exist, and therefore, there are no universals [--], conditions in which 
science is produced are unique” (Kuukkanen 2012, 485), is not compatible with gen-
eralizations and general considerations. Moreover, I argue that the explication offered 
in this chapter differs from strong localism which allows us to capture both the 
uniqueness of locations and the need for general considerations. As a surprising result, 
we will see that moderate forms of localism and universalism are compatible and even 
symbiotic. However, it also follows that local explanations are methodologically pref-
erable to only a crude universalism that attempts to capture science once-and-for-all 
by very limited set of factors. 
It must be noted that my explication is going to be somewhat revisionary, as it 
does not intend to capture how the notion of local explanation is in fact used but how it 
can be connected with the notion of contingency and with the methodological issues in 
historiography of science. However, I will illustrate this with an example from the 
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historiography of science that the explication can be closely connected with the exist-
ing historiography. 
 Local Explanations and the Contingency of Science  
In Chapter 6, we saw that explanations answer questions of the form “Why X 
rather than Y?” by pointing out factors Z and W such that “Had W rather than Z been 
the case, Y rather than X would have been the case”.155 Explanations are explications 
of counterfactual dependencies and contrastive in nature.  
Let C be the set of all factors such that: had any of these factors (or any subset of 
them) been different, Y rather than X would have been the case. Now, let CL denote 
the subset of all the factors in C such that: had any of these factors (or any subset of 
them) been located differently, Y rather than X would have been the case. CL answers 
what-if questions and therefore explains. Then we can say that: 
(Initial explication): The more factors there are in CL, the more local the 
explanation of ”Why X rather than Y?” is. 
Take an example (1): Why was a wallet picked up on a street in New York? There 
are many factors, including: because the wallet was in the location L and because there 
were people in L. The location of the wallet does not belong to CL whereas the crowd 
in L does belong. Had the wallet been on a different street, it would still have been 
picked up; had there been no-one on the location L (had the people been somewhere 
else), the wallet would not have been picked up. 
Next, consider second example (2): Why was a rare bird spotted in New York? 
                                                 
155 I have modified the terminology for the purposes of this paper. In Woodward’s theory, an ex-
planans consists of (i) a value(s) of a variable(s) and (ii) a “test-invariant” explanatory generaliza-
tions. Explanations relate changes in the explanans-variables to changes in the explanandum-varia-
ble. (Woodward 2003, 403).  
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There are many factors, among them: because the bird was in location L and 
because an ornithologist was in L. Both factors belong to CL: had the bird been located 
differently, it would not have been spotted; had the ornithologist been located differ-
ently, the bird would not have been spotted. 
We can notice that only if none of the factors in CL was located differently, then 
the bird would have been spotted (X) rather than not (Y). This means that if CL is 
complex, then there are many possible changes in the locations of particular factors 
that would have changed X to Y. If many such changes are possible, then the occur-
rence of X seems to have been fragile: it depended on the right occurrence of all the 
factors in a particular location. This seems to explain the close connection between 
local explanations and the contingency of science. 
However, we need to be somewhat more precise here. The contingency of X de-
pends on how plausible it was that some W (leading to Y) happened (see Chapter 8 
for discussion). It might be that there are many factors in CL and yet X was rather 
inevitable. This is the case if the situations where the factors in CL are located in rele-
vant alternative locations are not plausible. For example, we can say (contrary to our 
earlier thoughts) that in the example (1) the location of the wallet could have been 
such that the wallet was not picked up. If the wallet had been located at the bottom of 
the ocean, it would not have been picked up. Here, CL contains two factors: the loca-
tion of the wallet and the location of a crowd of people. Yet, it was not contingent that 
the wallet was picked up. Both a particular street being empty in New York and the 
wallet ending up at the bottom of the ocean are somewhat implausible scenarios. On 
the other hand, in the example (2) there are also two factors in CL: the location of the 
bird and the location of ornithologist. It seems that both the bird being somewhere 
else and the ornithologist being somewhere else are plausible scenarios. Therefore, the 
spotting of the bird was highly contingent. Of course, the difference here is a matter 
of degree. It is not impossible for a wallet to end up at the bottom of the ocean or that 
a street be empty. However, these are less plausible situations than that of an ornithol-
ogist or a bird being in different places. 
178 
 
 
 
Let Pf denote the set of places where a factor f (that belongs to CL) can be located. 
Let Pf* be the subset of Pf such that: had f occurred in a place that belongs to Pf*, Y 
would have been the case. We can say: 
(Explication): The more plausible it is that some factors that belong to CL 
occurred in places that belong to their respective Pf*s, the more local is the 
explanation of ”Why X rather than Y?”  
This explication connects the degree of locality with the degree of contingency.156 
But is it ad hoc? I do not think so. The explication says that we have a local explanation 
when a plausible change(s) in the location(s) of a factor(s) would have changed the 
outcome. Local explanations are supposed to be detailed and concrete. This focus 
should be extended to the modal sphere and therefore the explanatorily relevant pos-
sibilities should be fairly close to the actual course of events. It is disproportional to 
jump from the actual events to far-fetched scenarios while writing historiography with 
a detailed local focus. Moreover, if the explication above is ad hoc, then local explana-
tions and the contingency of science are not closely connected. This would not be a 
worrisome result - it would be rather interesting to notice that local explanations pro-
duce only an illusion of a contingency. However, one should wonder what explana-
tory role locations play if one does not restrict the relevant changes in them. The pres-
ence of a telephone keeps me alive: had there been a monster rather than a telephone, 
I would not be alive. What is the explanatory role of a telephone here? Is it not the 
absence of a monster that is really relevant? Similarly, an explanation citing a far-
fetched change in the location of a factor should make one wonder whether the ex-
planatory work is done by something else than the location, perhaps by the fact that 
explanatory factor existed in the first place. 
                                                 
156 The claim is not that only local explanations show the contingency of science. If there is a plau-
sible change in location that changes the explanandum, then there is contingency. There follows 
from the more general claim that there is  contingency when some plausible change in explanans 
changes the explanandum (see the next chapter). 
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A further issue is whether the existing historiography of science that claims to 
produce local explanations satisfies either the initial or the fully-developed explica-
tions and whether the local explanations which claim to point toward the contingency 
of science satisfy the fully-developed explication.157 However, at least sometimes his-
torical explanations satisfy the explications. Let’s take an example from the historiog-
raphy of science to illustrate the issues in this section. In the paper ”Distrust and Dis-
covery: The Case of the Heavy Bosons at CERN” (2001), John Krige describes “the 
microhistorical process whereby different groups of scientific actors [--] came to claim 
that a new fundamental particle (the W boson) had been discovered at CERN” (2001, 
517) The paper illustrates how factors including the theoretical background, the per-
sonal qualities of the scientists, the pressure from the funding agencies, and the com-
petition for prestige affected how the W boson was discovered and how the results 
were announced. The microhistorical focus of Krige’s study prima facie connects it to 
the family of local explanations. As Galison’s discussion about local explanations 
points out, a microhistorical explanation is a very typical local explanation (2008, 120). 
Krige’s paper is complex. However, we can focus on (i) the technology at CERN, 
(ii) the political pressures, (iii) Carlo Rubbia, and (iv) certain decisions. The decision 
of CERN to search for the W boson was due to a technological advantage over the 
competitor, Fermilab, and due to problems with the image of CERN (Krige 2001, 522-
523). Once that decision was made, the CERN directorate decided to perform two ex-
periments because (i) the most advanced technology was uncertain, because (ii) polit-
ical situation required the participation of many scientist and (iii) because the direc-
torate did not trust Rubbia (ibid. 525-528). However, two different experiments did 
                                                 
157 For example, Paul Elliot has concluded in one of his papers that “Far from being disembodied, 
placeless, abstract conceptions, the evolutionary theories of Erasmus Darwin and Herbert Spencer, 
which through the latter exerted a global influence, were rooted, shaped, and developed in the 
social, landscape, and industrial character of the English Midland provinces and the scientific com-
munities they nurtured” (2003, 29) even though a closer look reveals that, throughout the paper, 
Elliot describes in detail connections between ideas and worldviews that were moving around 
Europe. 
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not matter much in the end: Rubbia suddenly decided to publish results before ade-
quate scientific work had been done to check those results (ibid. 533-535). Once that 
decision was made, other people were forces to adapt to the situation due to political 
and institutional situation (ibid. 535-537). 
How local is this explanation? Plausible changes in the location of technology or 
political processes probably would not have changed the process or the outcome. Sci-
entists would have gathered around the technology and political information would 
have travelled anyway. However, suppose that the decision to search for the W boson 
had been made in Fermilab. This would have changed the technology used in the ex-
periments and the political and institutional context. Perhaps the W boson would not 
have been found; perhaps there the results were never published due to lack of clarity 
in the data. If either of these is a credible outcome, we can say that the location of the 
decision might be an explanatory factor. Moreover, suppose that Rubbia was located 
somewhere else than CERN. This would have decreased the need for two experiments 
and probably there would not have been a sudden turn. Without two experiments or 
Rubbia’s maneuvering, the process of experimentation or the outcome could have 
been different. If either of these is a credible outcome, the location of Rubbia might be 
an explanatory factor. Moreover, both (i) the change in the location of the decision and 
(ii) the change in the location of Rubbia seem plausible. Fermilab considered perform-
ing the experiment (ibid. 521-523) and perhaps Rubbia would have worked in that 
project.158 Moreover, human life is contingent, and some event could have affected 
Rubbia’s presence in CERN’s experiment. That these scenarios are plausible means 
that the location of the decision and the location of Rubbia are explanatory factors. 
I hope that this brief discussion indicates that the explication of the notion of local 
explanation formulated above is not trivial nor too complex. The discussion also shows 
how the question of explanatory relevance of locations can be approached in histori-
ography of science. Many questions concerning the relevance of the locations of the 
                                                 
158 Notice that his idiosyncrasies would not have forced everyone else to adapt to a rushed action, 
as the political and institutional situation would have been different. 
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factors in the process leading to the announcement of W boson was left open but we 
saw where the answers might be found. 
 The Need for Generality 
The idea that general laws are needed for causal judgements goes back to at least 
Hume. Hume thought that every causal judgement is based on an observed regularity, 
and a singular causal judgement is always an instance of such a regularity (T 1.3.14). 
In the famous covering-law model, general laws must be cited in every explanation 
(Hempel & Oppenheim 1948; Hempel 1952). A more subtle thesis is formulated by 
Davidson: A true singular causal claim is entailed by the premises citing the occur-
rence of cause and a true causal law, once the cause and effect fall under suitable de-
scriptions (1967, 701). We cannot accept these views in their original form in the phi-
losophy of historiography. The views of Hume and Hempel would imply that there 
are no causal explanations in historiography of science, whereas Davidson’s view 
would imply that the search for reductive descriptions is the main epistemological 
task in establishing historiographical explanations.159 
However, even if we do not accept the views above as they stand, this does not 
mean that we can have a complete methodology of explanations in historiography of 
science without some place for generalizations or general considerations (i.e. consid-
erations that are essentially about kinds of things and relationships between those 
kinds). In this section, I will not examine the general philosophical questions about 
such generalizations. Rather, I will point out some essential roles that (admittedly 
weak) generalizations play in the historiographical thinking and in the structure of 
historiography of science as a field. Once these roles are explicated, we see that the 
explication of the notion of local explanation formulated above is a methodologically 
                                                 
159 Of course, Hempel described historical explanations as ”explanation sketches”. I do not see any 
reason why explanations, having the form presented in the previous chapter, would not be genu-
ine explanations. See Woodward (2003, 4.9) discussing this issue. 
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sustainable explication. In the conclusion (Section 7.4), I discuss whether local expla-
nations are methodologically preferable and, if so, preferable to what approach. 
To clarify my position, I contrast it with strong localism, “a form of particularism, 
according to which only particular or individual objects exist, and therefore, there are 
no universals: [--] conditions in which science is produced are unique” (Kuukkanen 
2012, 485). Strong localism implies that there are no categories of (relevant) causal fac-
tors and therefore no historiographical (causal) generalization. If there were such cat-
egories, the conditions would not be unique to the relevant extent, as there would be 
universals or resemblance-relations that ground the categorization. My argument is 
the following: Assume that we can write about events in the past and warrant singular 
causal judgements even in the absence of categories and generalizations. Even in this 
case we need generalizations, and therefore categories, to direct and control histori-
ography of science in order to achieve important explanatory ends. Therefore, even if 
strong localism did not make the world unintelligible (which I doubt), we would still 
need generalizations, and therefore an alternative explication of localism. 
 
1. As I argued in Section 6.6, historiography of science is not an ahistorical prac-
tice. It builds on the results of previous studies and there have been discernible trends 
in the field. These developments are not just a mindless river where the historians 
swim; they are conscious choices. The developments are based on a search for deeper 
understanding and unified pictures. Such a search cannot proceed if nothing guides 
the research question and unifies the answers. 
In Section 6.6, we used the term explanatory resources to denote the set of kinds of 
factors that can be used in an explanation in historiography of science. The explana-
tory resources can be seen as consisting of possible-cause hypotheses: they describe 
which kinds of factors are among the possible explanantia for some event or process. 
We also saw that the explanatory resources must somehow be managed. I suggested 
the following picture: The method of managing the explanatory resources is to balance 
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the number of factors that provide explanatory understanding in particular historio-
graphical cases with the general applicability of those factors. This implies that general 
considerations play an important role in the process of balancing the resources. 
Consider an illustration: In the paper “Inspiration in the Harness of Daily Labor: 
Darwin, Botany, and the Triumph of Evolution, 1859–1868” (2011) Richard Bellon de-
scribes the process that led to the acceptance of Darwin’s evolutionary ideas in the 
British scientific community. Bellon claims that the publication of On the Origin of the 
Species in 1859 was not a decisive event in this process. On the contrary, the book was 
judged to be speculative in character and against the scientific and moral standards of 
the community. Only after publishing a study on orchid fertilization in which he ap-
plied his evolutionary ideas, did Darwin’s framework meet with approval by the com-
munity.  
Bellon is providing an answer to the question:  
Why were Darwin’s ideas accepted by the Victorian scientific community 
rather than not? 
Arguably, answering this question explains significant feature of science, the ac-
ceptance of Darwin’s ideas. Even if the question is not directly about the present sci-
ence, it is about a feature of science that, arguably, has had a wide impact on the pre-
sent science.160  
Bellon gives the following answer: 
The Origin was packed with evidence, but it communicated few entirely original scientific 
observations, and this allowed its critics to dismiss it as vainglorious speculation untethered 
from the manly discipline of original discovery. [--] If Darwin had not tied the theory of the 
Origin to productive, technical, and specialized research — in the event, his floral biology, 
but it could have been any number of things — the ultimate reception and received meaning 
of the Origin would have been significantly different. [--] science’s social, political, and reli-
gious respectability depended on the governance of imagination by consistently patient and 
humble behavior and [--] Darwin’s adversaries frequently used this ideology to bludgeon 
the Origin. Ultimately, Darwin vanquished his foes by reversing the weapon and claiming 
the mantle of heroic conduct for himself and his theory. (Ibid., 395–396.) 
                                                 
160 See Bowler (2013), a counterfactual history of what would have happened without Darwin.  
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It may seem that the explanation is a rather straightforward one, at least for a 
philosopher of science.161 Darwin first introduced a theory in the Origins, but since the 
evidence for the theory consisted of “old evidence” rather than from novel discoveries 
that the theory entails, and since novel discoveries are important in the confirmation 
of a theory, Darwin’s theory was not well confirmed and thus not accepted. What is 
more, Darwin’s theory had not yet been shown to produce a progressive research pro-
gram, and because it seemed like an improbable candidate to produce one, it was not 
accepted. Once Darwin published the Orchids, Darwin’s evolutionary framework 
proved to be a fruitful research program and to produce novel discoveries and was 
accepted. Moreover, it seems plausible to assume that the way in which Darwin for-
mulated his evolutionary framework is a factor without which it would have been 
impossible to make evolutionary ideas work in empirical research. “Darwin simulta-
neously illustrated the conceptual and methodological power of his theory and its 
prodigious ability to bring order to the study of natural history where older methods 
and concepts had failed.” (Bellon 2011, 409.) With hindsight, we can say that only be-
cause Darwin got things right (to a relevant extent) in the Origins it was possible to 
use the evolutionary framework in empirical research.162 The explanation of the ac-
ceptance of the evolutionary framework can be formulated as follows: 
(E1) Had Darwin not formulated an evolutionary framework very similar 
to that of the Origins or had he not shown in Orchids that this framework 
                                                 
161 This simplified form of analysis can be made, for example, by following Lakatos (1978), Laudan 
(1977) or Kuhn (1977, 322). Needless to say, the discussion about details of confirmation and ac-
ceptance of theories and research programs has been enormous. 
162 See the section, “Historiography of Science and Scientific Realism,” above. One can interpret 
the expression “got things right” in whatever way one’s philosophical theory of science suggests. 
The distinction between theories that do work empirically and those that do not can be drawn 
within every theory. Philosophical issues about realism are issues about what features of theories 
explain this distinction. 
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was successful and progressive (i.e. fruitful) in empirical research, the evo-
lutionary framework would not have been accepted. 
Yet there is a complication in the issue. Bellon also points out that before the 
Orchids were published, Darwin’s work was dismissed on moral standards. Darwin did 
not seem to work on a patient, humble and honest manner and, therefore, was not 
taken seriously (Ibid. 403–407). Only after the Orchids, was Darwin accepted as a mor-
ally righteous scientist, and therefore the fulfillment of Victorian moral standards was 
an important factor in the acceptance of his theory. As Bellon points out, the require-
ments for novel discoveries and progressive research program (i.e. requirement of 
fruitfulness) were an embodiment of the Victorian value system and moral standards: 
[The] technical issues of scientific theory and method fed into larger Victorian preoccupa-
tions with ideal behavior. Refusal to acknowledge phenomena a favored theory did not fully 
explain did more than violate philosophical principles. It revealed an arrogant bending of 
nature to the theorist’s notions, rather than a humble submission to the truth. A well-worn 
and culturally formidable vocabulary of praise existed in nineteenth-century British science: 
the words “cautious,” “laborious,” “painstaking,” “exact,” “humble,” “disciplined,” “ear-
nest,” and, above all, “patient” were pinned like medals on men of science and their work. 
(Ibid. 395.) 
This explanation for the acceptance of Darwin’s theory can be framed as follows: 
 
(E2) Had Darwin not lived in accordance with the values of the Victorian 
society, his evolutionary framework would not have been accepted.  
In the previous chapter, we saw that E1 and E2 are not necessarily competing 
explanations. For example, if E1 is given with respect to explanatory goal “under-
standing epistemology of science” and E2 with respect to explanatory goal “under-
standing values in science”, there is no real competition between them. However, we 
can still evaluate the explanatory depth of the two explanations.  
In the previous chapter, we formulated the following dimension of explanatory 
depth: 
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Explanation E is deeper than E*, if E would still be true while E* would no 
longer be true if there was a change in background conditions, due to the 
conceptualization of explanantia. 
We also saw that the difference between E and E* is due to the fact that E is a 
better candidate for a possible-cause hypothesis than E*.  
We can see that there is an asymmetry between E1 and E2. There are important 
changes in background conditions that would have made E2 false. For example, noth-
ing in Bellon’s paper indicates that had Darwin did something morally wrong that 
was not related to his scientific work, his theory would not have been accepted. In 
other words, it seems possible163 that had Darwin done something morally wrong 
(perhaps some minor misbehavior) and produced his theory, his theory would still 
have been accepted. Moreover, it seems possible that had Darwin lived in another 
society, his theory would still have been accepted even if he did not follow the Victo-
rian value-system.  
However, it is difficult to figure out any change in background conditions that 
would have made E1 false. What should we add to “Had Darwin not proved his the-
ory fruitful, it would still have been accepted” to make it possible? Of course, we can 
say that had Darwin lived in a society that considered fruitfulness as a reason to reject 
a theory, his theory would not have been accepted. However, it seems difficult to tell 
what kind of change this would have required. The claim seems to have the form “X 
would not have been the cause of Y if X occurred in the context where X does not cause 
Y”, and thus lacks informative content. The problem is that we do not have a clear 
conception of what kind of intervention on a variable would have made E1 false. (See 
Section 6.2 discussing this topic). 
                                                 
163 I say “it is possible that” because the nothing in Bellon’s paper does not establish that theory 
would have been accepted. However, the possibility is not excluded. In the next paragraph, we 
see that this possibility is enough to show which direction the explanatory resources should be 
taken to on the basis of this one study (see the introduction to this chapter on this methodology  used 
here). 
187 
 
 
 
One way to look at the difference between E1 and E2 is that one can abandon the 
Victorian moral standards and still perform fruitful scientific work. However, it is not 
possible to abandon the standard of fruitfulness and still live in accordance with the 
Victorian moral standards as the standard of fruitfulness is an embodiment of the 
moral standards. The antecedent of E2 is never true when the antecedent of E1 is not 
true. However, the antecedent of E1 can be true even if the antecedent of E2 is not true. 
The difference can also be seen if we consider the following hypotheses: (I) The-
ory T is accepted if it is fruitful, and (II) Theory T is accepted if it is formulated by a 
scientist living in accordance with the moral values of the society. There have been 
theories that have been accepted due to their fruitfulness despite the moral condem-
nation of the scientist. The case of Galileo Galilei is probably the best known..164 E1 
and the associated possible-cause hypotheses (I) seem to deserve their place in our 
explanatory resources. Producing fruitful results seems to be much more invariantly 
connected with the acceptance of a theory than the moral virtues of scientists. In Dar-
win’s case, the close connection between fruitful scientific practice and moral virtues 
was a rather lucky occurrence. 
 
However, cases such as Lysenkoism seem to indicate that the moral or political 
values of scientists sometimes do, in fact, matter more than the fruitfulness of a the-
ory.165 Therefore, it remains (to some extent) an open question whether fruitfulness or 
                                                 
164 See McMullin (1998) discussing the condemnation of Galileo. Notice that someone could argue 
that in the case of Galilei, the theory was accepted because the moral atmosphere relaxed. This is 
of course hypothetical but if this were a justified claim, then we should re-evaluate the respective 
explanatory powers of fruitfulness and moral righteousness. This issue cannot be solved here; my 
account gives only the tools to approach such evaluations. 
165 See deJong-Lambert and Krementsov (2017) for discussions about Lysenkoism. The Michurinist 
biology associated with Lysenkoism “openly contradicted the basic tenets of genetics, including 
Gregor Mendel’s laws, Thomas Morgan’s chromosomal theory, and the concept of the gene as a 
material unit of heredity, and supported the Lamarckian idea of the inheritance of the acquired 
characteristics” (Ibid., 5). Yet, “with the Cold War reaching a crescendo over the status of divided 
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values are more important in the development of science. This kind of open-ended-
ness was expected in the previous chapter. However, it seems safe to conjecture that 
values may play an important role with respect to the short-term acceptance but, in 
the long-term, it seems that fruitfulness matters more. After all, Lysenko’s theories are 
now rejected but Darwin’s ideas live on in science. This implies that when it comes to 
the acceptance of a theory, it is important to define what temporal interval one has in 
mind.  In Section 4.3 we noticed that different explananda may have different temporal 
extensions. The discussion here suggests that values and fruitfulness may play differ-
ent roles with respect to explananda that appear very similar but differ in their temporal 
extensions. Ideas from Section 4.3 further clarifies the issue that began with Bellon’s 
paper. 
I hope that this brief example illustrates how explanatory resources can be man-
aged and which kind of general considerations play a role in that process.  
 
2. Whereas explanatory resources guide historiographical studies globally by 
suggesting what questions are asked and how answers are unified, explanatory depth 
is a notion that is related to a particular explanandum. We discussed this notion in Sec-
tion 6.5. The idea behind the notion is that sometimes one explanandum can be ex-
plained in different ways and we can compare the depths of different explanantia. 
There are many dimension of explanatory depth and they are all related to the ability 
to answer what-if questions (see Section 6.5). Roughly, the more answers an explana-
tion gives to such questions, and the more interesting and accurate the answers are, 
the better the explanation. Assume that every explanation cites unique factors. What 
should the what-if questions be about in such case? If they are about unique factors 
that never existed (by definition, as what-if questions are about counterfactual alter-
                                                 
Germany and its capital, Berlin, Lysenko managed to attract Stalin’s personal attention to his strug-
gle with geneticists and to secure the Soviet leader’s personal support” (Ibid., 8). Soon “the ´undi-
vided rule of Michurinist biology´ had indeed been established” (Ibid., 9). 
189 
 
 
 
natives to actual events), it seems difficult to understand why we want deeper expla-
nations. The more natural view is that the questions are about the kinds of things that 
we are more generally interested in and whose causes we would like to understand. 
If we accept this, explanatory depth and explanatory resources are fruitfully connected: 
deep explanations are applicable to different cases that we are interested in and there-
fore provide possible-cause hypotheses. The deeper the explanation, the more it tells 
about interesting cases which did not actualize in a particular historical situation but 
which may actualize in other historical situations. This means that our search for 
deeper explanations depends on the possibility of such hypotheses. One cannot 
achieve deeper explanations without possible-cause hypotheses. As long as we do not 
abandon the idea of explanatory depth, we must assume that there are possible-cause 
hypotheses and therefore general considerations. 
 
3. Not only are our what-if questions but also our explanation-seeking questions 
themselves are based on general considerations. Historians do not explain everything 
and they cannot explain everything. Explananda must be chosen and such choices are 
value-driven. One can choose an explanandum randomly, but such random choice 
would leave the historiographical study completely irrelevant for other scholars and 
wider audiences. It is necessary that historians make judgements concerning the sig-
nificance of different explananda. In Chapter 4, it was argued that we are able to justify 
the significance of an explanandum in many cases. That justification must derive from 
considerations of general kind: How is this explanandum related to other significant 
explananda? How is it related to our wider concerns as human beings? Moreover, when 
such general considerations are applied to a particular explanandum, the explanandum 
must be described in general terms. For example, it is impossible to evaluate the sig-
nificance of “Galileo did A by B-ing”, where A and B are a unique act and a unique 
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attribute of such act. 166 However, we are able to evaluate the significance of “Galileo 
described the motion of falling bodies by using mathematical formulas”. Relevant his-
toriography requires the use of general considerations and therefore categorizations 
of factors. 
 
 We have seen that there are three ways in which generalizations and general 
considerations play a fundamental role in the methodologically sound historiography 
of science. Perhaps additional ways can be found. However, this already shows that 
strong localism is incompatible with healthy historiography. Strong localism implies 
that no such general considerations are possible. The alternative to that position was 
formulated in the previous section. Following that explication, we can think of local 
explanations as having the form:  
 
X rather than Y because (Z and B) rather than [(W and B) or (Z and H)], 
where Z = factor f1 is in location L, B = f2 in L, W= f1 in L*, and H= f2 in L**. 
 
In other words: had either f1 been in L* or f2 in L**, Y would have been the 
case. 
For example, a bird was spotted in New York because an ornithologist was on 
the building A and the bird was on A; had the bird or the ornithologist been on another 
building, the bird would not have been spotted. 
 
Now, it is possible that (Z and B) explain only X and nothing else in the history 
of science; yet f1 and f2 might be factors that fall under general categories and deserve 
                                                 
166 One cannot answer ”Tell me what A and B are and I tell you if they are significant”, since any 
informative answer would require some categorization of A and B that goes beyond them being 
A and B. 
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their place in our explanatory resources since the combinations of factors f1 and f2 with 
other factors f3 and f4, such as (f1 and f3) and (f2 and f4), are explanatory. “That there 
was a bird” and “that there was an ornithologist” can explain many things: for exam-
ple that a cat run (f3 = there was a cat) or that a new species was found (f4 = there was 
a bird of the species S). There is no incompatibility between local explanations and 
causal generalizations, once we accept the explication formulated in the previous sec-
tion. We need causal generalizations. Therefore, we need to accept that explication 
rather than strong localism. 
 
 Conclusion 
Even if there are no unique factors, there can be local explanations: a local expla-
nation points out a set of factors such that: had any of the factors been located differ-
ently, the explanandum would have been different. The co-occurrence of such factors 
can be a unique occurrence in itself. Here universalism, in the form of more-and-more 
generally applicable factors, and localism are connected: the same factors can exist in 
many locations where science is produced but the exact co-occurrences of such factors 
can be unique. Moreover, such a co-occurrence might be fragile: some of the factors 
could perhaps have easily ended in a different location and therefore the course of 
history could have changed, making the present situation contingent on the co-occur-
rence. 
Moreover, I have argued that it is methodologically necessary that a general ex-
planatory framework and the explanations of particular occurrences guide each other. 
The illustration focusing on Bellon’s paper did not directly involve a local explanation, 
but we can note that focusing on particular historical context is necessary in historiog-
raphy of science in order to build a good stock of explanatory resources that have 
more general scope. This is where the localist tradition is on the right track, methodo-
logically speaking. It carries the some ingredients for “well corroborated (general) 
knowledge, the validity of which extends beyond a particular locality” (Kuukkanen 
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2012, 484). Surely, localism must be supplemented with general considerations to 
achieve such knowledge but local explanations, qua explanations of particular occur-
rences, can be methodologically highly valuable. Universalism and localism are there-
fore symbiotic positions. 
However, we need to note that local explanations, as explicated here, are not 
methodologically preferable to every other kind of explanations, only to a crude uni-
versalism that attempts to capture science once-and-for-all by a limited set of factors. 
This might not be too great an achievement, as it is not clear whether such crude uni-
versalism has had any supporters (see Chapter 5). It might be that what seems like 
universalism is just a different way of looking the same thing, that the particular and 
the general must be connected in healthy historiography. Be that as it may, we now 
see why someone, taking crude universalism as a serious threat, can point out that 
localism is preferable to such universalism. Moreover, we see why trivial localism 
should not be accepted. Even crude universalists can claim that (i) explanatory factors 
are always instantiated in a particular location but (ii) the factors so located are always 
the same and therefore universal. If trivial localism is accepted, then local explanations 
are not methodologically preferable to anything (as crude universalism would also 
provide local explanations in the trivial sense).  
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Foreword to the section 
 
In the paper “Could Science be Interestingly Different” I apply the framework 
developed in the previous chapters to formulate a framework in which the ques-
tions of contingency and inevitability of science can be approached.  
I show how we can evaluate the contingency of some feature of science once 
we 
 (i) understand why that feature is significant, a theme related to Chapter 
4,  
 
(ii) find causal explanation of that feature, a theme discussed in  Chap-
ters 3, 5, 6 and 7, 
 
(iii) use, when possible, existing historiographical studies, a theme con-
tinuous with Sections 6.8 and 7.3. 
 
(iv) have a new and energy-efficient way of approaching historiograph-
ical counterfactuals, a theme related to Chapters 3 and 6. 
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My hope is that the discussion in the paper gives the reader an impression of 
the value of an explicit framework on the role and nature of causal explanation in 
historiography of science.  
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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I investigate the issue of the contingency and inevitability of science. 
First, I point out valuable insights from the existing discussion about the issue. I 
then formulate a general framework, built on the notion of contrastive explanation 
and counterfactuals, that can be used to approach questions of contingency of sci-
ence. I argue, with an example from the existing historiography of science, that this 
framework could be useful to historians of science. Finally, I argue that this frame-
work shows the existing views on historical contingency and counterfactuals in a 
new light. The framework also shows the value of existing historiography in phil-
osophical debates.   
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 Introduction   
Could science be different? In this paper, I investigate this issue. The debate 
between inevitabilists and contingentists concerns the question of whether science 
could be different from what it actually is, or if it is necessary that science has the 
particular features that it in fact has. Inevitabilists argue that it is inevitable that 
science has certain features, while contingentists argue that science could have dif-
ferent features from what it in fact has. These are not mutually exclusive positions. 
Hardly anyone denies that some features of science are contingent (for example, 
the exact notations used). Yet it is also clear that there are cases where people have 
differing views on whether or not certain features of science could be different from 
what they actually are. It is here that the debate is of philosophical and historical 
interest. 
By focusing on the contingency of science, I do not mean to suggest that sci-
ence is fundamentally different or independent from other human practices. Sci-
ence may or may not be just like any other human activity. However, the nature of 
science is a question that can be answered only after historical and philosophical 
study. The issue of the contingency of science is one that can lead us to a better 
understanding of the relationship between science and other human activities. For 
this reason, I focus on the contingency of science in this paper. Moreover, one could 
argue that science is a special kind of activity with respect to contingency. Such 
views cannot be dismissed without a closer look. For example, scientific realists 
could argue that scientific activities are limited by the way the world is.167 Science 
tracks the truth about mind-independent reality, and this fact sets very strict limits 
                                                 
I thank anonymous referees for valuable comments on the previous versions of this paper. 
167 Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (Routledge, 1999) is an excellent 
book on scientific realism.  
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to the kind of science we can have.168 Thus, the realists could argue that science is 
much more restricted than human activities in general. On the other hand, the ar-
gument could be made  that science is much less restricted than other human activ-
ities since science is an elite culture that does not have to care about politics, econ-
omy, and the like. Perhaps both of these views are wrong and science is just as 
contingent as any other human activity. However, before we can answer questions 
on the contingency of science, we need some tools to help us approach such ques-
tions. The development of those tools is the main task of this paper. Therefore, I 
focus on the contingency of science more as a methodological choice than as a state-
ment about the special nature of science. 
In this paper, I make three main arguments: 
1. Science is a multidimensional global enterprise. Because of this, hav-
ing a different science can mean many things. We must specify what we 
mean by different science, and in what way this different science would 
be an interesting alternative to our actual science. 
 
2. We can approach questions on the contingency of our actual science 
by using a framework built on the notion of contrastive explanations and 
counterfactual scenarios in the historiography of science 
 
                                                 
168 The connections between scientific realism and the contingency of science is, of course, a 
much more complicated issue than suggested here. See: Léna Soler, Emiliano Trizio and An-
drew Pickering, Science as It Could Have Been. Discussing the Contingency/Inevitability Problem 
(University of Pittsburgh Press 2015); Léna Soler, “Revealing the analytical structure and some 
intrinsic major difficulties of the contingentist/inevitabilist issue,” Studies in History and Philos-
ophy of Science Part A 39:2 (2008), 230–241; Howard Sankey, “Scientific realism and the inevita-
bility of science,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39:2 (2008), 259–264. 
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3. The framework developed in this paper makes the issue of the contin-
gency of science relevant to a wide range of historians. The framework 
also helps us see how the existing historiographical studies can be rele-
vant to questions of contingency. 
In the next section, I begin my investigation by briefly introducing the existing 
debate between contingentists and inevitabilists in the philosophy of science (in 
short: the C–I debate).169 However, it must be made clear that my task in this paper 
is not to argue for inevitabilism or contingentism, and that the principal aim of my 
framework is not to solve the C–I debate. The reason I introduce the C–I debate is 
because it has been a source of insight and inspiration for my investigation. From 
this debate, I have come to understand that 
(i) only some alternatives to the existing science would be relevant, and 
that  
 
(ii) historiographical studies play a fundamental role in answering ques-
tions of contingency. The debate is essential to understanding the frame-
work I formulate. 
Once we have gathered the most fruitful insights from the C–I debate, I then 
formulate a framework of contrastive explanations and define the concepts of con-
tingency and inevitability within this framework. This framework 
(i) connects questions of contingency and inevitability directly to issues 
that are interesting,  
 
(ii) enables us to pinpoint historical events and processes on which the 
degree of contingency of a given feature of science depends, and  
                                                 
169 I use the term “C–I debate” to refer to this particular debate. See next section. 
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(iii) tells us what kind of (counterfactual) considerations are relevant in 
assessing the degree of contingency of a given feature of science. 
This framework does not make questions of contingency completely empiri-
cally soluble, but it nevertheless helps us find common ground between rival views 
and clarify where they disagree. Thus, the framework is best understood as a phil-
osophical tool. 
Once this framework is in place, I demonstrate its application using Matthew 
Stanley’s study, “’An Expedition to Heal the Wounds of War’: The 1919 Eclipse and 
Eddington as Quaker Adventurer.”170 Given the information in Stanley’s paper, I 
ask how the contingency of observations of gravitational deflection can be ap-
proached. This example shows how asking contrastive questions enables us to use 
actual historiographical studies in the discussions on the contingency of science. 
However, it also shows that many questions remain open—some requiring further 
historical research, and others philosophical reflection. 
In the final sections, I point out how my framework relates to the existing dis-
cussions of contingency and counterfactuals in the philosophy of history. I show 
that there are interesting advantages if these issues are approached in the way sug-
gested in this paper. I also point out why it is important that existing historiograph-
ical studies can be used to answer questions of contingencies, and in philosophy in 
general. 
 Insights from the C–I debate 
Recently, there has been a rich debate between inevitabilists and contin-
gentists. In 2008, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science and Isis both devoted a 
                                                 
170 Matthew Stanley, “’An Expedition to Heal the Wounds of War’: The 1919 Eclipse and Ed-
dington as Quaker Adventurer,” Isis 94:1 (2003), 57–89. 
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special issue to this topic. In 2015, a book named Science as It Could Have Been: Dis-
cussing the Contingency/Inevitability Problem was published and included a variety 
of articles devoted to the theme. Of course, the debate had its beginnings much 
earlier, and can be found, for example, in Ian Hacking’s frequently cited paper 
“How inevitable are the results of successful science?”171 
The debate is nuanced. Katherina Kinzel’s analysis can be used as a helpful 
guide to the complexities of the debate.172 However, the debate usually centers on 
the features of science that have traditionally been under discussion in philosophy 
of science, such as theoretical commitments. As Joseph Rouse puts it: 
Does the emphasis on ontological commitments suggest that, despite all the talk about 
scientific practice, we philosophers still believe that the really important changes in sci-
ence concern theoretical beliefs and ontological commitments? Or is the contingency is-
sue itself a new way to reassert the philosophical primacy of theoretical commitments?173  
Moreover, the question is usually about the possibility of a science that is fun-
damentally different from but equally successful as the actual science. Ian Hacking 
writes: 
I asked: How inevitable are the results of successful science? Take any result R, which at 
present we take to be correct, of any successful science. We ask: If the results of a scientific 
investigation are correct, would any investigation of roughly the same subject matter, if 
successful, at least implicitly contain or imply the same results? If so, there is a significant 
sense in which the results are inevitable.174 
Along similar lines, Léna Soler defines contingentism and inevitabilism as fol-
lows: 
                                                 
171 Ian Hacking, “How inevitable are the results of successful science?” Philosophy of Science 67:3 
(2000), 58–71. 
172 Katherina Kinzel, “State of the field: Are the results of science contingent or inevitable?” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52 (2015), 55–56. 
173 Joseph Rouse, “Laws, Scientific Practice, and the Contingency/Inevitability Question,” Sci-
ence as It Could Have Been (2015), 321. 
174 Hacking, “How inevitable are the results of successful science?” 61. 
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Contingentism: 
(I) more or less the same initial conditions obtain as those which have occurred in the 
history of our own science; 
(II) nevertheless, the possibility, as ‘final’ (subsequent or later) conditions, at least in the 
long run, of an alternative physics, 
 (i) as successful and progressive as ours, and 
 (ii) which yields results irreducibly different from ours (notably which involves 
an  ontology incompatible with ours). 
Inevitabilism: 
(I) if more or less the same initial conditions obtain as those which have occurred in the 
history of our own science; 
(II) and a successful and progressive physics has indeed been developed; 
(III) then, inevitably, as ‘final’ (subsequent or later) conditions, at least in the long run: 
 (i) more or less the same results and the same ontology as our own, 
 (ii) or different but reconcilable results and ontologies as our own.175 
 
Soler’s definition helps us set aside the overly trivial and speculative defini-
tions of contingentism and inevitabilism. First, we may notice that it is trivially true 
that if human beings had never existed, there would be no science. It is also true 
that if human beings were very different from what they are, there would not be 
any science. For example, it could have been the case that human beings were in-
terested only in drinking beer, and science as we know it would not exist. This case 
does not fit Soler’s definition. 
                                                 
175 Soler, “Revealing the analytical structure and some intrinsic major difficulties of the contin-
gentist/inevitabilist issue,” 233. (The formulation of the passage has been slightly changed.) 
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Secondly, it is too easy to be an inevitabilist if one simply claims that in the 
end only one science will exist, and that no other science is possible. The character-
ization must specify what is meant by “the end”: Is it a situation in which no alter-
native considerations for the accepted science exist? If so, the debate will begin 
anew with the question of the possibility of such an end point. Perhaps the end 
could be seen as a situation where all our possible material needs are satisfied. Then 
the inevitabilist claim would be that if there came a point where all our possible 
material needs were satisfied, then there would only be one accepted science, and 
thus no alternative science could be accepted without diminishing material welfare. 
This implies that there might be no end point in the development of science, and 
would thus make the inevitabilist position uninteresting. Thus, as Soler’s definition 
points out, inevitabilists must minimally claim that there actually exist or will exist 
features of science that cannot be different from what they are, given that certain 
antecedent conditions hold. The claim cannot be that science has or will have certain 
necessary features if a certain goal is achieved. Since the C–I debate is so closely 
connected to the idea of antecedent conditions, the history of science has an essen-
tial role to play in the debate.176 
There are three main insights that I draw from the C–I debate. First, the debate 
must be about whether some antecedent conditions in history could have led to a 
different science. Secondly, the history of science has an essential role in the debate. 
Thirdly, a discussion about the contingency of science cannot proceed without an 
                                                 
176 See: Andrew Pickering, Constructing Quarks: A sociological history of particle physics (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1984); 
James T. Cushing, Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency and the Copenhagen Hegem-
ony (University of Chicago Press, 1994); 
Peter J. Bowler, Darwin Deleted. Imagining a World without Darwin (The University of Chi-
cago Press, 2013); 
Soler et al. Science as It Could Have Been; 
and the papers in Isis 99:3. 
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explication of what is meant by a different science. In the C–I debate, a different sci-
ence usually means an equally successful but fundamentally different science. 
While this focuses on the possibility of an equally successful but fundamentally 
different science is understandable from the perspective of philosophy of science, 
this is where I leave the C–I debate behind and widen the scope of discussion on 
contingency in the history of science. 
 The Point of Departure   
We already noted that Joseph Rouse ponders why theoretical commitments 
have been so central to the C–I debate. He also writes: 
Grant that the instruments, experimental systems, and models with which scientific un-
derstanding is realized are more obviously contingent. It does not follow from the mere 
recognition that abstract ontological commitments are the only conceivable locus of sci-
entific inevitability that such commitments are all that important.177 
This seems correct to me, but we can go even further. There is an enormous 
variety in the topics in which historians of science are interested.  Some of them are 
interested in the relationship between science and religion in the past; others in the 
history of medical institutions. The list could go on and on. Historians do not only 
study what the past was like. They are also professionals in building pictures about 
alternative ways of life. Historians of science are well positioned to spot significant 
aspects of our current practices and describe interesting alternatives to those prac-
tices—alternatives that would mean perhaps drastic changes in our lifestyle. Equal 
success is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to be an interesting alter-
native to science. It is not necessary because contexts of historical inquiry exist 
where an interesting alternative to our present science lacks some features that 
make our science so successful. Why is our present biology loaded with naturalistic 
                                                 
177 Rouse, “Laws, Scientific Practice, and the Contingency/ Inevitability Question,” 321–322. 
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explanations rather than religious ones? It would certainly be an interesting (alt-
hough, arguably, not as successful) alternative to our present science if biology 
looked for religious explanations—an alternative that some quarters try to advance. 
On the other hand, equal success is not sufficient. For example, in a medical context 
there could be a hypothesis that is not an interesting alternative to an accepted one, 
since it would not suggest changes in the treatment of patients. Even if this alterna-
tive hypothesis would have been as successful as the accepted one, this does not 
guarantee that it is an interestingly different alternative178 to a historian who is in-
terested in the treatments that are used. Moreover, the contingency of features of 
science is a matter of degree. Even if everything besides theoretical commitments 
are obviously contingent, we can still ask how contingent these features are. I now 
proceed to build a framework that can be used to approach the degrees of contin-
gency of the variety of features that historians of science are interested in. 
 Counterfactuals, Explanation and Contingency 
In this section, I argue that the best way to approach questions of contingency 
is to build counterfactual scenarios that would have led to an interestingly different 
science, and then evaluate the plausibility of these scenarios. In other words, we 
need to know what should have happened in the past in order for there to be some 
alternative to actual science, and then evaluate how plausible or far-fetched that 
occurrence was. In the following, I develop the details of this approach. 
In my earlier work,179 I defended the present-centered approach, also known 
as presentism, in the historiography of science. This approach has the following 
structure: 
                                                 
178 See the next section for what is meant by “interesting alternatives.” 
179 Veli Virmajoki “Miten tieteenhistorian pitäisi valita tutkimuskohteensa?” [“How Should the 
Historiography of Science Choose its Targets of Study?”] Ajatus 72 (2015). 
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1. By rational discussion, we isolate the significant features (F) of the pre-
sent science. 
 
2. Next, we isolate such features F* that: if the present science had the 
feature F* in contrast to the actual feature F, the present science would 
be interestingly different from what it actually is. 
 
3. The task of the historiography of science is to provide explanations of 
the form: had there been (in the past) an event180 Z, in contrast to the 
actual event Y, the present science would have the feature F* instead of 
F.181 In other words, the historiography of science provides explanations 
for significant features of the present science.182 
Using this approach, we can define the contingentist position as follows: 
                                                 
180 Usually, we must find a set of events that satisfies this condition. I will discuss the limiting 
case—only one event—to simplify matters. 
181 There has been much discussion about contrastive explanations. See: 
B. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford University Press 1980); 
P. Lipton, “Contrastive Explanations,” In Knowles (ed.), Explanation and its Limits (Cambridge 
University Press 1990) 247–266. 
In this formulation, I mainly follow James Woodward’s theory from Making Things Happen (Ox-
ford University Press, 2003). 
182 This is a normative view on the historiography of science. The suggestion is that the histori-
ography of science should, and sometimes does, provide such explanations. Moreover, much 
of existing historiography of science can be fruitfully read through such a conception of histo-
riography of science. It is a philosophical view that goes beneath the surface of what historians 
actually say. 
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It could have been the case that science has the feature F* rather than the 
actual feature F, where the difference between F and F* is considered 
interesting in the given context of discussion. 
 
We can accept that F* could have been the case if and only if (a) someone 
points out a counterfactual past event Z that would have led to F*, and 
(b) it is shown that the occurrence of Z in the past is not an impossible 
(or extremely far-fetched) scenario.183 
Moreover, the contingency of a certain feature F of science is a matter of de-
gree: 
Feature F can be judged to be (a) inevitable if and only if the occurrence 
of any Zi is seen as impossible and (b) a truly chancy feature if Z is a part 
of the actual history. Moreover, the more far-fetched the occurrence of Z 
is judged to be, the more inevitable feature F is. 
For example, if it turns out that a theory that is actually held was chosen from 
among many theories by a flip of a coin, then the fact that we hold that particular 
theory instead of another is a chancy feature of science. On the other hand, the fact 
that we have theories of celestial motion lies at the other end of the continuum of 
contingency. Only in the far-fetched scenarios where human beings were not inter-
ested in repeating patterns of time (the understanding of which is necessary for 
agriculture) there would be a complete lack of theories of celestial motion. Finally, 
if there are many counterfactual scenarios such that each of these scenarios would 
have led to F*, then the contingency of F depends on the scenario which is judged 
to be the most plausible one. 
                                                 
183 The example in the next section suggests how this can be done.  
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The claim that a feature F of the present science is contingent can (and must) 
be substantiated by (a) showing that the existence of the feature F* would have 
made the present science interestingly different, by (b) pointing out event Z that 
would have led to F*, and by (c) making sophisticated judgments about the plausi-
bility or the far-fetchedness of the occurrence of Z (i.e. about the scenario where Z 
is the case). In this way, the framework here helps us understand how the degrees 
of contingency can be approached by using historical studies, as we will see in the 
next section. 
The definition above requires that, in order to get discussions going, judg-
ments about the plausibility of historical scenarios involving Z can be made and 
that it can be assessed that Z would have led to F*. Nothing general about this topic 
can be said within the limits of this paper. However, in the next section, I give an 
example of how historical study can be used to argue for certain degrees of contin-
gency of certain features of science. This discussion points out that, even in the ab-
sence of a theory of how judgements about the plausibility of counterfactual sce-
narios work, historians always make these kinds of judgments when explaining 
historical processes. Moreover, these judgments make sense and can be rationally 
debated. Of course, there might not exist a point where everyone agrees on a given 
set of counterfactuals.184 Nevertheless, we will see that the framework developed 
here can narrow down the topics of disagreement and highlight which disagree-
ments are relevant with respect to a given topic. Moreover, there exists a comforting 
amount of analysis of the use of counterfactuals in history,185 and there exist, in the 
                                                 
184 Moreover, if someone is not skeptical only about particular evaluations of historical coun-
terfactuals but denies the possibility of historical counterfactual altogether, questions on con-
tingency of science are not meaningful to this person. After all, descriptions of science “as it 
could have been” are descriptions of counterfactual science. Thus, global skepticism towards 
counterfactuals is not something that affects my account alone. 
185 On the use of counterfactuals in history, see: 
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literature concerning the C–I debate, many studies that speak to the possibility of 
finding out points of history that have had an influence on the path that has led to 
the present situation in science.186  
Before proceeding to the example, one thing needs to be taken into consider-
ation. The isolation of significant features is typically carried out in the following 
manner: we take features that are prima facie significant and then attempt to estab-
lish more general principles that make these features significant. In a continuous 
process, we then compare the features and the principles in such a way that the 
judgments about the significance of some feature and the plausibility of our princi-
ples can both be adjusted. For example, we may say that the observation of gravi-
tational deflection (see details below) is a significant feature of science since it plays 
an important part in the acceptance of relativistic physics (and thus in the overall 
shape of our physics) and in the understanding and technology that it provides. If 
these were different, we would have an interestingly different science. Arguably, the 
way we see the world and the technology we use impact our lives in a remarkable 
way. Now, if one accepts this, a sociologist might point out that, since the techno-
logical state of our society is one of the features that makes science significant, gen-
der distribution in science is also a significant feature of science since it shapes the 
distribution and use of technology in a way that matters. If the distribution of tech-
nological resources were different, we would live in an interestingly different 
world. In contrast, if we used different symbols in the periodic table, science would 
                                                 
Alexander Maar, “Possible uses of counterfactual thought experiments in history,” Principia: 
An International Journal of Epistemology 18:1 (2014), 87–113.  
Tim De Mey and Erik Weber, “Explanation and Thought Experiments in History,” History and 
Theory 42:1 (2003), 28–38. 
Johannes Bulhof, “What if? Modality and history,” History and Theory 38:2 (1999), 145–168. 
and Journal of the Philosophy of History 10 (3). 
186 See footnote 10. 
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not be interestingly different. Everything we know about chemistry and the appli-
cations of this knowledge would be the same. At least one could, if they disagreed, 
argue for the significance of the symbols themselves.  
In this way, we can rationally evaluate which features of science are signifi-
cant.187 Once we know the significant features and why they are significant, we also 
know which alternatives to these are the interesting ones. What would be an inter-
esting alternative to science depends on what we want from science, and what 
achievements of science (good or bad) we see as relevant. Ultimately, considera-
tions such as these are based on our values. Deep questions of values cannot be 
discussed here. However, we have seen that it is possible to distinguish the inter-
esting alternatives to science from the non-interesting ones. 
 Eddington and the Gravitational Deflection   
In “’An Expedition to Heal the Wounds of War’: The 1919 Eclipse and Edding-
ton as Quaker Adventurer,” (2003), Matthew Stanley describes the process that led 
to Eddington’s 1919 eclipse expedition and the observation of gravitational deflec-
tion. According to Stanley, the execution of this expedition was a pivotal event that 
had a notable effect on scientists’ acceptance of Einstein’s general theory of relativ-
ity. 
I use Stanley’s article to demonstrate the framework formulated above. The 
main goal of this section is to show that the framework can help us use historical 
                                                 
187  Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond nicely illustrates the wide variety of features that might be taken 
to be significant: “Had the alternate approach been realized [in physics], there would be a num-
ber of significant differences: [among other things] pedagogical approaches to the theory would 
be different and certainly more convincing [and] the large cultural impact of relativity theory 
would have been quite different, from its many and often problematic philosophical exegeses 
[…] to its vernacular manifestations, for instance in popular iconography (Einstein’s tongue!).” 
(“On the Plurality of (Theoretical) Worlds,” Science as It Could Have Been, 341–342.) 
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studies to evaluate the degrees of contingency of particular features of science. I 
show that while we can have progress in these evaluations, we cannot settle the 
questions once and for all. I will make it explicit when further historical research 
can settle an open question and when we are forced to use considerations that are 
more philosophical—and thus also potentially undecidable—in their nature. 
Two things must be noted: first, for the sake of illustration, I assume that Stan-
ley’s account is correct. I also make, to the same end, some claims that might seem 
controversial with the purpose of isolating interesting issues that are connected to 
contingency and inevitability. This illustration does not have the purpose of argu-
ing for or against inevitabilism. It only aims to show how the issue can be ap-
proached by using existing historical research and how such research can fuel the 
discussion. 
Stanley highlights the following aspects of the process leading to the expedi-
tion:  
The eclipse’s scientific significance had gradually become clear over the course of the war 
years. The first mention of relativity’s prediction of the bending of light in the Observa-
tory was an anonymous 1913 note entitled “Gravitation and Light.” 188 
[Eddington published] Report on the Relativity Theory of Gravitation, a small volume that 
was the first complete treatment of general relativity in English. Soon, enough interest in 
the theory had been generated to begin investigation into the logistics of an expedition 
to test it.189[M]any astronomers thought the expedition would be a waste of time. The 
refugee scientist, Jonckheere, warned that there were several different mechanisms that 
might duplicate the predicted deflection, making observations useless. [Yet] such a vague 
objection, Lindemann said, should carry little weight compared to Einstein’s detailed and 
consistent theory.190 
[Astronomer Royal] Frank Dyson felt that while the theory was speculative, its implica-
tions were so important that it needed to be investigated.191 
                                                 
188 Stanley, “’An Expedition to Heal the Wounds of War’: The 1919 Eclipse and Eddington as 
Quaker Adventurer,” 71. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Stanley, “An Expedition,” 72. 
191 Ibid., 70–71. 
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Einstein’s theory predicted that a ray of light traveling near a massive object, such as the 
sun, would undergo a small but measurable deflection of its path. This was one of the 
three “classic” relativistic effects predicted by Einstein: the advance of the perihelion of 
Mercury was already established, and the measurement of the redshift of the solar spec-
trum was proving difficult. This left observing the gravitational deflection as the only 
realistic hope of confirming general relativity.192 
Passages such as these convey the impression that the British scientific com-
munity was interested in making the observations purely for scientific reasons—
even the objections to the journey were based on scientific considerations. The ex-
pedition to an eclipse was thought to be the only way to test the theory, and there 
were scientific reasons to think that the expedition could bring useful results. Yet 
Stanley points out that “[d]iscussions such as these were important in the scientific 
debate but had little impact on the actual planning of the expedition. This was 
chiefly in the hands of two astronomers who were also interested in ramifications 
beyond the scientific test: Eddington and Dyson.”193 The execution of the expedi-
tion required the individual effort of Eddington and Dyson despite the fact that the 
Joint Permanent Eclipse Committee, a group set up by both the Royal Society and the 
Royal Astronomical Society to pool the intellectual and logistical resources of the 
two groups, already existed. 
The question we must ask is why Eddington was so keen on the expedition. 
Stanley points to Eddington’s Quaker background and the context of the First 
World War. Stanley describes how the beginning of the war changed the attitude 
of British society, including scientists, toward the Germans. Despite an early decla-
ration that science is above politics, the reality of war resulted in hatred toward the 
Germans, as Stanley points out in detail. 194  In this context, it was Eddington’s 
Quaker background that shaped his attitude toward the situation:  
                                                 
192 Ibid., 71. 
193 Ibid., 72. 
194 Stanley, “An Expedition,” 59–67. 
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Eddington’s reaction […] was largely shaped by his membership in British society’s tra-
ditional bastion of pacifism: the Society of Friends.195 
The Friends’ goal was to demonstrate “the brotherhood of man overstepping all artificial 
barriers of race, politics or creed, which we believe to be the only true foundation upon 
which the family of nations can rest.”196 
Those Friends who ventured to Europe to relieve this suffering, both during and after the 
war, worked in difficult and sometimes dangerous conditions. These relief workers came 
to be known as “adventurers,” and they hold a special place in Quaker history as men 
and women who journeyed into far and foreign lands as a duty of conscience. The strat-
egies used by these adventurers became the models for Eddington’s efforts to use the 
eclipse expedition as a tool in repairing international relationships.197 
Given Stanley’s arguments, we can ask to what degree the observation of 
gravitational deflection was a contingent matter. To use the framework formulated 
in the previous section, we must begin by defining  the significant feature of science 
that resulted from Eddington’s expedition. Arguably, the answer is: the significant 
feature F in this case is that the observation of gravitational deflection has been made. A 
significant alternative (F*) to this feature F is that the observation has not been made.  
Next we must ask the question (C):  
What conditions should have been different so that the observation 
would not have been made?  
We can begin our search for the answer by formulating the following question 
and answer in order to find these conditions: 
Q1. Why did Eddington execute the expedition rather than not? 
 
E1. Because Eddington attempted to reunite the international scientific 
community due to his Quaker background and because the expedition 
                                                 
195 Ibid., 61. 
196 Ibid., 68. 
197 Ibid., 67–68. 
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had the chance to produce scientifically interesting results due to the in-
terest in Einstein’s theory. 
One might think that Eddington’s execution of the expedition of 1919 is the 
condition that can be given as an answer to the question C, and thus answering the 
question Q1 provides the details of the answer. If this is the case, then F is a rather 
contingent feature of science: it depends on Eddington’s personal religious 
worldview, and it is easy to provide plausible scenarios in which Eddington did 
not have this worldview—he could have lost his faith in humanity because of the 
war. However, the details given by E1 are not the answer to C. This is due to the 
fact that Q1 leaves it open as to whether or not someone else would have made the 
expedition if Eddington had not. Thus, we must continue our search for the answer 
to C. 
Next we can ask: 
Q2. Why did Eddington, rather than someone else, execute the expedi-
tion? 
 
E2. Because Eddington was concerned about the unity of the interna-
tional scientific community and wanted to unify it due to his Quaker 
background, and no one else had this concern.198  
It might be argued that once we know why Eddington, rather than someone 
else, executed the expedition, we can then evaluate how plausible it is that the ex-
pedition would have been executed without Eddington. But the contrast in Q2 is 
misleading if this was the evaluation we wanted. E2 tells us in which situation 
someone else would have executed the expedition instead of Eddington, but Q2 
                                                 
198 Stanley’s description makes one think that Eddington played the pivotal role due to his 
unique concern in the context. 
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assumes that the expedition would have been carried out in either case. E2 in itself 
would become interesting only if an argument was given for the claim that the iden-
tity of the executor of the expedition had an impact on the making of the observa-
tions. The possibility of this must be settled by investigating whether or not Ed-
dington had a unique set of skills that were necessary in making the observations. 
This is a step in the right direction, but we must still continue our search for the 
answer to C. 
We can ask: 
Q3. Why was the observation attempted199 in 1919 rather than later? 
 
E3. Because Eddington was concerned about unifying the international 
community and had the urge to work at a quick pace in this matter due 
to his Quaker background (and because of lucky occurrences during the 
journey). 
This is again a step in the right direction, because E3, unlike E1 and E2, speci-
fies the conditions in which the expedition (and thus the observations) would not 
have been made in 1919. It can be argued that the execution of the expedition in 
1919 was a rather contingent event based on, again, the contingency of Eddington’s 
background. But once we notice that we defined the significant feature F to be that 
the observation of gravitational deflection has been made, and once we notice that almost 
one hundred years have passed since 1919, we see that the contrast in Q3 is not 
relevant to answering question C. This is due to the fact that the answer to Q3 says 
nothing about the years since 1919 and thus E3 does not tell us anything about how 
                                                 
199 This innocent change of terms is due the fact that later an expedition itself may not have 
been necessary (it could have perhaps been made in a place where an observatory already ex-
isted, etc.). 
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plausible it is that the observation would have been sought later in the twentieth or 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century.200 The correct question to ask is:  
Q4. Why was the observation attempted rather than not? 
 
E4. Because there was an increasing scientific interest in Einstein’s theory 
and because the observation of gravitational deflection was viewed as a 
practical way to test the theory. 
We saw earlier how Stanley points to these factors. British scientists were 
planning the expedition even before Eddington and Dyson took the execution into 
their hands. Moreover, Stanley does not refer to or give any reason to believe that 
had Eddington not become involved when he did, the observation of deflection 
would not have been made at any point in history. This means that what seemed to 
make the feature F highly contingent, i.e. Eddington’s religious worldview, is no 
longer a condition that can be used to answer question C. 
We can now explicate the philosophical lessons that can be drawn from the 
example. First, it must be noted that we did not analyze the contingency of having 
the observation of gravitational deflection in detail. The example only pointed out 
how it is possible to find the conditions on which having the significant feature F 
                                                 
200 If we had formulated F in our illustration in another way, for example, saying that it is sig-
nificant that the observation was made in 1919 and not later, then a highly contingent condi-
tion—Eddington’s Quaker background—would be the condition on which the significant fea-
ture depends. F could be defined in this way if we wanted to know, for example, the degree of 
contingency of a certain other feature G, that has become part of science only recently and that 
is a result of developments that began in 1919 when Eddington made the observation of gravi-
tational deflection. That science has the feature G, and not some alternative to it, would be 
judged to be highly contingent if it was necessary, in order to have G, that the expedition took 
place in 1919. The more recent the features of science in which we are interested, the more likely 
it is that they could have been otherwise. 
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instead of F*depends. We came to the conclusion (for the sake of illustration, of 
course) in Q4-E4 that only if there had been no scientific interest in Einstein’s theory, 
it could have been possible that the gravitational deflection would never have been 
observed. To evaluate the contingency of having the observation of gravitational 
deflection requires an investigation that evaluates the plausibility of scenarios in 
which there was no interest in Einstein’s theory. How plausible is the scenario 
where Einstein’s theory was not formulated? How plausible is the scenario where 
Einstein’s theory was ignored by the scientific community? 
These questions cannot be answered based on Stanley’s paper. It is possible 
to get closer to the right answer through further historical studies. These studies 
could investigate the following questions:  
1. How widespread was the idea of spacetime curvature among scientific 
communities? 
 
2. How was the evidential value of such observations viewed in scientific 
communities?  
 
3. How seriously did scientists plan to isolate German scientists, includ-
ing Einstein, after the war? 
 
4. What was the status of physics among the socio-political environ-
ment? Were the politicians planning to solely focus on the aspects of 
physics that would have direct impact on military technology? 
Of course, no matter how much empirical information we have, questions of 
counterfactual paths of science cannot be unequivocally answered. Here we come 
to the point where different philosophical considerations and intuitions about sci-
ence divide us on the issue of contingency. Can we, for example, assume that the 
world has a determined structure? Is science an opportunistic field where very 
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small changes in the social environment can direct scientists to pursue different ac-
tivities? Do observations really matter in theory choice? This means that there is no 
guarantee that discussions on the contingency of a particular feature of science can 
be settled.  
However, once we have identified crucial historical points on which our ac-
tual science presumably depends, we have also limited the number of philosophical 
considerations that are relevant to settling the questions of contingency. For exam-
ple, if we are able to show that the existence of Einstein’s theory (and the scientific 
community’s interest in the theory) is the best candidate for the factor on which 
observations of gravitational deflection depend, then the considerations of the con-
nections between observations and theoretical works play a role in the attempts to 
decide the contingency of those observations. On the other hand, if empirical re-
search leads us to believe that Eddington’s religious background is the best candi-
date for the factor on which the observation of gravitational deflection depends, 
then the considerations of the connections between personal background and sci-
entific work play a role in the attempts to decide the contingency of those observa-
tions. Thus, the framework formulated in the last section does not rid us of all dis-
agreement in questions of contingency, but does help narrow down the relevant 
considerations in a particular case. Thereby, the framework helps us find common 
ground between rival views. 
There is one more lesson to be learned from the example. It must be noted that 
the difference between having the observation of gravitational deflection and not 
having that observation is interesting only in certain contexts of discussion, as the 
definition of contingency given in the previous section asserts. An example of this 
kind of context would be a discussion on the building of GPS navigation devices. 
One could wonder how these devices became so useful, and someone could answer 
the question by pointing out that this is partly due to the fact that we have begun 
to understand the effects of gravitational deflection. If the observation of deflection 
had not been made, we might still have inaccuracies in these devices and they 
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would not be as useful as they are. We would attempt to find the cause of the mal-
function of the devices in places it does not exist. Thus, it is significant that our 
thinking is no longer limited by assumptions based on a Euclidean view of space. 
In this way, it becomes clear that there exists a hidden structure in our definition of 
significant feature F that is given by the context of discussion: F is that the observation 
of gravitational deflection has been incorporated into our thinking and F*, the significant 
alternative, is that we do not use the concept of gravitational deflection in our thinking in 
the problem situation which we face in the modern world. 
The last point is important since it counters the following argument:  
Every feature of science is dependent on a previous event, and this event 
is again based on some previous event, and so on. Moreover, even if we 
ignore all the trivial factors that present science depends on (such as the 
existence of humankind), every event in the given chain is a contingent 
event and these contingencies add up to a highly contingent present sit-
uation. For example, the observation of gravitational deflection was de-
pendent on the formulation of Einstein’s theory; the formulation of Ein-
stein’s theory was dependent on the physics of the nineteenth century; 
the physics of the nineteenth century was dependent on the work of 
Newton; and so on. The chain could have broken at any point, and thus 
it is a great coincidence that we have observed gravitational deflection. 
First, it must be noted that this kind of thinking is flawed. Causal chains in the 
world do not work in this neat manner. There are situations of overdetermination, 
pre-emption, non-transitive causal chains and overlapping causal chains that make 
this kind of argumentation simply naïve.201 
                                                 
201 James Woodward’s Making Things Happen is a good place to become familiar with these is-
sues and the complexity of causal thinking and philosophy of causation. 
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Secondly, and more substantially, this argument can be overcome by simply 
pointing out that if Newtonian mechanics, for example, had never developed, then 
there would not be a theoretical framework against which the consequences of not 
having evidence for gravitational deflection could arise. If we had not dealt with 
the actual questions of physics, then the thinking process that uses knowledge of 
gravitational deflection would not exist, nor would the thinking processes that take 
the absence of gravitational deflection as a serious possibility (a process like this 
would be the futile search for the causes of the malfunctioning of GPS navigation 
devices). In the absence of physics, lacking one piece of data would be the least of 
our concerns. To summarize, the counterfactual situations in which an alternative 
feature F* is assumed to be part of science must be somewhat close to our actual 
situation. Otherwise the differences between the features of our actual science and 
the interesting alternatives to these would not be meaningful. As Rouse puts it: 
“Differing judgments about scientific significance thus matter well beyond whether 
they lead to differences in accepted truth claims. We need to ask which accepted 
beliefs matter to science, and how they matter.”202 
To ask whether science could have been different is to ask whether or not it 
could have been different in an interesting way. Asking whether science could have 
been different in an interesting way is not the same thing as asking whether science 
today could have been fundamentally different or missing altogether. Only histor-
ical studies that show the degree of contingency of the things that we find signifi-
cant in science can increase our reflective understanding of this question. 
 
                                                 
An example (not from Woodward): My soccer team’s losing to ManU depends on the goal they 
scored in the first minute. This depends on my team’s inability to stop the attack. However, 
had we been able to stop the attack earlier, ManU would still have scored a goal in the second 
minute (by understanding our defense better) and my team would have lost anyway.  
202 Rouse, “Laws, Scientific Practice, and the Contingency/Inevitability Question,” 320. 
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 Contingency, Counterfactuals and the Relevance of Historiog-
raphy 
Historical Contingency: The Nature of Relevant Initial Conditions 
The concepts of contingency and necessity are widely discussed in the philos-
ophy of history. One definition closely similar to the one presented in this paper is 
that of Yemima Ben-Menahem. According to Ben-Menahem, “contingency (neces-
sity) varies in magnitude: the greater (smaller) the sensitivity to initial conditions, 
the greater the degree of contingency (necessity).”203 To reiterate: 
Contingency: Similar causes lead to different types of effects. High sensitivity to initial 
conditions.  
Necessity: Different types of causes lead to similar effects. Low sensitivity to initial con-
ditions.204 
However, there are remarkable differences between the definition of this pa-
per and the definition of Ben-Menahem. First, my definition of contingency does 
not require that similar causes lead to different outcomes. 205  The factor Z that 
would have led to F* does not need to be similar to Y in order for there to be con-
tingency. All that is needed is that Z is not far-fetched.206 Secondly, even if different 
types of causes lead to similar effects, this does not mean that science is inevitable. 
                                                 
203 Yemima Ben-Menahem, “Historical contingency,” Ratio 10:2 (1997), 102. 
204 Ibid., 101. 
205 Notice that also Soler’s definition (section 2) mentions more or less the same initial condi-
tions. 
206 There does not seem to be any reason to equate similarity and non-far-fetchedness. Pulling 
the trigger of a gun and merely holding a finger on the trigger are very similar events. Yet the 
pulling of the trigger can be a far-fetched alternative in a situation where an experienced and 
trustworthy police officer holds their finger on the trigger. 
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In my framework, this similarity of effects can still mean that there are some inter-
esting differences between them, and thus there can exist contingency. Similarly, 
even if the effects are very different, this does not automatically mean that one is 
an interesting alternative to the other. A great advantage of my framework is that 
it makes explicit what differences and similarities we are interested in. We do not 
need to find out the general properties of the causal structures in history to gain 
knowledge of the contingency of features we are interested in. We can focus on the 
structures and features we are interested in. 
 
Reconsidering Counterfactual History 
It is important to make note of how the contrastive explanations based on 
counterfactuals differ from what is known as study of counterfactual histories. In these 
studies, an event C is assumed to be the cause of an event E and the question one 
tries to answer is: What would have happened had C not occurred,207 or more gen-
erally, what could have happened had certain things been different in the past? On 
the other hand, the formulation of a contrastive explanation begins by specifying 
the relevant alternatives to the event E and proceeds to find out which alternatives 
(C*) of C would have led to some relevant alternative (E*) to E. Although studies of 
counterfactual histories can achieve the conclusion that science would be interest-
ingly different had certain things been different, this is not guaranteed. The reason-
ing could also lead to the conclusion that science would be different, but not inter-
estingly so, or to the conclusion that science would not be different. 
This means that my framework offers an energy-efficient way of approaching 
questions of contingency. When we first specify what differences we are interested 
in and then proceed backwards in history to the causes of these differences (rather 
than forwards, as in the study of counterfactual history), we are able to bypass a 
                                                 
207 Maar, “Possible uses of counterfactual thought experiments in history,” 88. 
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variety of considerations that do not have direct relevance to understanding the 
contingency of science in particular cases. 
 
The Value of Existing Historiography in a Philosophical Debate 
The C–I debate has produced and highlighted many excellent historical stud-
ies that are relevant to the issue of contingency.208 The debate has shown that good 
historical work is extremely useful in approaching the issue of the contingency of 
science. Nevertheless, once we are interested in generalizing the questions on the 
contingency of science to a vast range of issues that historians of science are inter-
ested in, a general framework that tells us how we can approach questions of con-
tingency needs to be in place. There are two reasons for this. First, historians of 
science have produced high quality works. It is advantageous to have a framework 
that can be used to extract relevant points from these works; there is no need to wait 
for studies that directly intend to discuss the degree of contingency of a particular 
feature of science. Secondly, the framework can work as a tool in the historical re-
search that discusses such questions. Due to its complete generality, it can unify the 
structures of such studies. We also saw above that my framework is energy efficient. 
Moreover, since historical case studies in the philosophy of science face difficult 
                                                 
208 See examples in footnote 10. 
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methodological issues,209 the possibility of using historical studies that are made 
independently of the issue of contingency is an advantage.210  
 Conclusion 
In this paper, I formulated a framework that helps us discuss the degree of 
contingency of any feature of science in which a historian of science might be inter-
ested.  While this framework does not give a perfect algorithm to solve questions 
of contingency, it nevertheless tells us which types of questions to ask and what to 
consider when approaching questions of contingency. The framework also shows 
the place of our evaluations of significance in questions of contingency. Some alter-
natives to science are more interesting than others, and we should focus on those 
interesting alternatives. Furthermore, the framework shows how already existing 
historical studies can provide insights into questions of contingency. Although the 
framework is a very general one, it is humble in one important sense: we can ap-
proach the contingency of science only in a piecemeal manner, asking whether this 
or that particular feature of science could be interestingly different.  
                                                 
209 See Katherina Kinzel, “Narrative and evidence. How can case studies from the history of 
science support claims in the philosophy of science?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
Part A 49 (2015), 48–57; and 
Joseph C. Pitt, “The Dilemma of Case Studies: Toward a Heraclitian Philosophy of Science,” 
Perspectives on Science 9:4, 373–382. 
210 Of course, there does not exist a perfectly objective historical study, and historical research 
can benefit from the discussions on contingency and inevitability, as Soler argues in “Introduc-
tion. The Contingentist/Inevitabilist Debate: Current State of Play, Paradigmatic Forms of 
Problems and Arguments, Connections to More Familiar Philosophical Themes,” Science as It 
Could Have Been, 22–23, and as is argued in this paper. However, it is still useful to be able to 
use historical studies that are made independently of the debate. They are probably the most 
objective ground that we may wish to have.  
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9 CONCLUSION 
 Historiography of Science Is Not a Sui Generis 
In this book, I have argued that there are many advantages if we consider 
explanations in historiography of science as exhibitions of patterns of counterfac-
tual dependencies. Moreover, I argued that an explanation can be warranted in his-
toriography of science if and only if X is a part of the explanatory resources of the 
field. Since historiography of science shares the same stock of explanatory resources 
with sciences and other disciplines, historiography of science shares both the struc-
ture of explanations and the explanatory knowledge with other explanation-seek-
ing fields. If we accept the framework formulated in this book, historiography of 
science does not differ in any fundamental way from other fields of inquiry. From 
the traditional philosophical perspective, one controversial consequence is that his-
torical explanations do not provide understanding of a unique kind; historical un-
derstanding is not a sui generis. The sui generis view is exemplified in the following 
claims: 
[The main task of a historian] is to think himself into [the action under investigation], to 
discern the thought of its agent. [--] To discover that thought is already to understand it. 
After the historian has ascertained the facts, there is no further process of inquiring into 
their causes. (Collingwood, 1974, 25). 
Historical understanding (verstehen) has to do with grasping the intentional content at-
tached to human actions. (Bevir 2007, 259). 
We have seen that basically everything in the universe, from reasons to values 
to electrons, can be explanatorily relevant in historiography of science, not only 
thoughts or intentional contents, no matter how widely these are defined. The ques-
tion, how did we arrive at such view, arises. Answering the question is useful as it 
helps to understand the philosophical content of this book.  
The crucial move was made in Chapters 2 and 3 where it was argued that both 
(i) the developments in the historiography of science and (ii) philosophical consid-
erations show that the idea that there have been sciences (with era-specific features) in 
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the past is no longer sustainable in historiography of science. In order to avoid the 
impasse, I suggested that which events count as a part of the history of science does 
not depend on how those events can be conceptualized but on their relations to the 
present science: In the presentist approach, the backbone of the history of science is 
the causal connection to the present science. Further justification for the presentist 
approach was due to its ability to solve many historiographical problems (Section 
3.4) and due to its ability to work as a tool in the historiographical thinking. The 
presentist approach clashes with the sui generis view because historical understand-
ing is provided by patterns of counterfactual dependences between the present and 
the past. This implies that the target is no longer to understand different ways of 
thought in the past. If that were our target, we would need to define what makes 
some thought a scientific thought.  
Notice that I am not claiming that there cannot be historiography that is fun-
damentally about thoughts and intentional content. My argument is that such his-
toriography is not suited for understanding the history of science. Throughout this 
book I have argued that there are questions that can be answered only if science is 
located in the causal nexus of the universe. The fundamental reason for this is that 
science, whatever its exact nature, is connected to the causal nexus of the universe 
for the very reason that it attempts to gain knowledge of that universe. Neither am 
I claiming that thoughts or intentional content are irrelevant in historiography of 
science. They do deserve their place in the picture that emerges. Discerning 
thoughts and grasping the intentional content are also methodologically indispen-
sable. 
In Chapter 4, we saw that historiography of science should provide under-
standing about the significant features of science. I argued that since we have a plu-
rality of values and preferences, historiography of science should shed light on 
many features of science. The significant features also belong to different kinds 
(such as social, epistemological and cultural). The heterogeneity in the significant 
features is important because it implies that historiography of science must include 
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a variety of explanatory resources to explain them. The unfeasibility of the sui gen-
eris view is already present in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 5, I discussed why a completely general account of explanations 
in historiography of science is needed. The main reason was is that such an account 
can capture important perspectives within the field which are often seen as sepa-
rated by insurmountable barriers. Philosophical debates on the nature of historiog-
raphy of science have generated unjustified distinctions, confusions, and unneces-
sary restrictions that can be removed with such general account. In Chapter 6, such 
an account was formulated. It was built on the notions of counterfactuals and con-
trastive explanations. The account connects the explanations in historiography of 
science structurally to explanations in other fields and every-day life: Explanatory 
strategies in historiography of science are the same as in everyday life and in other 
fields of inquiry. Within the account, we were able to define important notions such 
as competing explanations and explanatory depth. Moreover, I argued that historiog-
raphy of science, if it is to have a sound and progressive methodology, must share 
the same explanatory resources with other fields of inquiry. Knowledge in histori-
ography of science and knowledge in other fields of inquiry cannot be separated. 
In Chapter 7 the account developed earlier was used to explicate one central notion 
in historiography of science, that of local explanation. Within the chapter, I used cases 
from existing historiography of science to further illustrate ideas developed in ear-
lier chapters. 
In Chapter 8, the explicit framework on the role and nature of causal explana-
tion in historiography of science was applied to a question (both philosophical and 
historiographical) of contingency/ the inevitability of science. This chapter, as well 
as Chapter 7, indicated that the theory of explanations developed in the earlier 
chapters has serious value as an analytical tool. 
In conclusion, this book established the close connections between historiog-
raphy of science and other areas of human understanding. Both the explanatory strat-
egies and the explanatory resources of historiography of science are shared with other fields 
of inquiry. 
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 From  the  past  to  the  present  and  beyond 
In this book, we have seen how the present-centered historiography of science, 
equipped with a suitable notion of causal explanation, enables us to see the value 
and prospects of historiography of science. First, we saw how being openly present-
centered revives the coherence and importance of the field known as historiog-
raphy of science. Secondly, we saw how reflection on significant features of science, 
based on values and preferences, enables historiography of science to remain a 
widely interesting discipline and to avoid biased studies. Thirdly, we saw how con-
trastive and counterfactual notion of causal explanation can guide and clarify his-
toriographical studies. We also saw how to decide what kinds of factors should be 
incorporated in the explanatory resources of historiography of science. Finally, the 
last chapter described how the developments of science can be used to evaluate the 
contingency and necessity of our present science. We can conclude that this book is 
about building a bridge between the present and the past. 
It is interesting to notice that the conceptual framework developed in this 
book is also applicable to the studying the possible futures of science. First, the re-
flection on the significant feature of science, as a preference-based activity, can be 
oriented toward the future: we can ask what kind of science could be significant for 
us in the future. Moreover, the causal explanations and the explanatory resources 
that are used to connect the past developments to the present science can be also 
used to estimate what the future will be like or how we could achieve the kind of 
future we prefer. For example, if we know why X rather than Y is the case now, we 
know what would have led to Y. If we know this, we can perhaps build a situation 
that leads to the Y in the future. Therefore, causal knowledge of the past, if struc-
tured the way suggested in this book, can be highly valuable in practice. This op-
portunity of futurizing the science studies should be taken seriously. However, the 
exact details of that project must wait for later studies.  
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